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 This dissertation focuses on a simple question: When, if ever, did the British Empire end? 
Over the past several decades, historians have argued that British decolonization was 
characterized by a series of quick and uncontested transfers of sovereignty from colony to 
nation-state, all ending in 1968. They pointed to several domestic events to substantiate this 
argument, including the merger of the Commonwealth and Foreign Offices and the drawdown of 
British troops “East of Suez.” But I argue that this historiographical consensus was based on 
limited sources left over after a deliberate purge. In the 1960s, British officials censored and 
destroyed colonial archives in an effort to mask the empire’s historical indiscretions—from 
forced labor and racial discrimination to torture and murder. Amid the high-stakes contest of the 
Cold War, the objective of this official policy (known as “Operation Legacy”) was to protect 
Britain’s international reputation and to validate the empire’s whole reason for being—the 
so-called “civilizing mission.” Operation Legacy was thus part of a deliberate and largely 
successful effort to shape the way ordinary people would come to imagine the British Empire: as 
a fixture of the past, not a central concern of their present and future. 
 This politicized effort to set an endpoint of empire had the effect of marginalizing those 
colonial issues that remained unresolved—an assumption which translated into the 
historiography. Historians cast the people, places, and issues of the late empire as outliers,
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disconnecting them from their wider history. Focusing on three such late imperial crises in the 
early 1980s—the independence of Zimbabwe, the Falklands War, and the “patriation” of the 
Canadian constitution—I demonstrate that Britain’s ragged constitutional and legal 
decolonization lasted well past 1968. I show that decolonization left indelible marks on British 
political culture. Indeed, Margaret Thatcher’s Britain was forged against the backdrop of 
sustained late imperial crisis. 
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When Margaret Thatcher died in April 2013, Natwar Singh, a one-time diplomat and 
Indian Cabinet minister, recalled his most memorable interaction with the former British prime 
minister. In 1975, a few months after she was elected as leader of the Conservative Party, 
Singh—then India’s deputy high commissioner in London—visited Thatcher in her 
parliamentary office. He was there to pass along a message: the noted Indian spiritual leader 
Chandraswami wanted to meet her.1 Would she be willing to sit down with him? Singh could 
offer no explanation as to why the guru had sought Thatcher out. But to his great surprise, she 
agreed to a quick introduction. “If you think I should meet him,” Thatcher replied, “I shall.”2 
On the appointed date and time, Singh found himself escorting Chandraswami into the 
Palace of Westminster. He wore what the diplomat recalled as his “sadhu kit”—the clothes of a 
holy man, with a large tilak on his forehead and beads around his neck. Increasingly embarrassed 
by the spectacle, Singh admonished Chandraswami for banging his long wooden staff on the 
ground as he walked.3 But once ushered into Thatcher’s small office, the guru’s behavior became
                                                        
1 I conform to the spelling of Chandraswami used by Singh. For more information on the man, see his obituary in 
the New York Times: Ellen Barry, “Chandraswamy, Who Fell from Favor as a Guru to Celebrities, Dies at 66,” New 
York Times, 2 June 2017. 
2 K. Natwar Singh, Walking with Lions: Tales from a Diplomatic Past (Delhi: Harper Collins India, 2013), 175. His 
story was first published in The Hindu at the time of Thatcher’s death. See Singh, “Thatcher, Chandraswami and I,” 
The Hindu, 9 August 2013, https://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/thatcher-chandraswami-and-
i/article4595546.ece. I am grateful to Susan Pennybacker for this reference. For a video of Singh recounting the tale, 
see “How godman Chandraswami got Margaret Thatcher to wear a talisman,” 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8h7-ENrKPgk (accessed 21 January 2019).  
3 Ibid., “Thatcher, Chandraswami and I,” The Hindu, 9 August 2013. 
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even more eccentric. He asked for a piece of paper, which he then tore into five strips. Because 
he could not speak English, Chandraswami relied on Singh to translate his instructions to 
Thatcher. He told her to write down five questions on the scraps of paper and to crumple each of 
them up. As the guru entered a trance and unrolled the first wad, Singh recalled that Thatcher sat 
with “scarcely camouflaged irritation.”4 But after Chandraswami correctly recited her question—
word for word, from a language he couldn’t read—Thatcher’s annoyance turned to subdued 
curiosity. When, in turn, he translated each of the four remaining questions, she had been 
thoroughly won over. “Like Oliver Twist,” Singh remembered, “she asked for more,” convinced 
that this Indian holy man had a special gift—perhaps even the ability to see into the future.5  
Chandraswami duly took off his sandals and sat in the lotus position on the sofa. “Mrs. 
Thatcher seemed to approve,” Singh recalled, as if this was the expected behavior of an Indian 
guru. She began to pepper him with questions. After several minutes, Chandraswami suddenly 
roused himself and declared that, as the sun had set, he could no longer respond to her queries. 
Crestfallen, Thatcher asked to see him again. While the guru agreed, he strictly dictated the terms 
of their next meeting. He would see her at midday at Singh’s London home. More boldly, 
Chandraswami asked Thatcher to wear a red dress for the occasion. He also produced a talisman 
on what Singh described as a “not-so-tidy piece of string;” she should wear it on her left wrist. 
Again, to the diplomat’s shock, the normally harried leader of the opposition readily agreed to all 
of these demands.6  
                                                        
4 Ibid., Walking with Lions, 176. 
5 Ibid., “Thatcher, Chandraswami and I,” The Hindu, 9 August 2013. 
6 Ibid., Walking with Lions, 177. 
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On the selected day, Margaret Thatcher appeared at the deputy high commissioner’s 
home, clad in crimson, with the grubby talisman affixed to her arm. With greetings exchanged, 
she quickly got down to business, asking the key question: “When will I become Prime 
Minister?” The guru predicted that Thatcher would enter 10 Downing Street in 1978 or 1979 and 
that her tenure would last for either nine, eleven, or thirteen years. Elected in May 1979, she 
would go on to serve for eleven and a half years.7 
At first glance, Thatcher’s peculiar interaction with Chandraswami seems out of character 
and context. For the faithful Methodist, committed to a conservative worldview and policies, and 
guilty of invoking frequent racist dog whistles to the more extreme elements of her base, 
Margaret Thatcher hardly seems to have been the type of politician who would have entertained 
the likes of Chandraswami. Indeed, this image of Thatcher as somehow divorced from any 
interest in the British Empire and its legacies was reflected in political commentary from the 
1980s. While the academic Stephen Haseler admitted in 1989 that Thatcher’s formative years 
were “suffused with the belief that she belonged to the most powerful country in the world, a role 
secured by Empire,” he did not believe this context had any influence on her time as prime 
minister. “Her political style and opinions were not formed in the schools of Empire,” he wrote, 
adding that “her womanhood, together with her Grantham public sector education, would not 
have taught her that she was born to rule.” She and the Labour leader Neil Kinnock represented 
Britain’s first truly “post-imperial leaders.”8 Haseler’s obviously fraught judgment, not least on 
                                                        
7 Ibid, 178-79. 
8 Stephen Haseler, The Battle for Britain: Thatcher and the New Liberals (London: IB Tauris, 1989), 91. See the 
following political commentaries from the 1980s, notable for their lack of discussions on the late empire or the 
Commonwealth: Peter Jenkins, Mrs. Thatcher’s Revolution: The Ending of the Socialist Era (London: Jonathan 
Cape, 1987); Peter Riddell, The Thatcher Decade: How Britain Has Changed during the 1980s (Oxford: Basil 
Blackwell, 1989); Shirley Robin Letwin, The Anatomy of Thatcherism (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction Publishers, 
1993).  
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gender roles, nevertheless represented the popular image of Thatcher in the 1980s as removed 
from the British Empire and Commonwealth, hostile to it, and operating in a definitively “post” 
imperial world.9  
These threads have persisted in the public imagination. For example, in Peter Morgan’s 
2013 play The Audience, which showcased Queen Elizabeth’s weekly meetings with each of her 
prime ministers since the coronation in 1953, the scene featuring Thatcher centers on her 
apparent loathing of the Commonwealth. Britain could not become great again “through political 
fraternization with unreliable tribal leaders in ethnic costumes,” a strident Thatcher declares to 
the Queen, played by Helen Mirren; instead, the path to greatness was through a “revitalized 
economy” at home.10 According to this enduring argument, Thatcher was too busy doing battle 
with coal miners or the European Commission to spare any time for the frivolities of empire, or 
the little that was left of it. 
But Thatcher’s death also occasioned another event—the publication of her authorized 
biography. Mining her family archive, the former Telegraph editor and journalist Charles Moore 
discovered that the young Margaret Roberts had a longstanding interest in India, excited by her 
early exposure to Rudyard Kipling at school and regular interactions with missionaries from the 
subcontinent, all in her hometown of Grantham. She later expressed to her father a desire to join 
                                                        
9 While probably not agreeing with the tone of Haseler’s intervention, the historian Stephen Howe’s opinion of the 
period is similar. There is still “some room for doubt” as to whether the Thatcher years and the late empire were 
connected in any meaningful way—“beyond a heterogeneous list of minor residues,” he wrote in 2003. Stephen 
Howe, “Internal Decolonization? British Politics Since Thatcher as Post-colonial Trauma,” Twentieth Century 
British History 14, 3 (January 2003), 236. He also doubts that the Falklands played any role in Thatcher’s 1983 
reelection, though this point is hotly debated. For a helpful discussion of the so-called “Falklands Factor,” see Eric 
Hobsbawm, “Falklands Fallout,” Marxism Today (January 1983): 13-19. For more on Howe’s views of 
decolonization and the Thatcher era, see Howe, “Decolonization and Imperial Aftershocks: The Thatcher Years,” in 
Making Thatcher’s Britain, eds. Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2012): 234-252. 
10 Peter Morgan, The Audience (London: Faber and Faber, 2013), 76. 
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the Indian Civil Service, and, in 1949, at age 24, she even sent off an application to the Colonial 
Office.11  
Thatcher’s fascination with India endured into her political career. During her 1975 
Conservative Party leadership challenge to Edward Heath, she compared herself to Indian Prime 
Minister Indira Gandhi, whom she called “a delightful person.”12 And after her own election as 
prime minister in 1979, when Thatcher received a warm letter of congratulations from Gandhi, 
then out of office, she quickly sent back a note of thanks. Over the two countries’ long historical 
engagement, Thatcher wrote, Britain had learned much from India. “Now we must teach 
Europe!” she added.13  
Thatcher never lost her esteem for Britain’s ostensibly liberal empire and its so-called 
civilizing mission. In a television interview with Miriam Stoppard in 1985, when questioned as 
to whether she had always been motivated to serve her country, Thatcher immediately reached 
for the empire. “Oh yes, yes,” she declared. “We were so proud of our country. We really were 
and we knew about Canada, we knew about Australia, and we knew about South Africa, we 
knew about New Zealand, and we knew about India.” Her conception of nationalism went far 
beyond the nation-state, extending to the imagined community that had once so clearly 
encompassed the British Empire.14 Of course, Thatcher’s early interests and prolonged 
                                                        
11 Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher: From Grantham to the Falklands, vol. I (New York: Knopf, 2013), 75. 
12 Ibid, 287. 
13 Margaret Thatcher to Indira Gandhi, 7 May 1979, THCR 3/2/1, Churchill Archives Center (henceforth, CAC), 
also available from the Margaret Thatcher Foundation (henceforth MTF), “MT: MT letter to Prime Minister Gandhi 
of India (thanks for message of congratulations),” https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/119076.  
14 Thatcher, “TV Interview for Yorkshire Television Woman to Woman,” 2 October 1985, MTF, 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/105830. See the interview footage at “Margaret Thatcher rare interview 
with Miriam Stoppard 1985,” https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=f_2IdNRTpOo (accessed 12 February 2019). 
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engagement with the empire do not absolve her from the dire consequences of her policies as 
prime minister, not least her firm stance against imposing sanctions on the South African regime. 
But her time in office was nevertheless saturated with the concerns of the late empire.  
This precis of Thatcher and her relationship to India and empire serves a wider purpose. 
The conflicting portrayals of Thatcher from Natwar Singh and Stephen Haseler demonstrate a 
profound issue with the way we have come to conceptualize British imperial history since 
1945—namely, the problem of periodization. We tend to think of the “end of empire” as having 
occurred in the late 1960s—a decade that acts as a hinge between a wholly colonial past and a 
postcolonial future. This deeply engrained paradigm is one of the reasons why, at first, the 
Thatcher/Chandraswami parley seems so counterintuitive.  
In this study, I ask how such a conceptual framework developed, reflecting on the factors 
that have shaped the prevailing historical narratives (either consciously or unconsciously) of 
British decolonization. This study is guided by a simple question: When, if ever, did the British 
Empire end?15 While historians have been reluctant to incorporate the 1980s into a much longer 
narrative of the British Empire, I argue that the recurring late imperial crises of the decade, 
especially in the tenuous early years of Margaret Thatcher’s premiership, had a deep and lasting 
influence in British political culture. This study focuses on three such issues between 1979 and 
1982—the independence of Zimbabwe, the Falklands War, and the “patriation” of the Canadian 
constitution—to show that the politics of late empire and of early Thatcherism were intimately 
                                                        
15 For useful reflections on this question, see Stuart Hall, “When Was ‘the Post-Colonial’? Thinking at the Limit,” in 
The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons, eds. Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti (London: 
Routledge, 1996): 242-260; Dane Kennedy, Decolonization: A Very Short Introduction (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2016); Ashley Jackson, “Empire and Beyond: The Pursuit of Overseas National Interests in the Late 
Twentieth Century,” English Historical Review 122, 499 (December 2007): 1350-1366; Michael Denning, Noise 
Uprising: The Audiopolitics of a World Musical Revolution (London: Verso, 2015). 
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intertwined. In the end, Thatcher’s Britain was forged against the backdrop of sustained late 
imperial crisis.  
 
Narrating the “End” of Empire 
Since the 1960s, the dominant portrayal of decolonization and the “end of empire,” both 
in the public imagination and in the historiography, has been as a series of political transfers of 
sovereignty from colony to nation-state.16 This vision cast the process of decolonization as quick, 
orderly, and successfully completed by the late 1960s—perhaps best encapsulated by the 
ubiquitous flag-raising ceremonies that took place on the parade grounds of empire. In these 
rituals, invariably performed in front of lesser members of the Royal family, color guards hauled 
down the Union Jack and hoisted up the flags of newly independent nation-states in its place.17 
This spectacle, or what the historian Michael Collins has called “flag independence,” came to 
represent the nation-state as the central goal of decolonization.18 
                                                        
16 See Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share: A Short History of British Imperialism, 1850-1970 (London: Longman, 
1977), 235; John Gallagher, The Decline, Revival and Fall of the British Empire: The Ford Lectures and Other 
Essays (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2004; first published 1982); Max Beloff, Imperial Sunset, vol. 2: Dream of 
Commonwealth, 1921-42 (London: Macmillan, 1989); John Darwin, Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from 
Empire in the Post-War World (London, 1988); David Reynolds, Britannia Overruled: British Policy and World 
Power in the Twentieth Century (London: Longman, 1991); Lawrence James, The Rise and Fall of the British 
Empire (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1996), 622; L.J. Butler, Britain and Empire: Adjusting to a Post-Imperial 
World (London: I.B. Tauris, 2002); Niall Ferguson, Empire: The Rise and Demise of the British World Order and 
the Lessons for Global Power (New York: Basic Books, 2002); Dietmar Rothermund, The Routledge Companion to 
Decolonization (London: Routledge, 2006); Dominic Sandbrook, Never Had It So Good: A History of Britain from 
Suez to the Beatles (London: Abacus, 2006), 276-308; Ronald Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire: The Road to 
Decolonization, 1918-1968 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2006), 329; Darwin, “Britain’s Empires,” in The British 
Empire: Themes and Perspectives, ed. Sarah Stockwell (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008): 1-20; Brian Harrison, Seeking a 
Role: The United Kingdom, 1951-1970 (Oxford: Clarendon, 2009), 101-114; ; Darwin, The Empire Project: The 
Rise and Fall of the British World-System (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2009); Darwin, Unfinished Empire: The 
Global Expansion of Britain (New York: Bloomsbury, 2012).  
17 On the spectacle of independence ceremonies, see Robert Holland, Susan Williams, and Terry Barringer, eds., The 
Iconography of Independence: “Freedoms at Midnight” (New York: Routledge, 2010). 
18 Michael Collins, “Decolonization,” in The Encyclopedia of Empire, ed. John A. Mackenzie (Hoboken, NJ: John 
Wiley and Sons, 2015), https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/9781118455074.wbeoe360. 
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In the wake of the Suez crisis and Harold Macmillan’s 1960 remark that the “wind of 
change” was blowing through colonial Africa, the enduring image of the proliferation of 
Westminster-style parliamentary democracies around the world also served the interests of the 
British state. By claiming to have delivered colonies to political “modernity” on European terms, 
the British government validated its long-held justification of the imperial project—its so-called 
“civilizing mission.” This “colony to nation-state” narrative was politically useful, helping to 
occlude the violence and intrigue of the 1950s and 1960s, from colonial emergencies in Malaya, 
Kenya, Cyprus, Aden, Northern Ireland, and beyond.19 According to this “light-switch view,” as 
the historian Frederick Cooper calls it, Britain’s imperial project was cast as a thing of the past.20 
  British politicians and officials could also point to a series of developments at home that 
served to underline the geopolitical shift they sought to emphasize abroad. In 1967, the UK 
government applied to join the European Economic Community, reorienting itself away from the 
former empire and toward the Common Market.21 And after a Sterling crisis forced the 
devaluation of the pound that autumn, Prime Minister Harold Wilson announced cuts in defense 
                                                        
19 As Dane Kennedy argues of empires, “It was obviously preferable to portray their loss of power as an act of 
altruism, [and] the realization of their longstanding claims that they were preparing their colonial charges for the 
responsibilities of self-government.” Dane Kennedy, Decolonization, 2-3. For work on violence and colonial 
emergencies, see Caroline Elkins, Imperial Reckoning: The Untold Story of Britain’s Gulag in Kenya (New York: 
Henry Holt, 2005); David Anderson, Histories of the Hanged: The Dirty War in Kenya and the End of Empire 
(London: New York, 2005); Benjamin Grob-Fitzgibbon, Imperial Endgame: Britain’s Dirty Wars and the End of 
Empire (London: Palgrave, 2011); Brian Drohan, Brutality in an Age of Human Rights: Activism and 
Counterinsurgency at the End of the British Empire (Cornell: Cornell UP, 2018).  
20 Frederick Cooper, Colonialism in Question: Theory Knowledge History (Berkeley: University of California Press, 
2005), 19. As Bernard Porter put it, “The fabric of the old empire had gone, now the frame which had taken its 
weight had gone too. There was nothing left but a few bricks and some shadows.” Porter, The Lion’s Share, 336. 
Porter first published these remarks in 1977; they have remained in the two subsequent editions of his historical 
survey, the latest in 2014. 
21 See Stuart Ward, “A Matter of Preference: The EEC and the Erosion of the Old Commonwealth Relationship,” in 
Britain, the Commonwealth and Europe: The Commonwealth and Britain’s Applications to Join the European 
Communities, ed. Alex May (Basingstoke: Palgrave, 2001): 156-180. 
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spending in January 1968, including the withdrawal of British armed forces “East of Suez.” A 
few months later, the Wilson government merged the remnants of the old colonial bureaucracy, 
by then called the Commonwealth Office, into the Foreign Office—creating the combined body 
that we know today: the Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO). Rhetorically, this collection 
of events established 1968 as the point on the timeline of empire between the colonial and 
postcolonial eras.22  
But this effort to delineate a single moment as the “end of empire” had the effect of 
marginalizing in the historical narrative the more than twenty colonies that remained part of the 
British Empire. Some of these territories—like British Honduras, the Falkland Islands, and 
Gibraltar—were the subject of competing sovereignty claims from neighboring nation-states, 
placing their residents in a perilous limbo. Several territories in the Caribbean and the Pacific 
were considered too sparsely populated for nation-statehood. With over three million residents, 
Hong Kong faced no such problem, but its future was uncertain given the looming expiration in 
1997 of Britain’s lease on the New Territories from China. Meanwhile, Britain continued to hold 
a large stake in the escalating conflicts of southern Africa. For example, successive British 
governments felt obligated to resolve the vexing conundrum of Rhodesia, a rogue white settler 
haven that had illegally declared independence in 1965 to head off the move to black majority 
rule. Rhodesia, however, defied any quick and simple British solutions. 
But Britain’s political and constitutional entanglements with the empire after 1968 were 
not limited to the remaining formal empire. In the 1970s and 1980s, London became a stage for 
                                                        
22 See, for example, Hyam, Britain’s Declining Empire, 329; Butler, Britain and Empire, 176-181; Harrison, 
Seeking a Role, 114; Porter, The Lion’s Share, 336; Colin Cross, The Fall of the British Empire, 1918-1968 (New 
York: Coward-McCann, Inc., 1969), 357. W. David McIntyre, The Commonwealth of Nations: Origins and Impact, 
1869-1971 (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1977), 350; David Goldsworthy, Losing the Blanket: 
Australia and the End of Britain's Empire (Melbourne: Melbourne UP, 2002), 157-58. 
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politicians and activists mobilized by unresolved imperial issues. Soon after independence, the 
Kenyan and Indian governments began to lodge protests in London, calling for the return of their 
archives, which the British state had stolen or destroyed to mask their well-documented histories 
of colonial indiscretions.23 At the same time, indigenous peoples from the former Dominions of 
Australia, New Zealand, and Canada regularly came to London after 1968 to make claims for 
sovereignty and rights on the British crown. Millions of British passport holders from around the 
world also sought to exercise their legal right of entry into Britain, despite successive 
governments’ best efforts to narrow the definition of citizenship. The empire—both Britain’s 
remaining formal colonies and an array of late imperial obligations and legal challenges at home 
and around the world—could not be shaken off so easily.  
Despite the continued urgency and immediacy of these issues, the FCO went to great 
lengths to ensure that the manufactured narrative of Britain’s successful decolonization took hold 
in the public imagination. For example, in 1969, Barry Smallman—an official at the FCO—
wrote to his colleagues about an upcoming BBC television series on the British Empire. 
Smallman was anxious about the screenwriters’ intention to “bring the series abruptly to an end 
at 1947.” He feared the popular impact of concluding the program with the violence of Indian 
partition, which would leave viewers “entirely with the wrong impression.” This endpoint 
ignored, to his mind, the success of the subsequent transition from Empire to Commonwealth 
after 1947. Was there any scope, he wondered, for “making the last part look forward rather than 
back?”24  
                                                        
23 Caroline Elkins, “Looking Beyond Mau Mau: Archiving Violence in the Era of Decolonization,” American 
Historical Review (June 2015): 852-868. 
24 The National Archives of the UK (henceforth, TNA): FCO 68/144, B.G. Smallman to B.D. Curson, “TV Series on 
the History of the British Commonwealth and Empire,” 9 September 1969. 
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In the end, the FCO successfully lobbied the BBC to add a further episode to the project. 
The series—The British Empire: Echoes of Britannia’s Rule—took two and a half years to 
produce and was released in January 1972. According to the Royal Commonwealth Society’s 
librarian, who took copious notes on the content of each episode, the final installment, entitled 
“The Setting of the Sun,” featured predictable references to the assumed benefits of empire—
education, railways, medicine, the rule of law, governance, and administration.25 In broad 
strokes, then, the episode supported Smallman’s wider contention that the empire had been a 
liberalizing force, bringing colonies to independence and modernity and ending in a partnership 
of equal nation-states. For another viewer, the Daily Mail’s Peter Black, the audience “got the 
impression that if only the British had behaved as sensibly in the previous one hundred years as 
they did in the last ten, the sun might still be complacently revolving around us.” 26  
The FCO’s response to the BBC documentary demonstrated how concerned officials 
were with narrating the story of empire. Whitehall could hardly have asked for a more politically 
useful portrayal. By the early 1970s, the British government had effectively underlined its 
contention that the UK had turned the page on empire.   
 
Flotsam on the Beach of History? 
In the immediate aftermath of the wave of national independences in the 1960s, historians 
generally shied away from writing the history of empire. As Fred Cooper notes, by the 1970s, 
                                                        
25 D.H. Simpson, “The BBC Empire Programme: Personal notes by the librarian, RCS,” 21 April 1972, RCMS 32/4, 
Royal Commonwealth Society Papers, Cambridge University Library Archives, Cambridge, UK. 
26 Peter Black, “Curious. . .I haven’t met any who said he liked this series!,” Daily Mail, 5 April 1972. 
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empire had become “one of the deadest of dead fields within history.”27 In the case of Africa, 
young historians avoided projects that centered on colonialism for fear of being seen to do 
“white” history.28 Indeed, the historian Dane Kennedy notes that, by this period, those still 
writing about colonial history were largely white men, trained in the style of Ronald Robinson 
and John Gallagher in the 1950s and 1960s.29 In contrast, and though they had other motives, 
many younger scholars readily agreed with the notion that the empire had ended in 1968. For 
their purposes, such a periodization supported a heroic narrative of nationalist resistance against 
the forces of colonial oppression.30 The independent nation-state thus became proof of the moral 
righteousness of global liberation struggles.31  
In the 1970s, popular history helped to fill the historiographical void. Works like Jan 
Morris’s Farewell the Trumpets: An Imperial Retreat, the last volume in her non-fiction trilogy 
on the history of the British Empire, reified the FCO’s argument that the empire had ended in a 
clean and definitive break in 1968. 32 For Morris, whose study was described by one reviewer in 
                                                        
27 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 13. See also Richard Aldrich and Stuart Ward, “Ends of Empire: Decolonizing 
the Nation in British and French Historiography,” in Nationalizing the Past: Historians as Nation Builders in 
Modern Europe, eds. Stefan Berger and Chris Lorenz (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 260.  
28 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 5. 
29 Dane Kennedy, “Postcolonialism and History,” in The Oxford History of Postcolonial Studies, ed. Graham 
Huggan (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2013), 469. 
30 For a schematic overview and criticism of this trend in the context of Rhodesia, see Luise White, Unpopular 
Sovereignty: Rhodesian Independence and African Decolonization (Chicago: Univ. of Chicago Press, 2015), ch. 1. 
See also Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 3. 
31 As Aldrich and Ward point out, one exception to the dearth in colonial history-writing came from J.G.A. Pocock. 
Aldrich and Ward, “Ends of Empire,” 262-256. In a 1973 lecture, subsequently published as an article in 1975, 
Pocock argued for a wider definition of “British” history to encompass white British settler communities around the 
world, like his native New Zealand—as opposed to a national history centered on England. J.G.A. Pocock, “British 
History: A Plea for a New Subject,” Journal of Modern History 47, 4 (Dec. 1975): 601-621. 
32 Jan Morris, Farewell the Trumpets: An Imperial Retreat (New York: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1978). See also, 
Percival Griffiths, Empire into Commonwealth (London: Ernest Benn, 1969).  
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the Observer as “magical” and by Tom Stoppard as one of the two best books of 1978, the 
remaining colonial possessions in the 1960s did not look impressive on world maps, once awash 
with the pink tones of British sovereignty.33 By 1970, the only remaining value of these far-flung 
places, Morris argued, was for the wandering Briton, who might “stumble upon such half-
forgotten relics and anachronisms.” They were places that still “retain[ed] some air of the 
imperial reassurance,” she wrote, “some promise of relative good manners, some suggestion of 
punctuality, or prospect of fish and chips.” But in the end, they were nothing more than “flotsam 
on the beach of history.”34  
Helping to cement the FCO narrative in the public mind, Farewell the Trumpets served to 
de-historicize the people, places, and unfinished business of the late British Empire. Stripped of 
their rightful position within a long narrative of empire, the remaining colonies and Britain’s 
other complicated geopolitical entanglements were replaced by Morris’s nostalgic understanding 
of a world sprinkled with British outposts of a bygone era. 
By the 1980s, historians were beginning to look anew at colonial history, especially with 
the corresponding growth in area studies.35 In 1987, the British Academy—in partnership with 
the Institute of Commonwealth Studies at the University of London, and funded by the 
Leverhulme Trust—commissioned the British Documents on the End of Empire (BDEEP) series. 
                                                        
33 See, Cyril Dunn, “Going, Going, Gone,” Observer, 13 August 1978; Tom Stoppard, quoted in “Books of the 
Year: Some Personal Choices,” Observer, 17 December 1978. 
34 Morris, Farewell the Trumpets, 532. Over twenty years later, Niall Ferguson also employed the “flotsam” 
metaphor. See Ferguson, Empire, 358. 
35 One of the significant historiographical debates in this era was over the extent to which ordinary British people 
were aware of, or affected by, the empire. For the affirmative view, see John A. Mackenzie, Propaganda and 
Empire: The Manipulation of British Public Opinion, 1860-1960 (Manchester: Manchester UP, 1986). For the 
contrary view, see Bernard Porter, The Lion’s Share, and Porter, The Absent-Minded Imperialists: Empire, Society 
and Culture in Britain (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2004). Stuart Ward later classified these opposing viewpoints as the 
“maximal” and “minimal” impact theses. See Stuart Ward, ed., British Culture and the End of Empire (Manchester: 
Manchester UP, 2001), 1-17. Both theses focused on culture over politics and economics. 
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This project produced volumes of annotated primary sources, each centering on a different 
sequential date range or geographic region. BDEEP’s renewed focus on the empire helpfully 
attuned historians’ discussions of metropolitan Britain to the changing geopolitical contexts of 
the postwar era, especially the role of the Cold War.  
But the project also created problems, not least in helping to entrench the well-established 
“end of empire” chronology. As the final volume was released in 2004, the nature of the UK’s 
thirty-year rule governing document declassification allowed the series editors only to pan back 
to 1971. This periodization gave the appearance that 1971 was the limit of British 
decolonization, even though one editor readily conceded that the question of when the empire 
ended was “open to interpretation.”36 The historian Caroline Elkins has been most critical of 
BDEEP, arguing that the series merely “reproduced [the archive’s] fictions and silences,” 
without properly problematizing them.37 One of these myths was the timeline of decolonization.  
The historian John Darwin was at the forefront of this 1980s reengagement with imperial 
history and soon became one of the most prolific authors on the subject. Darwin’s frequent 
publications have reinforced the position of the 1960s as the hinge on the imperial timeline. By 
1970, he wrote, the British Empire had been reduced to “a handful of rocky outposts (together 
with a tract of Antarctic waste).” Yet at the same time, he also recognized the intractability and 
serious nature of the issues of late empire. “We may be grateful that there were not more 
                                                        
36 S.R. Ashton, “Introduction,” in British Documents on the End of Empire, Series A, Volume 5, East of Suez and the 
Commonwealth, 1964-1971, Part I: East of Suez, eds. S.R. Ashton and Wm. Roger Louis (London, 2004), xxix-
cxxxiii. For another series editor, the project “allowed scholarship to continue within broadly familiar narratives 
without appearing stale.” Sarah Stockwell, “The Ends of Empire,” in The British Empire: Themes and Perspectives, 
ed. Sarah Stockwell (Oxford: Blackwell, 2008), 150. 
37 Elkins, “Looking Beyond Mau Mau,” 865.  
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Falklands or Gibraltars in the British Empire,” he argued.38 Carrying forward Morris’s 
invocation of a marine metaphor, in 1988, Darwin dismissed the remnants of empire as 
“limpets”—or small conical mollusks.39 Nearly twenty-five years later, he was still advocating 
that the British government’s “grand illusion” of a world role “crashed to earth in January 1968,” 
when Wilson announced his withdrawal East of Suez.40 In the aftermath, Britain’s remaining 
colonial possessions “[clung] like barnacles to the old hull of empire.”41  
The re-engagement with colonial history from people like John Darwin and initiatives 
like BDEEP came from more traditional quarters of the discipline, emphasizing political and 
economic narratives of change. But beginning in the 1990s, historians of empire began to engage 
fully with a new intellectual movement—postcolonial theory.42 Some historians found in 
postcolonialism a commitment to new sources and archives outside of the purview of the state, as 
well as an interest in difference—whether of race, gender, sexuality, or class. They also had a 
deep appreciation for the influence that the periphery had on the metropole.43  
                                                        
38 John [J.G.] Darwin, “The Fear of Falling: British Politics and Imperial Decline Since 1900,” Transactions of the 
Royal Historical Society, 36 (1986), 42. 
39 Darwin, Britain and Decolonization: The Retreat from Empire in the Post-War World (London: Palgrave, 1988), 
307.  
40 Darwin, Unfinished Empire, 343. 
41 Ibid, 380. Darwin finds the end of empire in the Second World War. The “long fuse [of the end of empire] was lit 
by [Britain’s] great geostrategic defeats in 1939-42.” See also, Darwin, The Empire Project: The Rise and Fall of the 
British World System, 1830 1970 (Cambridge, 2009). For a perceptive critique of Darwin, see Bill Schwarz, “An 
Unsentimental Education: John Darwin’s Empire,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth Studies 43, 1 (2015): 
125-144.  
42 They were also influenced by concurrent developments in postmodernist and feminist scholarships. See Michel 
Foucault, Discipline and Punish: The Birth of the Prison (New York: Pantheon Books, 1977); Joan Wallach Scott, 
“Gender: A Useful Category of Historical Analysis,” American Historical Review 91, 5 (1986): 1053-1075; Judith 
Butler, Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity (New York: Routledge, 1990).  
43 See Dane Kennedy, “Postcolonialism and History,” 469-488. 
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The literary and cultural critic Edward Said played an important role in motivating 
historians to re-think the empire. He argued that, from their earliest contacts, Europeans 
“othered” indigenous peoples as “savage” in their discourses and cultural formations, validating 
their presumed racial superiority and justifying their efforts to spread “civilization.” Said’s 
important intervention dovetailed with the work of cultural theorists like Stuart Hall and Paul 
Gilroy, who argued that colonialism had been and remained central to British peoples’ 
self-fashioning.44 For his part, the writer Salman Rushdie eloquently argued in 1983 that “four 
hundred years of conquest and looting, four centuries of being told that you are superior to the 
Fuzzy-Wuzzies and the wogs leave their stain.” He added that “this stain has seeped into every 
part of the culture, the language and daily life.”45  
For their efforts to break down the conceptual boundary between metropole and 
periphery, historians who invoked elements of postcolonial theory in their analyses of empire 
were identified as adherents of the “New Imperial History.”46 The knock-on effect of 
                                                        
44 See Stuart Hall, “A Question of Identity (Part II),” Guardian, 14 October 2000; Stuart Hall, and Bill Schwarz, ed., 
Familiar Stranger: A Life Between Two Islands (Durham, NC: Duke UP, 2017). Paul Gilroy, There Ain’t No Black 
in the Union Jack: The Cultural Politics of Race and Nation (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1991); Paul 
Gilroy, Postcolonial Melancholia (New York: Columbia University Press, 2006). 
45 Salman Rushdie, “The New Empire within Britain,” in Imaginary Homelands: Essays and Criticism 1981-1991 
(London: Granta Books, 1991; essay first published 1983), 130. 
46 See, for example, Antoinette Burton, Burdens of History: British Feminists, Indian Women, and Imperial Culture, 
1865-1915 (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press, 1994); Mrinalini Sinha, Colonial Masculinity: The 
“Manly Englishman” and the “Effeminate Bengali” in the Late Nineteenth Century (Manchester: Manchester UP, 
1995); Burton, At the Heart of the Empire: Indians and the Colonial Encounter in Late-Victorian (Berkeley: 
University of California Press, 1998); Kathleen Wilson, The Island Race: Englishness, Empire and Gender in the 
Eighteenth Century (New York: Routledge, 2002); Catherine Hall, Civilizing Subject Metropole and Colony in the 
English Imagination 1830-1867 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2002); Bill Schwarz, “‘Claudia Jones and 
the West Indian Gazette’: Reflections on the Emergence of Post-Colonial Britain,” Twentieth Century British 
History 14, 3 (January 2003): 264-285; Dipesh Chakrabarty, Provincializing Europe: Postcolonial Thought and 
Historical Difference (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2008); Ann Laura Stoler, Carnal Knowledge and Imperial Power: 
Race and the Intimate in Colonial Rule (Berkeley: University of California Press, 2010). For Stoler and Cooper’s 
influential call to historians to collapse the conceptual boundaries between metropole and colony, see Ann Laura 
Stoler and Frederick Cooper, “Between Metropole and Colony: Rethinking a Research Agenda,” in Tensions of 
Empire: Colonial Cultures in a Bourgeois World, eds. Frederick Cooper and Ann Laura Stoler (Berkeley: University 
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postcolonialism on historians of Britain after 1945 was thus to stress that, while the period of 
political and constitutional decolonization had ended in 1968, the lingering influence of empire 
was—first and foremost—in the mind.47 To some extent, then, the New Imperial History played 
to the established narrative and timeline of a 1960s decolonization that centered on “nationalist” 
struggles and the proliferation of the nation-state.48 
More recently, historians—influenced to greater or lesser degrees by postcolonial theory, 
postmodernism, and the cultural turn—have expanded the prevailing understanding of British 
decolonization beyond much more than simple “flag independence.” They focused on the ways 
in which imperial power was reformed and reconstituted in the postwar era.49 At the head of this 
trend, Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson argued in 1994 that the postwar years were 
characterized by the “imperialism of decolonization,” pointing to the British state’s efforts to 
maintain and even extend its political and economic power by means other than formal empire.50 
Other historians have located decolonization in hitherto unexplored spaces. Jordanna Bailkin, for 
                                                        
of California Press, 1997): 1-58. For a much-discussed critique of Said, which privileged an analysis of class over 
race, see David Cannadine, Ornamentalism: How the British Saw Their Empire (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2002). 
47 Though Cannadine’s Ornamentalism differs from much of the New Imperial History, he still declares that “the 
British Empire may have vanished from the map, but it has not entirely vanished from the mind.” Cannadine, 
Oranamentalism, 179. 
48 See Collins, “Decolonization,” 11.  
49 Historians and commentators from the former colonial empire had been aware of this all along. See, for instance, 
Kwame Nkrumah, Neo-Colonialism: The Last Stage of Imperialism (London: Thomas Nelson & Sons, 1965).  
50 But “the post-war Empire was more than British and less than imperium,” they argue, pointing to the growing 
influence of the United States. Wm. Roger Louis and Ronald Robinson, “The Imperialism of Decolonization,” 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 22, 3 (1994), 494. For Frederick Cooper’s discussion of the 
“gatekeeper state” in Africa, see Frederick Cooper, Africa Since 1940 (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2002), ch. 7. See 
also, Joseph M. Hodge, “British Colonial Expertise, Post-Colonial Careering and the Early History of International 
Development,” Journal of Modern European History 8, 1 (2010): 24-46; Jordanna Bailkin, The Afterlife of Empire 
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 2012); Mark Mazower, No Enchanted Palace: The End of Empire and the 
Ideological Origins of the United Nations (Princeton: Princeton UP, 2009). For how UK institutions “exercised their 
own ‘imperialism’ at the end of empire” by “embed[ding] specifically British practices and customs,” see Sarah 
Stockwell, The British End of the British Empire (Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 2018). 
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example, notes the interlinkage between the processes of decolonization and the creation of the 
British welfare state.51 Still, others have helpfully pushed the discussion into the former settler 
colonies, challenging the historical paradigms of the so-called “white Dominions.”52  
By calling into question the “when” and “where” of decolonization, historians naturally 
question what it meant as an historical process. In this effort, Fred Cooper’s interventions have 
proven most valuable to the debate. Cooper has challenged historians’ habit of treating the 
nation-state in the twentieth-century as an almost predestined geopolitical form. The politics of 
decolonization was always contested, Cooper argues, with activists mobilizing to back different 
visions of sovereignty and political rights—sometimes even working from within the structures 
of empire to try to achieve their goals.53 Cooper cites what he calls the “epochal fallacy” of 
trying to pin down a wholly coherent understanding of the “colonial” or “postcolonial” ages. 
Decolonization varied according to local circumstance, he argues, placing regions within empires 
on different trajectories.54 In the end, he helpfully states that historians must be attuned to the 
many “openings, closures and new possibilities” inherent in the process.55  
                                                        
51 Jordanna Bailkin, The Afterlife of Empire. For a discussion of the late imperial influences on urban planning and 
the postwar development of New Towns in the north of England, see Jesse Meredith, “Decolonizing the New Town: 
Roy Gazzard and the Making of Killingworth Township,” Journal of British Studies 57, 2 (April 2018): 333-362.  
52 See especially, A.G. Hopkins, “Rethinking Decolonization,” Past and Present 200 (2008): 211–47; Simon Potter, 
Broadcasting Empire: The BBC and the British World, 1922–1970 (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2012); James Curran and 
Stuart Ward, The Unknown Nation: Australia After Empire (Melbourne: Melbourne UP, 2011); Bill Schwarz, 
Memories of Empire, Vol. I: The White Man’s World (Oxford: Oxford UP, 2011). 
53 Cooper, Colonialism in Question, 23. Cooper’s analytical focus is on French West Africa, the politics of which 
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54 Ibid., 19 
55 Frederick Cooper, Citizenship Between Empire and Nation: Remaking France and French Africa, 1945-1960 
(Princeton: Princeton UP, 2014), 25. See also, Gary Wilder, Freedom Time: Negritude, Decolonization, and the 
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of Africa: Future Imperfect?, eds. Andrew W.M. Smith and Chris Jeppesen (London: UCL Press, 2017): 17-42. For 
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In challenging the established timeline of the “end of empire,” historians can consider 
decolonization for what it was—a series of contextual struggles for self-determination, often 
violently contested and complicated by complex geopolitical entanglements. In such 
circumstances, activists could even be moved to argue that, rather than the nation-state, 
continued association with the metropole offered the best possible hope of securing the goal of 
sovereignty and rights. Cooper’s intervention has opened up the field to a constructive discussion 
of late empire and long decolonization. As Sarah Stockwell has since argued, “to understand the 
full effects of empire and of British decolonization, we need to adopt a long perspective.”56 
 
The Late British Empire 
This study deconstructs a well-established historical narrative. It challenges the 
long-accepted timeline of the British Empire, tied to the rise of the nation-state, asking how and 
why officials in the 1960s constructed a very specific understanding of the end of empire. It also 
considers how this story seeped into the historiography and became the framework from which 
imperial historians later hung their well-crafted historiographical interventions.  
I argue that the widely recognized “end” of empire was hardly an end. Instead, 
decolonization was a long, messy, contested, and contextual political process. This study also 
contends that the 1970s and 1980s witnessed not only the “decolonization of the mind,” central 
                                                        
a critique of Cooper, see Samuel Moyn, “Fantasies of Federalism,” Dissent (Winter 2015), 
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Britain. “The admission of refugees from Vietnam [in 1978-79]—coming through the British colony of Hong 
Kong—was. . .not an ‘epilogue’ to decolonization, but part of it. In this sense, none of the camps discussed here 
were ‘after’ empire at all. The transformations of independence galvanized a new range and depth of entanglements, 
rather than bringing them to an end.” Bailkin, Unsettled: Refugee Camps and the Making of Multicultural Britain 
(Oxford: Oxford UP, 2018), 10.  
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to the arguments of postcolonial theorists and the New Imperial History, but also the continuing 
processes of political, constitutional, and legal decolonization. I focus on three regions—
Rhodesia/Zimbabwe, the Falkland Islands, and Canada—because the questions of their contested 
futures all came to the fore in the uniquely divisive moment of Margaret Thatcher’s first term in 
power: 1979-1983. In the case of Canada, I explore the grievances of Indigenous peoples, who 
felt exploited by Ottawa and excluded from ongoing discussions of constitutional reform.57 
These cases demonstrate the diversity of Britain’s colonial engagements—a rogue colony, a 
small dependent territory with no indigenous population, and a Dominion. Together, they formed 
a late imperial conjuncture, in which British ministers, MPs, and officials were forced to grapple 
daily with the geopolitical complications of contested decolonization. In Thatcher’s 
impressionable early years in power, in which the combination of ideology and doctrine later 
known as “Thatcherism” was ill-formed and unpopular within the party, London remained an 
epicenter for colonial activists and lobbying groups. It played host to constitutional conferences. 
And in the midst of this, the government mobilized Britain’s largest ever naval flotilla to fight a 
war with Argentina over a string of islands some eight thousand miles from home. Far from 
“flotsam on the beach of history,” this study shows how the people and places of the late empire 
left indelible marks on British political culture. 
This study begins by exploring one of the ways in which officials sought to advance the 
notion that the British Empire had ended peacefully and consensually in 1968. In 2009, a group 
of elderly Kenyans filed a civil suit against the British government in London’s High Court, 
                                                        
57 In Canada, the term “Indigenous” (capitalized) has specific political connotations, referring inclusively to Indian, 
Inuit, and Métis populations. I use “indigenous” (lower case) to refer more broadly to first peoples around the world, 
and the links between them. For a helpful discussion of terminologies, see Chelsea Vowel, Indigenous Writes: A 
Guide to First Nations, Métis, and Inuit Issues in Canada (Winnipeg: HighWater Press, 2016), ch. 1. 
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alleging that they had been unlawfully detained and tortured as part of Britain’s 
counterinsurgency strategy during the Mau Mau Uprising in the 1950s. Based on the expert 
testimonies of historians Caroline Elkins, David Anderson, and Huw Bennett, each of whom 
served as witnesses for the Kenyan claimants, a British judge ordered the UK government to 
produce all documents on the emergency that it was withholding—and, subsequently, a clerk 
“found” thousands of relevant files on the shelves of a covert records center at Hanslope Park. 
These files detailed an official government policy from the 1960s called “Operation Legacy”—a 
deliberate effort to cull the colonial archive of sensitive or objectionable records. While an 
unknown number of files was destroyed, the FCO later acknowledged that it had concealed 
archival material from 37 former British colonies, which it released in six batches between 2012 
and 2014.58 These tranches became known as the “Hanslope Disclosure.”  
In Chapter 1, I show how officials were “thinking historically” as they carried out the 
terms of Operation Legacy in an effort to influence the way British people, as well as future 
generations, would reflect on the empire. But they were not only destroying and occluding 
historical facts; they were also creating a new historical reality—one which glossed over regular 
instances of oppression, racial discrimination, and violence. Britain was a liberal empire and a 
benevolent colonizer, or so the story ran. Such efforts made even more sense in the context of 
Cold War paranoia, when British officials in Africa worried about what black political actors 
might do with unfettered access to the archives after independence.  
According to the state’s constructed reality, the British government had brought 
colonized peoples onto the international stage as equal inheritors of the nation-state. By 1968, the 
                                                        
58 Mandy Banton, “Destroy? ‘Migrate’? Conceal? British Strategies for the Disposal of Sensitive Records of 
Colonial Administrations at Independence,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth Studies 40, 2 (2012), 324.  
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UK’s colonial obligations had been fulfilled. The Empire was a thing of the past, and the British 
nation moved on. This line of thinking was taken up by popular historians and became firmly 
entrenched in the historiography. Years later, when historians began to challenge the more 
pernicious and blatantly false components of this narrative—revealing, for instance, the violence 
of British decolonization—one element always remained: its timeline.  
While historians have been divided on the importance of the information revealed by the 
Hanslope Disclosure, this chapter argues that the revelations of how Operation Legacy actually 
worked—in other words, the logistics of stealing and destroying archives—act as a useful 
indicator of the lengths to which officials went to cement a very specific vision of “flag 
independence,” tied to the nation-state.  
Taking on a much more flexible understanding of decolonization, the three subsequent 
chapters carry the story of the British Empire into the 1980s, providing an alternative framework 
for understanding the political culture of the early Thatcher years. Chapter 2 focuses on Rhodesia 
and the political imaginary of decolonization articulated by the Methodist Bishop Abel 
Muzorewa. In the late 1970s, Muzorewa joined Ian Smith and the leaders of two other African 
political parties to convene the so-called “Internal Settlement.” Nearly 15 years after Smith’s 
Unilateral Declaration of Independence, his grip on power was slipping under the growing 
pressure of the decade-long insurgency led by Joshua Nkomo and Robert Mugabe. As part of the 
Internal Settlement, Smith and Muzorewa negotiated a new constitution, and in elections held 
under the full franchise, the Bishop was elected prime minister of a new state, Zimbabwe-
Rhodesia.  
Muzorewa claimed that his idea of a qualified decolonization that granted heavy political 
concessions to the white minority was designed to stem the flow of settler capital from Rhodesia. 
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Economic stability was more important than political sovereignty, he argued. Chapter 2 looks at 
how Muzorewa’s understanding of decolonization filtered into the political discourses of the 
British Conservative Party where support for the Bishop became a litmus test for the Tory 
far-right. While Margaret Thatcher initially pledged to recognize Muzorewa if elected herself, 
she quickly realized that such a course would not end the fighting. Over the summer of 1979, she 
slowly moved toward a more moderate position. In the end, she would support a political process 
that ultimately brought Robert Mugabe to power. This chapter shows the extent to which the 
Rhodesian issue wreaked havoc on party discipline among Tories at one of the most 
consequential moments in the history of British conservatism—Margaret Thatcher’s first year in 
power. 
From southern Africa, Chapter 3 pans to Canada, where a 1981 political campaign 
organized by the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs (UBCIC) was poised to make a very 
public display of opposition to Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau. Indigenous peoples were deeply 
distressed by Trudeau’s efforts to sever the last constitutional ties between Britain and Canada— 
without their consent—by “patriating” the British North America Act, 1867. This act, together 
with the Royal Proclamation of 1763, had combined to affirm Indigenous sovereignty within 
Canada. The UBCIC first chartered a train, filled it with activists, and sent it on a well-publicized 
journey from Vancouver to Ottawa. When that effort did not gain the constitutional assurances 
that they desired, Indigenous activists appealed first to the United Nations, before traveling 
directly to Britain. Taking their campaign to the heart of Westminster, Indigenous peoples 
argued for the maintenance of their continued relationship with the British crown as their best 
chance of achieving sovereignty. In the process, they negotiated Britain’s deep political rifts—
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from disagreements among Conservatives over “Thatcherism” to the 1981 split in the Labour 
Party. 
Finally, Chapter 4 explores the effect of the Falklands War on the discourses and 
representations of race, belonging, and citizenship in Britain. In the postwar years, British 
governments repeatedly faced the question of the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands—a source 
of bitter dispute with Argentina since the 1950s. In 1968, the FCO’s clumsy handling of the issue 
had initiated a well-orchestrated backlash from a nascent lobbying group in parliament. These 
sympathetic MPs portrayed the islanders as ideal Britons. Unsullied by modern life, 
unemployment, and the UK’s increasingly multicultural population, the Falkland Islanders 
became “Britain lost in time.” Years later, when Argentina invaded the Islands, this idealized 
image entered mainstream political discourse. This chapter shows how the Falklands dispute and 
British representations of the islanders grafted onto parallel domestic debates about race and 
belonging in Britain, especially in the context of the Thatcher government’s initiative to reform 
citizenship law under the British Nationality Act, 1981.  
Since 1968, historians have treated these three cases as discrete episodes that briefly 
distracted British ministers from the much more pressing concerns of their domestic agenda. In 
drawing this story together, I show the extent to which the political context of the early 1980s 
was shaped fundamentally by late imperial concerns. These issues were not separate from the 
domestic, but closely bound up with it. I push the narrative of empire into the 1980s to advance 
an alternative paradigm—one not fixated on “ends,” but on Britain’s contested and ragged 
decolonization. This story, however, starts in the 1960s—in the glow of Operation Legacy’s burn 
barrels—as just one example of the deliberate and largely successful state effort to shape the way 
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ordinary people would come to imagine the British Empire: as a fixture of the past, not a central 
concern of the present and future.
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CHAPTER 1: “WHAT’S BURNT WON’T BE MISSED”: THE ARCHIVE OF 
DECOLONIZATION AND THE “END” OF THE BRITISH EMPIRE 
 
 In August 1963, Robert Noel Turner, chief secretary in the colonial government of North 
Borneo, wrote to the Colonial Office about the tranche of classified documents being sent home 
to Britain before independence. North Borneo was just over a month away from joining Malaya, 
Singapore, and Sarawak to form the new nation-state of Malaysia. The documents primarily 
covered local issues, Turner reported, but they were also of “historical interest.” Chief among 
them was a collection of monthly diaries written by North Borneo’s Residents. Turner had 
grappled with the decision over whether to send these diaries to London or to destroy them. 
Residents, he noted, had been encouraged to compose reports that were “completely informal 
and uninhibited,” and with the understanding that their circulation would be limited to the 
governor and chief secretary alone. “I know how easy it is for people living thousands of miles 
away and with only an imperfect knowledge of the local context to get hold of the wrong end of 
the stick,” Turner told the Colonial Office. But, in the end, he felt the weight of history, choosing 
to save the diaries from the incinerator. He hoped that their contents “may come in handy when 
some future Gibbon is doing research work for his ‘Decline and Fall of the British Empire.’”1 
Turner’s efforts were part of a much wider process of archival reorganization and 
destruction in British colonies in the 1950s and 1960s. In the context of the Cold War, the 
general assumption was that African politicians and their newly independent governments could
                                                        
1 TNA: FCO 141/19929, Robert Noel Turner to J.D. Higham, “Material for Colonial Office Archives,” 6 August 
1963.  
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not be trusted with full access to the archives, including sensitive, embarrassing, and potentially 
incriminating records. Drawing upon the past experience of decolonizations in India, Ceylon, 
and the Gold Coast, the British government and colonial officials constructed a process to 
sanitize the colonial archive. In Whitehall lingo, the endeavor was called “Operation Legacy.” 
As the system became more sophisticated over time, the Colonial Office issued guidance to so-
called “emergent territories,” or those colonies nearing independence, on what to do with their 
records. By 1961, they were ordered to establish small committees to oversee the sorting of old, 
current, and future files into three categories: so-called “legacy” files that would be passed on to 
successor governments, files to be “migrated” to Britain, and those to be destroyed.1 As Richard 
Drayton argues, the goal was to secure documents that had continued “operational value” to the 
British government.2 Working feverishly in capitals around the decolonizing empire, staff often 
had to make snap judgments about which files might be embarrassing or operationally useful. 
They ultimately determined which papers would survive the cull and where they would end up.  
 According to the Colonial Office’s librarian, Ben Cheeseman, migrated documents that 
could not “properly be handed over [would] come back here [to London], where, of course, the 
‘50 years’ rule [would] operate.”3 Cheeseman’s specific reference to fifty years, the disclosure 
terms as set out in the Public Records Act, 1958, was meant to mitigate the criticisms of 
academics who had heard rumors of colonial governments’ covert destruction of documents, 
especially in Kenya. But the librarian’s pledge was misleading, as the Public Records Act offered 
                                                        
1 TNA: CO 822/2935, Iain Macleod, Secretary of State for the Colonies, to the officer administering the 
Government of Tanganyika, copied to the officers administering the Governments of Uganda and Kenya, the British 
Resident at Zanzibar, and the administrator of the East African High Commission, 3 May 1961. 
2 Richard Drayton, “Britain’s Secret Archive of Decolonization,” History Workshop Histories of the Present blog, 19 
April 2012, http://www.historyworkshop.org.uk/britains-secret-archive-of-decolonisation/. 
3 TNA: CO 822/2739, Ben Cheeseman to N.R. Fry, 30 October 1961. 
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no legal provisions to cover documents produced outside of the United Kingdom. Colonial 
archives thus had no legal status in Britain, meaning that files brought to the UK fell 
conveniently into a juridical grey area.4 But even if they had been properly archived in the UK, 
the documents would have been thousands of miles removed from any local researcher wanting 
to access the records of their own history. Turner may have had in mind a “future Gibbon,” but 
that person was likely not Malaysian.  
As a result, the entire migrated archive, including the diaries of North Borneo Residents, 
went off the grid in the 1960s, only to resurface fifty years later after a group of elderly Kenyans 
filed a civil suit against the British government in London’s High Court. During this case, we 
discovered the full extent of Operation Legacy, including the fact that the British government 
had spirited away thousands of files from 37 colonies to a secret MI6 records center at Hanslope 
Park, outside Milton Keynes (see Figure 1.1). Countless more were destroyed by fire or ditched 
at sea. The FCO later released some of the documents in six batches between 2012 and 2014.5 
Historians’ initial work in this so-called “Hanslope Disclosure” sought to determine the 
extent to which revelations contained in the papers might change the way we think about those 
colonies beset by colonial emergencies in the 1950s and 1960s.6 The general consensus on the 
migrated archive has been that, while these papers contain some valuable details, their 
importance should not be overstated or fetishized. These self-selected papers present what the 
                                                        
4 David M. Anderson, “Guilty Secrets: Deceit, Denial, and the Discovery of Kenya’s ‘Migrated Archive’,” History 
Workshop Journal 80, 1 (2015), 155. 
5 Ibid., 151. FCO officials’ failure to locate thirteen boxes of key Kenya files that allegedly went missing in the 
1990s has fueled doubts about the sincerity of government assurances that the contents of the migrated archive have 
been disclosed in their entirety. Anthony Badger, “Historians, a Legacy of Suspicion, and the Migrated Archive,” 
Small Wars & Insurgencies 23, 4-5 (October-December 2012), 805.  
6 For Kenya, see Elkins, “Alchemy of Evidence: Mau Mau, the British Empire, and the High Court of Justice,” 
Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 39, 5 (December 2011): 731-748.  
 29 
historian Brian Drohan calls a “pruned, manicured” representation of decolonization.7 But the 
Hanslope Disclosure has been most noteworthy for revealing fragmentary details about the 
archive destruction regime, itself.8 As a result, some scholars have focused on what Operation 
Legacy tells us about the so-called “colonial mind,” asking to what extent the destruction of 
archives was orchestrated in a top-down fashion from London or was, instead, first given force in 
the colonies. In reality, it was somewhere in between these two extremes. The attempts to 
                                                        
7 Brian Drohan, Brutality in an Age of Human Rights: Activism and Counterinsurgency at the End of the British 
Empire (Ithaca: Cornell UP, 2018), 9.  
8 Elkins, “Looking Beyond Mau Mau,” 860. 
Figure 1.1 A section of the migrated records “found” at Hanslope Park. Katie Engelhart, “Will the UK Government Ever Release 
These Secret Files to the Public?” Vice News, 14 May 2014, https://www.vice.com/en_uk/article/mv5393/the-uk-government-
are-opening-thousand. 
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sanitize the archive during decolonization represented a negotiation between a Colonial Office 
attempting to systematize the process, and officials on the ground, operating on an ad hoc basis.9  
But this chapter takes a broader historical approach to Operation Legacy in an attempt to 
understand the extent to which these revelations about archival erasure force us to question our 
basic historical and historiographical assumptions about the so-called “end of empire” and 
historians’ emphasis on “flag decolonization.” It thus argues that, at each stage of this process, 
British and colonial officials were “thinking historically” about the potential impact the archive 
would have on the way future generations considered Britain’s imperial history, just as Turner’s 
efforts in North Borneo demonstrate. In the 1960s, British officials consciously sought to 
construct a historical narrative that would vindicate Britain’s supposed “civilizing mission” of 
empire. As the story went, British decolonization had successfully delivered colonies to 
nation-statehood in a peaceful process that was definitively completed by 1968. They also 
operated out of fear—a fear that African politicians would discover hard evidence of British 
indiscretions and use the details as an excuse to pivot towards the Soviet Union after 
independence. To perpetuate their narrative, officials first had to neutralize the incriminating 
colonial archive.  
This chapter suggests that, in much the same way officials consciously sought to shape 
the historical record of empire, pushing the notion that decolonization had successfully ended, 
historians’ engagement with colonial archives must be equally meticulous. Archives are, as Ann 
                                                        
9 Mandy Banton, “Destroy? ‘Migrate’? Conceal? British Strategies for the Disposal of Sensitive Records of Colonial 
Administrations at Independence,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth Studies 40, 2 (2012): 321-335; Elkins, 
“Looking Beyond Mau Mau,” 867; Shohei Sato, “‘Operation Legacy’: Britain’s Destruction and Concealment of 
Colonial Records Worldwide,” Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 45, 4 (2017): 697-719. In seeking to 
explain why officials didn’t simply destroy everything in Kenya, Anderson argues that the survival of the migrated 
archive points to the “machinations of internal bureaucratic politics.” Mid-ranking officials, he argues, ensured 
documents were salvaged so that their superiors would be unable to pin the blame on them for the state’s 
indiscretions during the Mau Mau Uprising. Anderson, “Guilty Secrets,” 157. 
 31 
Stoler argues, “cultural artifacts of fact production.”10 Or as Elkins aptly puts it, they “produce 
realities as much as they document them.”11 Recognizing this essential truth, this chapter 
considers how British colonial officials created and massaged realities that then came to shape 
our root assumptions of the “end” of empire, including when and where decolonization took 
place, and what it meant as an historical process—both in Britain and in the empire.  
 
Earmarked for Destruction 
Some six years before Turner helped to sort North Borneo’s archive in preparation for 
Malaysia Day, British officials undertook a similar, though much hastier exercise in Kuala 
Lumpur, ahead of the full independence of the colony of Malaya. On 30 July 1957, Donald 
MacGillivray, the British high commissioner, contacted Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, soon to be 
independent Malaya’s prime minister. “I think that I should tell you, before independence,” 
MacGillivray wrote, “we shall remove certain documents, mostly the property of Her Majesty’s 
Government, which it is not possible to hand over to the independent Federation Government.” 
As these documents were primarily about external relations with other countries, it would “not 
be proper to hand [them] over to another Government,” MacGillivray wrote, adding that this was 
in accordance with the usual practice in Britain whereby Cabinet papers of one government were 
“not left for the use of its successors.”12 The Tunku, a stalwart British ally and avowed 
anticommunist, did not protest the British plans.13 But two months later, a UK diplomat 
                                                        
10 Ann Laura Stoler, “Colonial Archives and the Arts of Governance,” Archival Science 2 (2002), 91. 
11 Elkins, “Looking Beyond Mau Mau,” 853. 
12 TNA: FCO 141/19929, D.C. MacGillivray to Y.T.M. Tunku Abdul Rahman Putra, 30 July 1957. 
13 Edward Hampshire, “Apply the Flame More Searingly”: The Destruction and Migration of the Archives of British 
Colonial Administration: A Southeast Asia Case Study, Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth Studies 41, 2 
(2013), 339; Anderson, “Guilty Secrets,” 145. 
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conceded to his colleagues back in London that when the Tunku raised no objections, he 
“probably did not know on what a scale the removal was to take place.”14 
In fact, the high commissioner’s letter was a model of obfuscation. As early as February 
1956 with the signing of the Anglo-Malayan Constitutional Agreement, British officials in Kuala 
Lumpur had begun to consider the status of the colonial archive. They did this both in light of 
Malaya’s approaching independence and the fact that British forces had been engaged in a 
decade-long counterinsurgency campaign in the colony.15 In this strategic context, the archive 
was bound to contain operational details and intelligence that the Colonial Office would never 
willfully allow to go public. In the first phase of the Malayan counterinsurgency campaign 
before 1950, for example, the British had taken an aggressive approach, overseeing mass arrests 
and deportations in ethnic Chinese communities.16 British officers only loosely policed the use of 
lethal force among soldiers engaged in so-called “jungle bashing” operations, wherein large 
frontiers were opened up in densely forested areas in an attempt to draw out suspected guerrillas. 
In one notorious case, soldiers from the Scots Guards were accused of indiscriminately killing 
twenty-four men before torching the village of Batang Kali.17  
                                                        
14 TNA: DO 186/17, A.J. Brown to R.W. Newsam, 17 October 1957. The politics of the colonial archive have not 
only been fraught in Britain, but also in former colonies. Elkins discovered this when she was asked to leave an 
archive in Penang after requesting files on detention camps and other materials on the period of the Malayan 
Emergency. “Postcolonial archives often reflect the interests of ruling elites who are invested in a particular version 
of the past—a version typically devoid of the messiness of end-of-empire violence,” she argues. Elkins, “Looking 
Beyond Mau Mau,” 865. 
15 Souchou Yao, The Malayan Emergency: Essays on a Small, Distant War (Copenhagen: Nordic Institute of Asian 
Affairs Press, 2016), 40-41. 
16 Huw Bennet, “‘A Very Salutary Effect:’ The Counter-Terror Strategy in the Early Malayan Emergency, June 
1948 to December 1949,” Journal of Strategic Studies 32, 3 (2009), 417. 
17 Yao, The Malayan Emergency, 46-47. By January 1950, ten thousand ethnic Chinese had been forcibly repatriated 
to China. Low Choo Chin, “The Repatriation of the Chinese as a Counter-Insurgency Policy During the Malayan 
Emergency,” Journal of Southeast Asian Studies 45, 3 (2014), 372. Anthony Badger highlights the incriminating 
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The colonial authorities thus sought to destroy all sensitive records in order to safeguard 
the UK’s image as a benevolent and liberal imperial power. According to a retrospective report 
by M.L. McCaul, an MI5 security liaison officer (SLO) stationed in the colony, officials in Kuala 
Lumpur had concluded that it was undesirable to hand over documents to the independent 
Malayan government if they might betray the British government’s views on sensitive issues or 
offend members of the Malayan ruling elite. They had also withheld papers if they were 
considered historically important to Britain or potentially useful to the British government.18 
These broadly defined categories had given officials great leeway in determining what 
documents could be retained or destroyed. They had also encouraged officials engaged in sorting 
documents to consider the historical stakes of each file. Records that had been considered 
strategically useful or historically significant had been withdrawn from their departments and 
retained at the high commission, until they were eventually migrated to the Colonial Office in 
London. Those files that had threatened to embarrass British officials and their allies had been 
“earmarked for destruction.”19  
 In the eighteen months after the Anglo-Malayan Constitutional Agreement, this sorting 
process had been undertaken most intensely in the British governor’s office, but also in 
departments engaged in legal and security matters and Chinese affairs. But the greatest urgency 
had been in the Department of Defense, which had already been “Malayanized,” meaning that 
Malayan officials had taken up positions in the administration. The remaining expatriate staff in 
                                                        
paper trail created in the wake of massacre. Materials discovered in the Hanslope Disclosure, he notes, show the 
“retrospective attempt to legitimize the action at Batang Kali.” Badger, “Historians, a Legacy of Suspicion,” 804. 
18 TNA: DO 186/17, M.L. McCaul, “Destruction of Records in the Federation of Malaya,” 9 September 1957. For 
the role of MI5 security liaison officers in the decolonizing empire, see Calder Walton, Empire of Secrets: British 
Intelligence, the Cold War, and the Twilight of Empire (New York, 2013), 143-144. 
19 M.L. McCaul, “Destruction of Records in the federation of Malaya.” 
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the department had secretly scrutinized all relevant documents, determining which should stay, 
which should be migrated, and which should be destroyed. At Special Branch headquarters, 
sensitive files remained in use until the very moment of independence—meaning that the process 
of culling the documentary archive continued even after the official transfer of powers. As 
McCaul noted, the Special Branch registrar, a British woman, had agreed to discretely “remove 
not only certain listed papers but also any other papers which she considered unsuitable for 
Malayan eyes.”20  
The physical process of destroying such a large volume of paper had proven to be the 
most onerous task in Malaya, especially as the intent was to avoid public attention. In this, 
officials had learned from the mistakes of their forebears in the Indian Civil Service in 1947.21 
As the British had withdrawn from the subcontinent, they had hastily constructed makeshift 
pyres in the open courtyards of colonial government buildings, heaping mounds of files onto the 
flames. In Delhi, the result had been “a pall of smoke” that shrouded the center of the city in a 
noxious cloud, which drew press attention.22 British officials in Kuala Lumpur had sought to 
avoid a similar public relations disaster. Indeed, the only incinerator in the capital capable of 
handling such a large bulk of documents had been at the railway engine sheds, which was run by 
Malayan staff. A similar issue had ruled out ditching the files in the Indian Ocean, as Malayan 
customs staff were, by then, in place at Port Swettenham.23 
                                                        
20 Ibid.  
21 They also drew upon the experiences of Ceylon and the Gold Coast. Shohei Sato, “Operation Legacy,” 699-703. 
22 Ibid. See also, TNA: FCO 141/19929, F. Mills to M. McMullen, 18 May 1963.  
23 M.L. McCaul, “Destruction of Records in the federation of Malaya.” 
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As would be the case in many similar situations in years to come, the British military 
filled the breech. In Malaya, they had offered use of the Royal Navy’s incinerator in Singapore. 
Colonial officials thus drew up plans to transport the mass of files the two hundred miles from 
Kuala Lumpur to Singapore. But because the sight of British personnel outside of the central 
government offices, putting dozens of boxes onto trucks, had been deemed likely to arouse the 
suspicions of passersby, European staff had assigned the loading of files to “Chinese coolie” 
laborers. Army field security officers had then driven the crates in five unmarked trucks to 
Singapore, escorted at points along the route deemed to be especially vulnerable to attack. The 
last truck had departed on 28 August 1957, just three days before Malaya’s independence, and all 
flagged documents had been incinerated in Singapore by September 2. While McCaul judged 
that it was impossible to be certain that all papers unsuitable for Malayan eyes had been 
destroyed, in the end, he surmised that “the risk of compromise or embarrassment arising out of 
any paper left behind [to be] very slight.” 24 
The British experience in Malaya served as the basis for the treatment of classified 
archives in later decolonizations—both as a useful model and as a cautionary tale.25 For some, 
the sorting and destruction in Malaya had been too thorough. “It is better for too much, rather 
than too little, to be sent home,” D.H.B. Gregory of the Colonial Office wrote to colleagues in 
1963. “The wholesale destruction, as in Malaya, should not be repeated.”26 In future operations, 
less documents would be destroyed and more would be migrated to Britain. But in either case, 
the terms of what would become Operation Legacy were designed to sanitize and censor the 
                                                        
24 Ibid. 
25 TNA: CO 822/2935, Ben Cheeseman to J.B. Pearce, 29 December 1960. 
26 TNA: FCO 141/19929, D.H.B. Gregory, handwritten note, 8 May 1963. 
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archive and to push a very specific understanding of history—one that would not embarrass the 
British government or imperil its alleged position on the moral high ground during the Cold War. 
 
“Trustworthy, Loyal, and Discreet” 
 By December 1960, before any official intervention from London, staff in Tanganyika 
began to consider the content of their own archives. They were pushed to do so by what Richard 
Clifford of the deputy governor’s office in Dar es Salaam called “the changed circumstances 
which will arise from the impending constitutional developments.” In a seven-page memo on the 
subject of colonial records, Clifford noted that with the approach of responsible government and 
the incorporation of African ministers into departments, colonial officials should begin 
withdrawing classified material from general circulation. Their task was to “leave the future 
Government with such material,” Clifford declared, “to enable its efficient functioning.” But he 
left the relative definition of “efficient functioning” to British officials, with no input from 
Africans. Like his colleagues in Malaya three years earlier, Clifford’s chief concern was in 
safeguarding the reputation of the empire. He sought to recall any records that might 
“embarrass” the British and colonial regime.27 The specter of embarrassment, and its geopolitical 
implications, became an official driver of archival policy in Tanganyika. 
Clifford outlined a system in which archives for the period after 1950, as well as future 
papers, would be split into two parallel series—one which contained materials “assumed to be 
cleaned” that could be passed safely onto the future government, and the other containing 
objectionable records that needed to be destroyed or taken to Britain. Officials in Tanganyika, 
with occasional input from London, were tasked with making this determination. For example, 
                                                        
27 TNA: FCO 141/18409, R.H.R. Clifford to Permanent Secretary S.I., 21 April 1961. 
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local officials considered destroying the files on Julius Nyerere’s Tanganyika African National 
Union (TANU), which were said to provide an “‘unvarnished’ history of the development of the 
organization since July 1954.” They checked with London first, and, ultimately, the Colonial 
Office ordered that these files be shipped to the UK, where they would later end up at Hanslope 
Park.28 Records dating from before 1950 would also be divided in the same way, but given the 
volume of the task, Clifford suggested that officials could either first conduct a cursory 
examination of these historical records and “destroy the bulk of the paper” or have the 
documents removed from their current locations and put in a secure space to be more closely 
reexamined before full independence.29 In the intervening months, no African would have access 
to these files. 
In December 1960, Clifford passed his memo to Bill Marquand, a visiting official from 
Uganda’s Ministry of Security and External Relations. With the Uganda Protectorate quickly 
moving toward independence, Marquand was poised to initiate his administration’s own archival 
sorting operation. A few months later, drawing on Clifford’s experiences, he circulated an 
internal document on colonial archives. As in Tanganyika, any papers that threatened the defense 
of the Commonwealth, embarrassed the British government, or revealed an intelligence source 
were flagged for disposal or for future migration to Britain.30 While Special Branch in Dar had 
suggested “WATCH” as Tanganyika’s codeword to designate materials unsuitable for Africans, 
Marquand chose the letters “DG” for Uganda, ostensibly to represent the papers of the deputy 
                                                        
28 TNA: FCO 141/ 19928, Clifford to C.E.R. Darby, 2 September 1961. 
29 The Colonial Office would later determine that many of these older papers should be migrated to the UK. TNA: 
FCO 141/18409, Clifford to Permanent Secretary S.I., 21 April 1961. 
30 TNA: FCO 141/6957, W.J. Marquand (for chief secretary) to all recipients of circular No. S.10166, “Operation 
‘Legacy’,” 17 April 1961. 
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governor’s office.31 As such, all papers flagged for migration to Britain were to be stamped in the 
upper-right corner with the letters DG (see Figure 1.2). 
Uganda differed from Tanganyika in that it already had some African ministers in place. 
Since 1955, they had served in unofficial capacities, shadowing white ministers. British officials 
shared classified material with their African colleagues on a need-to-know basis. Marquand was 
concerned about the security implications of this situation. As a result, he went much further than 
Tanganyikan authorities to explicitly define who could and could not view DG materials. As 
more posts were taken up by African ministers and civil servants, it would be “necessary to 
withdraw certain papers to places where they can only be seen and handled by an authorized 
                                                        
31 TNA: FCO 141/18409, A.S. to S.G.R., 30 December 1960. For Clifford’s reservations about the word “WATCH,” 
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permanent secretary S.I., 21 April 1961. 
Figure 1.2 A document stamped "DG" by authorized officers in Uganda. TNA: FCO 141/6957, Marquand (for chief secretary, 
Circular Memorandum S.10166, "Operation 'Legacy'," 28 February 1961. 
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officer.” For Marquand, an authorized officer “meant a civil service officer who is a British 
subject of European descent employed by the Protectorate Government.”32  
This effort to establish a racial categorization in the archival censorship regime quickly 
created personnel difficulties in a colonial administration with a relatively small European staff. 
In response to Marquand’s circular, R.E. Stone—the British Resident of Buganda—wrote to the 
chief secretary, requesting that his assistant—Olinda de Souza—be made an authorized officer.33 
De Souza was from Goa and had obtained her UK citizenship through marriage to a naturalized 
British subject in the late 1930s.34 She had been in charge of all classified information in the 
Resident’s office for over two years. “I consider her to be thoroughly trustworthy, loyal, and 
discreet,” Stone wrote. In his plan, he and De Souza would “both be responsible for the ‘purging’ 
and division of files.”35 But MI5’s local SLO objected to this plan based on De Souza’s race, and 
he was backed by the members of the colony’s police liaison committee, which declared her 
unfit to be an authorized officer. The SLO noted that the circumstances at the time of her hiring 
were “different from now in that [back then] the handling of security papers was dealt with on a 
non-racial basis.”36 
                                                        
32 TNA: FCO 141/6957, Marquand (for chief secretary), Circular Memorandum S.10166, “Operation ‘Legacy’,” 28 
February 1961, 2.  
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35 Ibid. 
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While Stone refused to let the matter drop, passionately defending De Souza’s reputation, 
his opponents declared that they could not risk setting a racial precedent by granting her an 
exemption. “If we allow Mrs. De Souza to be ‘authorized,’” one official wrote, “there is no 
reason why very many others in exactly similar circumstances should not be similarly 
‘authorized.’”37 Staff spent days parsing De Souza’s status as a British citizen. Was she a dual 
citizen, the chief secretary wondered?38 This might signal a potential conflict in loyalties. When 
they learned that De Souza had diligently turned in her passport to the Portuguese consulate after 
marrying her British husband, and firmly considered herself and her family to be British, they 
moved on to their next consideration.39 Had she taken a loyalty oath to the King at the time? One 
official believed this to be a moot point. Even if she had not, De Souza would undoubtedly agree 
to take an oath, but this would not solve the issue of her race.40  
Colonial officials then tried to spin their discriminatory policy as doing De Souza a great 
favor. By asking her to handle DG material, she would likely come under pressure from a future 
independent African government to divulge information about what files had been migrated or 
destroyed—something she “will find hard to resist when we are no longer here.”41 Stone 
informed the SLO that De Souza planned to join her daughters in London at independence, one 
                                                        
red 10 has been closed for 65 years under Section 3(4) of the Public Records Act, 1958, via Freedom of Information 
exemption 40: “Personal Information.” 
37 TNA: FCO 141/18409, Ag. PS/SER to chief secretary, 27 March 1961. 
38 TNA: FCO 141/18409, A.P. to S/SER, 30 March 1961, no. 28. 
39 TNA: FCO 141/18409, Ag. PS/SER to chief secretary through AS, 5 April 1961.   
40 TNA: FCO 141/18409, Ag. PS/SER to chief secretary, 27 March 1961. 
41 TNA: FCO 141/18409, S.A.S. to A.S., 10 March 1961. 
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of whom was training to be a doctor, the other soon leaving for a teacher’s training college.42 
Still, the police committee would not budge; based on considerations of race, De Souza could not 
be an authorized officer.  
Marquand also went further than his colleagues in Tanganyika by listing specific types of 
content in Ugandan archives that could embarrass the British government and should be 
considered “automatically DG.” In an appended list, he flagged “any papers which might be 
interpreted as showing religious intolerance on the part of HMG, the present Uganda 
Government, or friendly countries,” and “all papers which might be interpreted as showing racial 
discrimination against Africans (or Negros in the USA).”43 During the De Souza imbroglio, no 
one, except perhaps Stone, seems to have grasped the irony of the colonial government’s racial 
policy on authorized officers. Archival erasure in Uganda was carried out using the very same 
type of discrimination that motivated British efforts to censor the historical record in the first 
place. The extended discussion of De Souza’s racial status only generated more of a paper trail 
that had to be stamped “DG” and later destroyed or migrated to Britain.44 
But as part of his appended list, Marquand also described those subjects which he did not 
consider embarrassing. This alternative list acts as a useful indicator of the lengths to which 
colonial officials went to cover up issues like racial discrimination. “Papers about Communism 
generally and Communist activities of persons in Uganda are not automatically ‘DG,’” 
Marquand wrote in the February circular, “in that the British attitude toward Communism is well 
                                                        
42 TNA: FCO 141/18409, R.E. Stone to Marquand, 18 March 1961, no. 20. 
43 TNA: FCO 141/6957, Marquand (for chief secretary), “Appendix to Circular Memorandum No. S.10166 of 28th 
February 2018,” 28 February 1961, 2. 
44 There is no real indication that the fragmentary correspondence on De Souza in FCO 141/18409 represents the 
extent of records on the matter. 
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known.”45 He was even more direct in a discussion with officials at the Ministry of Commerce 
and Industry who asked if so-called subversive publications should be marked DG. They should 
be treated “as clean,” Marquand responded, “on the grounds that we [the British] are not 
ashamed of anything we have done in this way.”46 In the context of the Cold War, Britain’s 
policy on communism did not risk embarrassment. By contrast, details of the colonial 
government’s racial policy were potentially volatile, if widely disseminated. It was what colonial 
officials regularly referred to as a “dirty” subject.47 
In all of this shuffling of materials in Uganda, the status of police and intelligence records 
generated much handwringing among officials. In January 1961, while in the process of drafting 
his circular on archives, Marquand wrote to police headquarters with a quandary. “I am 
somewhat puzzled as to how to treat the Police in this matter,” he noted, adding that it was 
“essential to get settled in our minds. . .exactly what we are going to do about the Police before 
we start the work otherwise we might find ourselves in the position of having to go back to do it 
all over again.”48 Ugandan officials also sought advice from their counterparts in Tanganyika 
who noted that, in their sweep of records centers throughout the colony, they had found the 
“really ‘dirty material’” in provincial and district police headquarters.49  
                                                        
45 TNA: FCO 141/6957, Marquand (for chief secretary), “Appendix to Circular Memorandum No. S.10166 of 28th 
February 2018,” 28 February 1961, 2. 
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that, in his opinion, these records should be destroyed, as they fell under the provision in Ian Macleod’s telegram 
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Colonial officials worried that, once in place, African ministers with responsibility for 
policing would have the clearance to call up records on unsavory episodes that they might then 
release to the general public and to an international audience. In the context of the Cold War, 
these unsavory details would be detrimental to Britain’s reputation and to the Commonwealth 
and Western Bloc, as a whole. Marquand thus recommended that police and intelligence matters 
be given special consideration. He classed “activities of a security nature involving expatriate 
Government officers” as automatically DG, along with intelligence summaries and any material 
relating to Special Branch training and organization.50 The commissioner of police was also 
authorized to provide his officers with separate instructions on the “purging” of files.51 
Marquand’s caution over police files was likely well-placed. An official later sorting files in 
North Borneo recalled of his time in Ceylon “that there was a lot of trouble when a Ceylonese 
was appointed Head of S.B. [Special Branch] and discovered personal files about Ministers—and 
himself.”52 This was the type of volatile scenario Marquand sought to avoid. 
By May 1961, the bulk of police and intelligence papers in Uganda had been dealt with. 
Though there is no account of how these documents were sorted, in the course of events, Special 
Branch officers encountered an awkward problem. As local police precincts gradually came 
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 44 
under African control, they were declared “clean,” meaning that all sensitive records had been 
withdrawn from the office.53 But once in supervisory positions, African police officers 
unwittingly produced reports that the British colonial administrators in Entebbe considered to be 
DG—or potentially embarrassing to Britain. In essence, black officers continued to engage in 
tactics of violence and illegal surveillance that had been regularized by their former white 
supervisors, and to record these activities in their official reports. “There is no difficulty in 
restricting DG material which we ourselves originate, or which comes down to us,” Andrew 
Malcolm—the senior superintendent of police at the central office in Entebbe—wrote to 
Marquand. The issue was “when material which very obviously is now DG comes upwards from 
a clean office.” Officials worried that, for instance, if African police officers continued to 
illegally surveil local political parties after the institution of responsible government, their 
activities could raise the ire of African ministers who might then look more closely into the 
historical operations of the police. If they delved into the archives, they would quickly notice that 
large swaths of records had either been removed or destroyed by the British.  
To guard against this disaster scenario, Malcolm stated that he and others were 
“encouraging our [African Special Branch officers]. . .to relinquish their interest in certain 
subjects.” White officials in Entebbe were forced to explain away “this apparent slackening of 
interest in hitherto prime security targets [as] due to a shift of overall security danger.”54 The real 
reason was that they could not risk exposing their archival erasure program to African police 
officers and ministers. 
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1962.  
54 TNA, FCO 141/18409, Andrew (A.K.) Malcolm to Marquand, 9 May 1961. 
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Several months later, with independence drawing closer, white Special Branch officers 
were still attempting to find a workaround to the problem of sensitive details in police records. 
“Whenever possible, intelligence material which is dirty will be slanted and presented as a law 
and order problem, rather than a political one,” M. Davies of the Ministry of Security and 
External Relations wrote in a draft circular.55 Davies’s suggestion indicates that white Special 
Branch officers in Uganda actively reframed intelligence material that was illegally harvested so 
that it looked like the state was focusing its activities on criminal matters, not on people and 
parties with political—and likely anticolonial—grievances. This activity shows that officials 
were not simply engaged in the destruction and migration of archives, but in doctoring those 
legacy papers meant to be passed on to the future African government, so as to mask the motives 
behind their own extensive surveillance and intelligence operations. Unable to think up an 
appropriate hypothetical example of how intelligence language might be “slanted” to frame a 
political issue as a law and order issue, Davies asked his colleagues in Special Branch for 
assistance. The correspondence indicates that they supplied him with draft language to add to his 
circular, but neither this draft, nor the edited circular, has survived (see Figure 1.3).56  
 
Sinning Quietly 
On 20 May 1961, Ugandan officials learned that their colleagues in Kenya were now 
operating an archival classification system similar to their own, under the codeword WATCH.57 
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Papers flagged as unsuitable for Africans would be stamped with a bold “W” in the upper-right 
corner. As in Uganda, Kenya’s system would be similarly concerned with the question of race 
and the security of classified material. The implementation of WATCH followed an extensive 
security survey of the Kenyan Cabinet Offices by the colony’s security officer—Colonel 
Romilly—who was concerned about the threat of subversion. In Kenya, the perceived danger of 
Africans accessing classified material was compounded by the lingering paranoia of the Mau 
Mau Uprising.58 “With the progress of localization will come the threat of infiltration by 
opportunity or intimidation of African employees,” Romilly wrote in his survey. He added that 
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“any African employee in Government offices, who has freedom of movement within these 
offices during working hours, must be considered a possible security threat.”59 
Of the small group of African clerical staff at the Cabinet Offices, Romilly cited an 
individual of key concern: the African office messenger. The messenger carried out a variety of 
tasks as part of his day-to-day duties. He ferried correspondence between the Cabinet Office and 
Government House. He also lived onsite and acted as the caretaker, receiving the keys to the 
building when European staff departed at the end of the day. In the morning, he entered 
unsupervised to clean. European staff had become much too complacent about the presence of 
this individual, Romilly argued. “They do not appear to be aware that he might become a 
security risk in the future.”60 The Colonel provided an example. While discussing the intricacies 
of the classified filing system in the strong room with Mrs. Carter, clerk of the Top Secret 
Registry, Romilly “saw the African messenger come into the office and put a cup of tea down on 
her desk.” After the messenger left, Romilly asked Carter if she had been aware that someone 
had entered the room. She had not. “There was classified material on her desk,” Romilly later 
reported.61  
As a result, the Colonel recommended that not only should the messenger’s cleaning 
activities be supervised each morning by a European staff member, who should arrive early for 
the purpose, he “should not be allowed to enter any of the offices during working hours.” 
                                                        
59 TNA: FCO 141/6957, Col. Romilly, colony protective security officer, Kenya, “Security Survey Report on the 
Cabinet Offices, Nairobi, and Recommendations for the Protective Security Measures to Safeguard the Classified 
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Instead, European staff should collect messages from him at the office door.62 He should also be 
relinquished of his courier duties. Though Romilly acknowledged that, in theory, Africans had 
access to the mail in every part of the system, he advised that a European courier should be hired 
to handle the deliveries. Romilly was also unsatisfied by the Cabinet Office’s haphazard 
destruction of classified documents. When pressed, staff admitted that they burned documents 
“periodically,” which he took to mean about once every two weeks. They did so using an 
“improvised incinerator,” a contraption that failed to make “sufficient heat to produce all burnt 
paper to dust.”63 He recommended that the office be given a paper shredder and that all classified 
waste should be destroyed at the end of each working day.64 
Colonel Romilly found an even more distressing state of affairs a few months later at 
Kenya’s Department of Information, where he stumbled upon boxes of files boarded up in an 
easily accessible elevator shaft. Staff made a list of the contents, and Romilly’s supervisor, J. 
Woodley—the Director of Intelligence—“observe[d] with alarm” that several of these files were 
graded as classified and “contain[ed] material which would be of considerable intelligence value 
to subversive elements in the Colony.”65 Even a casual glance at the list of files explains 
Woodley’s anxieties: “Intelligence and Security: Secret Reports;” “Psychological Warfare: 
Malaya;” “Kenya Defense Scheme;” “Kenya Colony Emergency Scheme;” “Special Branch: 
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Fortnightly Intelligence Summary.”66 These files all dated from 1958, the height of the Kenya 
Emergency. 
Colonial officials’ concern about archival security seemed well-founded in light of 
several breaches reported in 1960-61.67 These incidents had drawn the attention of Kenya’s top 
colonial brass. In March 1960, the assistant chief secretary complained that a suspected breach 
had not been properly reported. Instead of immediately notifying Special Branch, officials had 
alerted local police, which made it much more likely that an African police officer might be 
brought into deal with the handling of classified documents.68 Given the potential content of 
these documents, which might implicate colonial officials in everything from torture to forced 
labor, the state’s response was unsurprising. In just one grisly example from a file that survived 
the purge and was migrated to Britain and released in 2013, a telegram reported the brutal 
punishments meted out by eight district officers in interrogations, including burning some 
detainees alive.69 Complicity reached the upper echelons of the Kenyan government hierarchy. 
The Attorney General had once remarked that if “we are going to sin, we must sin quietly.”70  
Unsurprisingly, given the lackluster security in government offices, some knowledge of 
British indiscretions in Kenya had already gone public, largely thanks to the Labour MP Barbara 
Castle. Castle made a well-publicized visit to the colony in 1955 to investigate the death of 
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Kamau Kichina, who was murdered in British custody after being accused of theft.71 “In the 
heart of the British Empire,” she later wrote in an op-ed in the Tribune, “there is a police state 
where the rule of law has broken down, where the authorities pledged to enforced justice 
regularly connive at its violation.”72 Four years later, and only a few months before Romilly’s 
security reviews, Castle again took up her public crusade after hearing of a massacre in Hola, 
where eleven detainees were beaten to death by British prison guards. Accusing the British and 
Kenyan governments of an “absolute classic case of covering up,” Castle mobilized the Labour 
Party, and some two hundred of her party colleagues in Parliament voted for an independent 
investigation into alleged abuse in detention camps in Kenya.73  
Owing to this increased public scrutiny and the perceived risk of infiltration, officials in 
both London and Nairobi felt the pressure to do everything possible to stem leaks about Britain’s 
repressive counterinsurgency regime. In their WATCH circular, Kenyan officials pulled heavily 
from the Ugandan and Tanganyikan experiences. As in Uganda, WATCH would be overseen by 
authorized officers who were British subjects of European descent. These individuals were given 
similar guidelines as to which documents merited a WATCH designation—those that might 
cause embarrassment, imperil the defense of the Commonwealth, or reveal a source. But Kenya 
added an additional qualifier. No papers should be made available to a future government which 
“[gave] a political party in power an unfair or improper advantage over an opposition party, by 
possession of delicate information liable to be exploited in a party interest.”74  
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Colonial officials thus justified their censorship of archives as part of the ongoing 
civilizing mission of empire, cloaking their efforts to bury evidence of British indiscretions in the 
argument that African politicians were too facile to be trusted with unlimited access to 
information, even after independence. This stipulation also dovetailed with colonial 
administrators’ Cold War concerns. They did not wish to leave behind incriminating materials 
that, if discovered, might embolden African politicians to turn away from the Commonwealth 
and towards the Soviet Union or China. These two concerns contradicted each other. African 
politicians were both too simpleminded to govern themselves but too scheming to be trusted. 
The official who penned Kenya’s WATCH circular recognized that he had set local 
offices up for “much tedious work” in examining their files.75 But he reassured them that some 
of it might be quite straightforward. “Before the stamping and segregation of papers is embarked 
on,” he noted, “it should be considered whether many files and documents cannot simply be 
destroyed.”76 Authorized officers were also given the authority “to remove a few significant 
documents in order to render a whole file innocuous, while still useful to the inheritor.”77 These 
instructions followed on from an earlier list of intelligence summaries slated for destruction from 
Kenya’s Senior Assistant Commissioner of Police. In it, the Commissioner gave Special Branch 
officers the authority to destroy any “Provincial and District files not covered by this directive,” 
though with that cautionary advice that old material “should not be destroyed merely because it 
is old.”78 As in Uganda, officials had the power not simply to destroy or to migrate, but through a 
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process of selective destruction, to significantly alter the contents of a single file, and thus the 
historical record. 
 
“Certain Surplus Documents” 
In a late bid to fully synthesize the archival sorting operations that had grown up 
organically in East Africa, Britain’s Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod dispatched official 
instructions to Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya in May 1961.79 This telegram formally initiated 
Operation Legacy. But much of Macleod’s directions merely endorsed aspects of operations 
already underway in these colonies. In truth, Macleod was looking ahead with this telegraph, just 
as much as he was looking back. The Colonial Office hoped to harness the East African 
experience for use in future colonies, just as Tanganyika, Uganda, and Kenya had drawn upon 
the logistics of decolonizations in Gold Coast, Malaya, Ceylon, and India.80  
Unlike the case of Malaya, no official report exists detailing the physical destruction of 
files in Uganda and Kenya. Authorized officers were required to make certificates for every file 
destroyed, but few of these certificates have survived.81 Historians have, however, pieced 
together fragments of the story. The historian David Anderson, for example, recalls an Oxford 
garden party in 2011, attended by well-to-do retirees celebrating the royal nuptials of William 
and Kate. He recounts how one woman, a former file clerk at Government House in Nairobi, 
                                                        
79 TNA: CO 822/2935, Macleod to Uganda, Kenya, Zanzibar, the East African High Commission, 3 May 1961.  
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 53 
casually described how she “[took] bundles of documents onto the governor’s lawn and [stuffed] 
them into a burning brazier.” Apparently unaware of the sensitive nature of the information she 
was divulging, she added that the “fires never ended”—scenes reminiscent of Delhi in 1947.82 
Officials in Uganda also sought some efficient way of burning their materials. In May 1962, 
having reviewed all DG papers, the chief secretary noted that the government’s incinerator was 
“not sufficiently secure for this large volume of paper.” As an alternative, staff suggested that 
“he might consider using the furnace at [the] Lugazi Sugar factory.”83 The surviving 
documentary record gives no indication of how the documents were ultimately destroyed. But 
given sugar’s central role in the expansion of the British Empire, it was almost poetic that 
colonial officials contemplated using the facilities of a sugar processing plant to destroy Britain’s 
“dirty” record in Uganda.  
Bearing in mind Malaya’s difficulty in destroying such a large amount of paper, in his 
May 1961 telegram, Colonial Secretary Iain Macleod offered an additional option to Tanganyika, 
Uganda, and Kenya. “It is permissible, as an alternative for destruction by fire,” he telexed, “for 
documents to be packed in weighted crates and dumped in very deep and current-free water at 
maximum practicable distance from the coast.”84 Indeed, C.E.R. Darby, the Colonial Office 
mandarin tasked with overseeing Operation Legacy from London, went even further. “Dumping 
in the sea is preferable to destruction by fire,” he told one official in late April, because 
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otherwise “it is difficult to ensure that all paper is properly burnt.”85 Over the next few years, 
several colonial governments would take up this offer. 
But despite their best efforts to avoid another “pall of smoke” moment, the purging of 
documents in Kenya and Uganda did not go unnoticed. In the summer of 1961, a young Oxford 
PhD student named Robert Rotburg presented himself at the Central Government Offices in 
Nairobi, seeking access to confidential colonial records to support his dissertation research. 
According to T. Neil—permanent secretary to the chief secretary—Rotburg was one of a 
“continuous stream of research scholars of one sort and another turning up here in Nairobi.” Neil 
added that “we generally have three or four sitting around our officers collecting material for 
their PhDs.” Rotburg, an American, had clearly left an impression on Neil, but despite his 
impeccable academic history as a “Harvard man,” Neil denied him access. At the same time, 
Neil pulled Rotburg aside and casually noted that, even if he could grant him access, staff were 
in the process of reorganizing the archive. The logistics of this, Neil suggested, would have made 
working in the papers impossible. “I may have mentioned that we were burning certain surplus 
documents,” Neil later reported to the Colonial Office. Quite by chance, Rotburg’s host in 
Nairobi was Clive Sanger, the local correspondent of the Guardian.86 
Neil reported to London that, Harvard man or not, Rotburg was “undoubtedly the source” 
of the dramatic article in the Guardian that followed under Sanger’s byline: “Bonfire of 
Documents, Kenya Burning Secret Papers.” Sanger described how colonial officials had been 
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busy burning classified documents from the last two decades, including a considerable number of 
files on the Mau Mau Uprising. “In the Central province, it is believed about three quarters of the 
secret, confidential, and restricted papers of the last decade are being burned,” he reported. “In 
one district, which was a center of Mau Mau activities, more than four hundred files are being 
destroyed.”87 Three days later, the East African Standard picked up the story. In their report, 
Neil himself was quoted as confirming that some records had been incinerated, while also 
arguing that there was “no intrinsic or historical value in the documents destroyed.”88 
The exposé in the papers followed heated exchanges over the summer of 1961 between 
the Colonial Office and British academics who had heard rumors of the fires in local Kenyan 
archives. In July, a meeting of the British Academy’s Archaeological and Historical Advisory 
Committee for Colonial Territories met to discuss “reports to the effect that orders had been 
issued by British colonial governments to destroy certain documents of a confidential nature in 
anticipation of the transfer of power to independent African governments.”89 Committee 
members registered specific concern about the diaries of District Officers in the colonies, 
imploring officials “to take suitable measures to ensure the preservation of these District 
Notebooks, preferably in some central and accessible place [within the colony].”90 The Colonial 
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Office easily outmaneuvered these metropolitan academics and their petitions, just as ministers 
and civil servants had cast aside the criticisms of Barbara Castle and the majority of the 
Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP) over the Hola massacre.  
But in Uganda, protests came from a potentially more dangerous source. Despite the 
pains that authorities had taken to ensure that the “DG” classification system remained secret, in 
August 1962, George Magezi—an African minister then serving in Uganda’s responsible 
government—wrote to colonial administrators in Entebbe of his “great regret that, at a number of 
sites, some old files are being destroyed.” While noting that “this may be a policy of the past,” 
Magezi set down a marker in the transition to independence. “The present [responsible] 
Government requires every file that has not yet been destroyed to be preserved,” adding that any 
further destruction would require his permission.91  
Officials in Uganda had taken great care in their efforts to keep the DG system a secret. 
In Gulu, a single official was sent out to all of the northern district offices to complete the entire 
sorting process on his own. The goal was “to avoid the proliferation of [“dirty” DG] 
correspondence which would otherwise occur.”92 And when communication became necessary, 
officials followed strict rules on how to mark files properly to avoid accidental interception by 
Africans, placing their letters in double sealed envelopes.93 These exacting efforts to ensure 
secrecy at all costs were replicated in other colonies. For instance, one official later sorting 
documents in North Borneo reported that the classified nature of his work often meant that he 
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was confined to the claustrophobic confines of his “brief-case and a corner of the strong room at 
the Secretariat.” His working environment was not aided by the fact that the “air-conditioning 
had broken down at the time leaving the prison cell where [he] work[ed] very hot and stuffy.”94 
Despite the best efforts of the colonial state, Operation Legacy was not foolproof. George 
Magezi did not indicate how he had heard about the ongoing destruction of records in 1962. But 
in Bunyoro, the District Commissioner reported that while an African official had taken charge 
of the civil service in the Masindi region as planned, the local transition had not been registered 
properly at the national level, meaning that the office continued to receive DG material not 
cleared for Africans. As a result, this unauthorized African official had seen one of Marquand’s 
follow-up circulars, which began with an especially ominous opening line: “The ‘purging’ of 
files should now have been completed in the Protectorate. . .”95 Thus, while British colonial 
officials could have guessed that George Magezi likely knew the details of the DG system, they 
merely responded to his protests by noting that the destruction of documents that “ceased to have 
any current value” was simply down to “the shortage of storage space.”96 
Whitehall’s worst fears about the vulnerability of its secret archives seemed to be 
confirmed a few years later when a large wooden box filled with classified files from Basutoland 
mysteriously broke open while enroute to the Colonial Office. Photos from the subsequent 
investigation showed files clearly visible through a gash in the side of the box, which alone 
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contained forty-four bundles of files, neatly tied together with pink ribbon (see Figure 1.4). 
These files detailed the internal affairs of Basutoland from 1938 to 1961, including all 
communications between the colonial administration and the British Secretary of State.  
The RAF Counter Intelligence Section initiated an inquiry and interviewed the flight 
crew transporting the shipment to try to determine if anything had been stolen. They were most 
anxious about the flight’s refueling stop, where the plane had sat on the ground for a time in now 
independent Kenya. For his part, the pilot recalled his surprise at seeing that one of the 
protruding files was about an African political conference in 1958. The RAF report read that “he 
Figure 1.4 A box of classified documents damaged while being migrated from Basutoland to London. TNA: FCO 141/19930, 
photos, "Annex 'C' to report 4D/C41/22/65/CIS," 24 June 1965. 
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thought this was peculiar and wondered why the documents were being returned to the UK.” 97 
Though inspectors ruled that nothing had been stolen, their quick reaction gives an idea of how 
seriously British officials took the threat of subversion.98 When considered from the viewpoint of 
officials concerned with the alleged existential threats of the Soviet Union and fifth column 
communist sympathizers, such a security break was an immediate cause for anxiety.  
 Pushback to Operation Legacy did not only come from people who found out about it by 
accident. In at least one case, a colonial official objected to the state’s efforts to conceal the 
destruction and migration of archives—but not because he believed that all records should be 
handed over to the future government in Kenya. “It will not be possible to conceal from an alert 
[African] parliamentary secretary the existence of these collected files,” the official argued. 
Instead, he “rather believe[d] in jumping before one is pushed.” Instead, the official argued that 
they should simply tell African officials “that we [the British] are the custodians of certain 
Imperial secrets which we are not allowed to disclose to him.”99 This paternalistic approach 
positioned the British as the protectors of imperial knowledge to which Africans were not a 
party. 
Back in Uganda, on 5 October 1962, just four days before the Protectorate’s 
independence, staff loaded four plywood crates filled with DG documents into a Special Branch 
van. They then drove the files to Nairobi and put them on a flight to London.100 Kenyan officials 
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had considerably longer to mull over which records to migrate or destroy ahead of their 
December 1963 independence.101 The WATCH procedure itself was abolished in May 1963, and 
officials were told to burn all circulars and to destroy their rubber “W” stamps.102 Just over a 
year after Uganda’s records were migrated, Kenyan officials airmailed five wooden crates filled 
with files to England.103 These included over a thousand personnel files of people who had 
worked in Kenya’s police, prisons, and intelligence services during the Mau Mau uprising.104  
As an addendum, Governor Malcolm Macdonald wrote to Colonial Secretary Duncan 
Sandys—Winston Churchill’s son-in-law and a long-serving Tory grandee on the party’s right 
wing.105 Macdonald, himself a former Cabinet minister in the National Government of the 1930s, 
told Sandys that he was sending a priority package along with the WATCH consignment: a 
“large black leather-bound folder weighing about thirty pounds.” Inside it were the original 
copies of some ninety-one treaties negotiated between the Imperial East African Company and 
local indigenous peoples from 1887 and 1894. These documents had no bearing on the stated 
considerations of Kenya’s WATCH circular. They did not threaten to endanger the security of 
the Commonwealth or to embarrass the British government. Instead, Macdonald’s rationale for 
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migrating them was simple. The treaties were being “transferred to you for safe keeping,” he told 
Sandys, “on account of their historical value which it is thought will be better appreciated in 
London than elsewhere.”106 
 
“Down to Davey Jones” 
 By December 1961, after the initiation of Operation Legacy in East Africa, Darby at the 
Colonial Office reported that “we have now almost a standard instruction to Governors of 
emergent territories on the disposal of records.”107 With the approach of independence in the 
Caribbean, he suggested that Sir Solomon Hochoy—governor of Trinidad—be forwarded the 
same circular. Hochoy had recently written to the Colonial Office seeking early guidance on 
what to do with government archives. “We do not wish to celebrate Independence Day with a 
holocaust of burnt ODC [Overseas Defense Committee] papers,” he wrote.108 The Colonial 
Office happily encouraged the governor to get a head start on burning files. In lieu of this, they 
also alerted Hochoy to the convenient alternative they had offered East African stations—that of 
ditching documents at sea.109 Jamaica’s Governor Sir Kenneth Blackburne, who received the 
circular in March 1962, assured the Colonial Office that the “matter [was] already well in hand” 
in Kingston.110 
                                                        
106 TNA: FCO 822/3199, Malcolm Macdonald to Sandys, 11 September 1963. For a list of the treaties migrated, see 
TNA: FCO 822/3199, “Treaty between the tribes of East Africa and the Imperial British East Africa Company,” 
n.d., Saving no. 1087/63. 
107 TNA: FCO 141/19928, Darby to Mr. Skinner, Gen. Dunlop, Mr. Whitelegg, and Mr. Williams, no. 43, 13 
December 1961. In Colonial Office parlance, an “emergent territory” was a colony approaching independence. 
108 TNA: FCO 141/19928, Sir Solomon Hochoy to A.R. Thomas, 1 December 1961. 
109 TNA: FCO 141/19928, Thomas to Hochoy, 21 December 1961. 
110 TNA: FCO 141/19928, Sir Kenneth Blackburne to Douglas Williams, 27 March 1962. 
 62 
 Elsewhere in the Caribbean, the task facing colonial governments was less routine. In 
British Honduras, Mother Nature had already accomplished much of the Colonial Office’s dirty 
work for them. With 160mph winds, Hurricane Hattie, the strongest storm of the 1961 season 
barreled through Belize City, gutting Government House—and its archives. While some files 
were recovered from the wreckage, Governor Peter Stallard reported in October 1962 that their 
condition was so poor that the local MI5 officer decided to burn them all. Other recovered files 
were taken to Jamaica, but they were little more than “wads of congealed papers.” Stallard 
assured the Colonial Office that careful attention would be paid to the sorting and destruction of 
documents generated since the storm. “The smoke from small bonfires will fill the air for a few 
weeks to come and at subsequent intervals,” he wrote.111  
 The situation was much more complicated in British Guiana, where the colonial 
administration only amounted to a handful of Europeans. As Darby noted in November 1962, 
even in Uganda, “with its relatively very large number of expatriates, [they] found the sifting of 
classified papers no easy task.”112 The undertaking in Georgetown was daunting, with much of 
the work falling on two clerks at Government House, Mrs. Sutherland and Miss Dalgleish, who 
were deemed “entirely trustworthy.”113 But given the great amount of discretion in the task of 
sorting documents, some officials questioned placing such a heavy burden on two low-level 
clerks—and women at that. “Some responsible officer would be required” to supervise the 
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process, one official wrote, adding that he “imagine[d] the ladies could not be set to plow 
through the archives unsupervised.”114 
 Three years later, they were still dealing with this problem in Guiana. In December 1965, 
Paul Thirsk—the governor’s assistant—wrote to London to seek a reprieve from some of the 
requirements set out in the now standard circular on Operation Legacy, including the mandate 
that certificates of destruction had to be written up and logged for every file destroyed. Thirsk 
complained that, “with the volume and diversity of paper here and the shortage of time and staff 
for listing purposes, these requirements are onerous and bog down our efforts at destruction.” He 
wondered, instead, if his office could “merely [report] the date [of the files] up to which we have 
destroyed.”115 Officials in Guiana had been pressing this point with the Colonial Office for three 
months, imagining that once a fixed date had been set for independence “an orgy of destruction 
will then become a practical proposition.”116 But in the meantime, it would all be down to “a 
44-gallon petrol drum and some hot work.” As had been the case in Malaya, Sutherland and 
Dalgleish were eventually assisted by the local commander of the British garrison who had 
“undertaken to provide more adequate facilities for disposal by burning.”117 
Darby reported back to Thirsk in December that staff only needed to draw up destruction 
certificates for documents with the highest graded security classification, significantly lightening 
the load for staff in Georgetown.118 He also imparted another useful shortcut for the overworked 
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employees. “It does not follow that because one paper in an otherwise innocent file would be 
embarrassing, if passed on to your Ministers, that the whole file need be withheld,” he wrote. “In 
the best regulated offices, papers have been known to disappear from files leaving no trace but 
the word ‘removed’ and a completely illegible signature!”119 In Uganda and Kenya, officials had 
received tacit approval to doctor or “slant” individual files. The same was true in Guiana. Indeed, 
Darby and others repeated this same pithy phrasing, almost verbatim, in surviving 
correspondence with Colonial Office officials in North Borneo, Malta, and to an official at the 
British Embassy in South Africa.120 Given the constraints put upon the small staff in Guiana, and 
that much was left to the local discretion of two clerks and a naval officer, the bulk of the 
documentary record in Georgetown seems to have been destroyed. This fact was borne out in 
2013 when the Hanslope Disclosure contained no papers on British Guiana, though some 
historians have used this curious dearth in files to question whether the FCO has been forthright 
about releasing all migrated files.121 
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The final case for which there are significant records relating to Operation Legacy draws 
the story back to Southeast Asia where this chapter began. In 1963, North Borneo, Sarawak, and 
(initially but not ultimately) Brunei planned to join Malaya and Singapore to form the state of 
Malaysia on September 16. Two Colonial Office officials, by then ominously nicknamed 
“harbingers,” were dispatched to Sarawak and North Borneo with directions to sort the archives 
under the terms of Operation Legacy.122 
Sarawak’s harbinger Murray McMullen found a small colonial administration that “had 
been rudely shoved into the 20th Century” with the sudden onset of independence. Staff “under 
very heavy strain” juggled preparations for federation with the ongoing fight against a 
communist insurgency in the region.123 McMullen’s first task was to conduct a survey of the 
Central Registry in Kuching. Beginning with files of a lower security grading, he wrote to Frank 
Mills of the British high commission in Kuala Lumpur that he was “rather alarmed to find in 
three or four cases highly prejudicial or embarrassing documents classified as ‘Secret’ tucked 
away in ‘Confidential’ files.” In his opinion, this threw the whole archive into question, in that 
“an unfriendly official might well light upon a confidential paper containing, for example, 
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phrases which he, and indeed the Tengku [sic] himself, might regard as unflattering to the 
Tengku [sic], and make mischief with it.”124  
The task at hand was overwhelming, with the files in question amounting to a “vast list, 
with literally thousands of entries” on almost seventy typed pages. Moreover, on the frontlines of 
the Cold War, busy Sarawak officials were unable to offer McMullen any assistance, beyond a 
“(very) part-time cheerful Australian girl.”125 “They state categorically,” McMullen wrote, “that 
they cannot with their exiguous staff fight a war, prepare at break-neck speed for Malaysia, and 
at the same time spare a responsible officer full time till M-Day [Malaysia Day] to go through 
their files folio by folio.”126 McMullen had some sympathy with this staffing shortage, and he 
made a start on the work alone, “rush[ing] smartly through [the Confidential files] to get an idea 
of the subjects, scope, and sensitivity of each and [making] a snap decision.” In that moment, he 
decided a file’s fate—legacy, migration, or disposal.  
A week later, Mills wrote back, supporting this approach. “As we see it. . .your main task 
should be the withdrawal of embarrassing papers,” he wrote. “We cannot advise you from here 
on precisely what is and what is not likely to be embarrassing,” adding that “you will just have to 
make up your mind on the spot.”127 Two months later, Mills went even further, telling McMullen 
that he would “just have to exercise the wisdom of Solomon himself” when deciding the fate of 
specific records.128 Mills gave the harbinger in North Borneo, Terence O’Brien, more 
                                                        
124 TNA: FCO 141/12758, McMullen to Mills, 8 May 1963. 
125 TNA: FCO 141/12758, McMullen to Mills, 11 May 1963. 
126 TNA: FCO 141/12758, McMullen to Mills, 8 May 1963. 
127 TNA: FCO 141/12758, Mills to McMullen, 18 May 1963. 
128 TNA: FCO 141/13039, Mills to McMullen, 20 July 1963. 
 67 
enthusiastic encouragement. “You are so obviously enjoying the processes of destruction,” he 
wrote, that “we feel we can leave it to you to rid the world of all unnecessary encumbrances of 
this kind.”129 
Mills also passed along the hackneyed Colonial Office advice that papers could easily be 
removed from files, so long as they were backed by illegible signatures.130 And in June, the chief 
secretary in the government of Sarawak confirmed this directive in a handwritten note to 
McMullen. “You are authorized to remove individual papers from otherwise harmless files at 
your discretion,” he wrote.131 Officials in North Borneo were given similar leeway. “I should be 
grateful,” Turner, the chief secretary in Jesselton, wrote in February 1963, “if every Secretariat 
Officer, and particularly Schedule Officers, will develop the practice of rapidly checking through 
files. . .with a critical eye to see whether there are any passages in correspondence which should 
be excised because they may hurt personal feelings or be critical of local personalities.”132 
By June, McMullen provided a summary of his sorting activities. Of the 1,200 files 
handled thus far, he had flagged 189 for the state government in Kuching, 467 for the Malaysian 
federal government, and 238 for the British high commission in Kuala Lumpur. Twelve files 
would go to an as-of-yet undetermined local archive, perhaps the municipal museum, while 382 
would be destroyed.133 O’Brien in North Borneo had been much more ruthless in his six-week 
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stint, with McMullen admitting to Mills that “no doubt I could apply the flame more searingly, as 
Terence has evidently done.”134 For his part, O’Brien was later blunt in his appraisal of his 
clear-out. “What’s burnt won’t be missed,” he reported to the high commission.135 
But in the end, fire would not be McMullen’s method of choice. Relaying to the high 
commission that he had received approval directly from the Colonial Office to ditch the papers at 
sea, McMullen made plans to send the files “down to Davey Jones in current-free, deep water.” 
He was lucky, he noted, in that Kuching hosted a Royal Navy detachment and also that they had 
the deep-water “Mindanao trench at hand.”136 McMullen arranged for crates of migrated files to 
be airlifted to Kuala Lumpur.137 At the same time, John Higham at the Colonial Office alerted 
the harbinger in Brunei, A.M. Mackintosh, that ditching at sea was a good option. “In moments 
of despair,” Higham wrote, “I shall encourage myself by thinking of you paddling your solitary 
canoe, taking a heavily weighted bag of documents to their doom!”138 
No such exaggeration was necessary in Sarawak, where McMullen planned to “draft a 
couple of intelligent policemen” to physically move the files into ten perforated drums.139 In 
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mid-August, the minesweeper HMS Maryton set sail from Kuching where it dealt with the 
documents consigned to destruction. Under the cover of darkness on 14 August 1963, the barrels 
were “jettisoned” into the South China Sea with military precision. “All drums were seen to 
sink,” the ship’s Lieutenant Commander reported, sending along the precise geographic 
coordinates of each barrel’s final resting place (see Figure 1.5).140  
 
“Unrewarding Detective Work” 
Despite the mission of Operation Legacy to migrate or destroy colonial archives, by late 
1965, a substantial number of documents had been consigned to a third fate: temporary storage 
on the premises of British High Commissions around the former empire. At the time of 
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independence, many colonial administrations had hastily recalled documents to the residences of 
future British envoys, spaces they knew would remain sovereign British territory.141 Officials at 
the Colonial Office later highlighted the need to track down these papers. “At some time in the 
near future, we might send a circular to all former colonial territories who have received 
independence since the war (i.e. from Ceylon onwards, but excluding Somalia),” D. Gregory 
wrote to the department’s librarian in October 1965. They should ask “each BHC [British High 
Commission] to confirm if they still have material (both classified and unclassified) which was 
passed to them on independence.”142  
In London, too, officials began to consider the loose ends and long-term implications of 
the migrated archive. The mass of files was housed, first, in Room 420 at the Colonial Office. 
But even by 1963, as more colonies became independent, it was becoming clear that the onsite 
facilities were inadequate for storing such a large volume of paper. “Can you arrange for me to 
be supplied with another security cupboard pls?” Gregory wrote to a colleague that August. “The 
last cupboard has been completely filled with Kenya material and the North Borneo files are at 
present locked in Room 420,” he added.143 Gregory began to seek out alternatives. “Since this 
storage problem was first raised, I have learnt that the Public Record Office (PRO) could provide 
us with a ‘security cage’ at their Hayes repository,” he reported to his colleagues. “Not only 
would this solve our problem with regard to the overseas papers but could be considered for the 
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storage of the other classified files from the CO.”144 But despite the PRO’s assistance in storing 
the documents, they ultimately refused to take possession of them. In March 1982, staff at the 
PRO declared that the migrated archive did not amount to the definition of British state records 
under the terms of the Public Relations Act, 1958. The files stayed in Hayes until 1994 when 
they were transferred to Hanslope Park.145 
Underpinning much of Operation Legacy was the assumption that newly independent 
governments would be too busy with the weighty responsibilities of governing to properly 
examine what was missing from their archives. The Kenyan colonial government’s WATCH 
circular from April 1961 even assured staff that it was highly unlikely that “time will be wasted 
in unrewarding detective work among old records” in the opening days of the newly independent 
government.146 But British officials were also reassured by the knowledge that many friendly 
expats would continue in their roles in independent governments, at least in the short term.  
It took Kenyan officials three years to raise the issue of the archive with their British 
counterparts.147 In July 1967, Leonard Kibinge—a civil servant at the Kenyan Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs and future Ambassador to the United States—wrote to James S. Arthur, 
counsellor at the British High Commission in Nairobi. Kibinge explained that, just before 
independence, African ministers were told that “certain documents” had been withdrawn to 
Britain. “It now appeared to our Archivists,” Kibinge noted, “that ‘certain documents’ included 
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the entire archives of the Governor’s Office at State House and other documents from several 
Government Ministries.” Kibinge listed nearly a dozen broad themes for which no documentary 
record existed in the Kenyan archives. Chief among these were files relating to the colonial 
emergency of 1949-1958. His government wished to open discussions with London on the return 
of these series “to form a natural part of the Kenya Archives.”148 
James Arthur duly forwarded the Kenyan request to his superiors in London, who were 
by then a part of the newly organized Commonwealth Office—the result of a merger between the 
Colonial Office and the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO). “I suggested to Kibinge—
knowing nothing of this subject—that there must be a precedent for such a request in the 
Commonwealth,” Arthur told London. Unaware of Operation Legacy, by this remark, Arthur 
meant that British officials might have faced this type of request before and established a 
precedent through which documents were returned to former colonies. Kibinge had 
misunderstood him. “He did not take very kindly to this observation,” Arthur wrote, “since he 
assumed, as people tend to do, that any precedent would operate in the wrong direction!”149 In 
any case, Arthur’s ignorance of Operation Legacy shows the degree to which colonial officials 
remained tight-lipped about their archival migration and destruction program in the years after 
Kenya’s independence. 
Over two months later, Arthur had yet to receive a formal response from London to relay 
to Kibinge.150 Again, he sought guidance. “This is quite a difficult business,” L. Reid—an 
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official in the East and Southern Africa Department at the Commonwealth Office—scrawled 
across Arthur’s note.151 Reid wrote back to explain the delay. Officials had classed Kibinge’s 
request as “one of the less pressing of our problems.” “I am conscious that it must be 
embarrassing for you to have to tell Kibinge that you are still without a reply,” Reid noted. But, 
for the time being, Arthur would have to continue to do just that. Reid also prepared Arthur for 
the eventual UK response, which would not satisfy the Kenyans. “A reply when it comes will not 
be very helpful,” he wrote, but he hoped that it would adequately explain “why it is impossible to 
meet the Kenyan request.”152 Arthur was content. “We will do our best to stonewall the Kenyans 
until the pressure eases up a bit,” he reported to London.153  
In the meantime, an official at the Commonwealth Office had drawn up a memo, 
crosschecking the series mentioned in Kibinge’s letter with the files that had been migrated to 
London. Overall, there were three hundred boxes of files in the office, amounting to about a 
hundred linear feet of shelf space. The vast majority of those documents related to the period of 
the colonial emergency. There was also some miscellaneous material from well before 1950, 
including the aforementioned collection of nineteenth century treaties from the Imperial British 
East Africa Company whose historical significance had been considered of greater value in the 
UK. The official reported that the migrated archive did not contain files from the colony’s agent 
in London, the Council of State, or papers relating to the distribution of honors and awards—all 
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series that Kibinge had alleged were in London.154 Unable to locate them in the migrated papers, 
the reasonable assumption was that these files had been destroyed. 
Acquiescing to the Kenyan request, or even divulging too much information about it, 
threatened to unravel the whole sordid history of Operation Legacy. This consideration was at 
the heart of the official response to Kibinge. Speaking cryptically, even to Arthur, about the 
extent of Operation Legacy—which he did not name—Michael Scott of the Commonwealth 
Office termed the sorting of documents at the end of empire a “security exercise.” It was carried 
out by the governor “in his capacity as representative of the British Government and not in his 
capacity as Head of the Local Administration.” The British government had never formally 
admitted to the Kenyan government that it had withdrawn or destroyed papers, and Scott advised 
Arthur to “stand fast on this position” when he spoke to Kibinge. Any indication otherwise 
“could affect treatment of records and files withdrawn from other Colonial Territories,” he 
admitted. They must be careful of not setting a precedent.155  
Despite all of this, Scott conceded that there were clearly examples of documents that 
should not have been migrated under the terms of Operation Legacy. The historic treaty 
documents from the nineteenth century seemed an obvious candidate for repatriation to 
Kenya.156 But Scott cautioned against this, even as a gesture of goodwill. “The moment we 
return any records whatsoever,” Scott stated, “there is the danger that we should find ourselves 
under constant pressure to make good other gaps that were thought to exist in the records of the 
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Kenya Government.” He advised Arthur to tell Kibinge that documents withdrawn or destroyed 
“concerned the development of U.K. policies.”157 
Scott also made one further attempt to rationalize British policy. “The removal of these 
documents,” he wrote, “was in accord with the usual policy by which the secret records of one 
Government are not left for the use of its successors.”158 Scott’s comments drew back to 1957 
Kauala Lumpur, when Donald MacGillivray justified the removal of Malaya documents to the 
Tunku along similar lines. Just as individual governments in Britain were not allowed to peruse 
the Cabinet papers of their predecessors, neither should governments be capable of doing so after 
formal independence.159 In these very final moments of imperial control, MacGillivray and, later, 
Scott spun Britain’s illicit destruction of documents as a teachable moment for local leaders. 
Withholding Cabinet papers from one government to the next was part of the fabric of 
parliamentary democracy. “I assume that the same practice will be followed in this country,” 
MacGillivray had told the Tunku.160 The farce of the “civilizing mission” held until the very end. 
Over the next four decades, former colonies would petition Britain for the return of 
documents. They would also take their case to the UN, marshalling the support of UNESCO, 
which included archives in its definition of intellectual property in 1970.161 The Kenyan 
government would approach the UK government again in 1974 about the migrated archive. And 
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in 1981, Nairobi even dispatched a delegation of archivists to the PRO in London to track down 
the records—but to no avail.162 The British government remained firmly opposed to any such 
request for the return of archives and, in the end, only confirmed the existence of the migrated 
archive when forced to do so under the legal terms of discovery in 2011. Even after their 
“discovery,” the documents were not returned to their countries of origin but housed at the 
British National Archives at Kew as series FCO 141. 
 
Regrets 
 In June 2013, after the five Kenyan claimants won their civil suit against the British 
government, Foreign Secretary William Hague rose in the House of Commons to offer an 
apology to the victims of torture during the Mau Mau Uprising. “We understand the pain and the 
grief felt by those who were involved in the events of the emergency,” Hague said, adding that 
the “British government recognizes that Kenyans were subjected to torture and other forms of 
ill-treatment at the hands of the colonial administration.” He registered London’s sincere 
“regrets” for these abuses, especially because “they marred Kenya's progress to 
independence.”163 On this occasion, Hague made no mention of Operation Legacy. But in 2013, 
the last migrated records were released to the public at the National Archives—or so the 
government claims.  
The revelations of the Hanslope Disclosure have called into question the basis upon 
which historians approach the British state and colonial archives, as well as the narrative and 
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timeline of the “end of empire.” Those documents that survived to detail the skeleton of 
Operation Legacy show that British officials were “thinking historically” as they sought to 
censor and conceal embarrassing records—documents that unmasked the fiction of Britain’s 
benevolent empire and so-called “civilizing mission.” Far from an objective repository of 
historical events, the archive itself must be recognized as the principal agent of a state-sponsored 
cover-up. By challenging these basic historical and historiographical misunderstandings, 
historians can contemplate an alternative narrative of Britain’s late empire, one that stretched 
well into the Thatcher years and lingers to the present day.
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CHAPTER 2: CONTESTED POLITICAL IMAGINARIES OF DECOLONIZATION IN 
ZIMBABWE-RHODESIA AND BRITAIN 
 
In November 1965, Ian Smith—prime minister of the self-governing British colony of 
Southern Rhodesia—declared his country’s independence from the British Empire. The intent 
was to preempt British plans to devolve power to a black majority government, as had been done 
in Zambia, Malawi, and other African states. Smith’s Unilateral Declaration of Independence, or 
“UDI,” as it became known, stirred controversy in Britain between those who felt a special 
kinship with British settler communities abroad and those who viewed Smith’s actions as a 
national embarrassment and an affront to the rule of law. Unwilling to commit troops to depose 
the UDI regime, Harold Wilson’s Labour government instead imposed sanctions on Rhodesia. In 
1970, at the helm of an increasingly isolated state, Smith declared Rhodesia a republic, 
effectively deposing the Queen as the head of state and severing all formal ties to the UK.1  
At the same time, insurgent groups began a violent campaign against the well-equipped 
Rhodesian Security Forces, supplied by the sympathetic South African government. Smith’s 
troops successfully defended the regime against the allied militias of Joshua Nkomo’s Zimbabwe 
African People’s Union (ZAPU) and Robert Mugabe’s Zimbabwe African National Union 
(ZANU), which combined into a joint fighting force called the Patriotic Front. This war—known 
as the Second Chimurenga—carried on for years, with no end in sight. But in 1975, the 
geopolitical map of southern Africa rapidly changed as Portugal withdrew from its colonies in 
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Angola and Mozambique. Sensing the increased threat of a growing collection of independent 
African states on its northern borders, the apartheid government initiated a policy of détente with 
its neighbors, engaging in direct talks with the leaders of the Frontline States. As a result, South 
Africa’s material support for Ian Smith and his counterinsurgency campaign began to wane.1 
By November 1977, Smith was forced to compromise, reluctantly declaring that he now 
accepted majority rule’s inevitability, if not its merits as a concept. To undercut the popular 
legitimacy of the Patriotic Front, he began to pursue a separate peace. After months of 
negotiations, in March 1978, Ian Smith, Bishop Abel Muzorewa of the United African National 
Council (UANC), and the leaders of two other legal African political parties in Rhodesia agreed 
to a so-called “Internal Settlement.” Under the settlement, an interim “Transitional Government” 
made up of these parties jointly governed Rhodesia for a further year until they had agreed on a 
constitution. In April 1979, elections were then held under universal suffrage in which Bishop 
Muzorewa was elected Prime Minister of a rechristened state, “Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.” But with 
Nkomo and Mugabe denouncing the Bishop as a traitor, the war raged on unabated. 
By coincidence in Britain, just three weeks later, Margaret Thatcher was elected prime 
minister. Even 15 years after UDI, there was a sense in the international community that 
Rhodesia remained Britain’s unresolved problem. Successive British governments had been 
unable to chart a path forward. Thatcher’s response to the Internal Settlement thus became a 
cause for great speculation, hope, and concern. Would she seek a solution that had a chance of 
bringing an end to the war? Or, as many feared, would she recognize the new state of 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, possibly making the situation even worse?  
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In June 1979, Dr. Kenneth Kaunda, president of Zambia, wrote urgently to Thatcher to 
determine her position. During the campaign, she had made clear that she intended to bolster Ian 
Smith and the white community by diplomatically recognizing Muzorewa as prime minister. 
Although Kaunda knew Thatcher was no natural friend of the Patriotic Front, he sought to 
persuade her that the Internal Settlement contravened the path to independence that was 
supported by both the liberation movement and the international community.2 It could never end 
the war. The trappings of white supremacy, he argued, merely had been “reorganized and 
reconstituted” in Salisbury. Smith was clever, Kaunda implied: “He ha[d] barricaded his 
institutionalized white rebellion with a body of political blacks.”3  
But he went even further. “The highest positive value I would give to [the Internal 
Settlement],” Kaunda wrote, “is that it is one reality, though unfortunate, among many and more 
valuable realities in the current transitional process of Rhodesia from a rebellious colony to a 
free and independent state.”4 Decolonization, then, according to the president of Zambia, was not 
a clear-cut political transfer from colony to independent nation-state—but something much more 
frayed and complex. It was a contested and variable process that opened up several ways 
forward—each of which mobilized their own political imaginaries of usable pasts and futures.5 
For Kaunda, the Internal Settlement was the wrong path, but he did not deny that it was out there 
as an enticing offer to people who sought a viable political alternative to the Patriotic Front.6 
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Thatcher thus inherited a highly disaggregated and contingent process of political transition. 
Before her stood several different political visions of decolonization, each of which came tied to 
serious international and domestic political baggage.  
As Kaunda’s efforts to persuade Margaret Thatcher demonstrate, Britain was very much 
at the center of this story. The contested discourses of decolonization—what he called its 
multiple “realities”—became refracted through British political culture. Factions within British 
politics, especially in the Conservative Party, took up the language and representations of these 
disparate African political imaginaries and became their metropolitan advocates. Right-wing 
Tories, like Julian Amery, John Biggs-Davison, and other members of the Conservative Party’s 
Monday Club fervently supported Bishop Muzorewa. More moderate voices like the future 
Foreign Secretary Lord Carrington and Chancellor of the Exchequer Geoffrey Howe realized that 
a practical settlement involving the Patriotic Front was the only way to end the war.  
Thatcher had to negotiate and manage the political maelstrom that followed her election, 
tempering her own views on Rhodesia to keep the Conservative Party from devolving into its 
own civil war. All of this came at the most crucial moment for the British right in the second half 
of the twentieth-century—the 1979 election and the slow-burning onset of the neo-liberal state, 
leading ultimately to “Thatcherism.”7 This chapter then seeks to read British responses to the 
                                                        
Minister B.J. Vorster viewed the Internal Settlement in Rhodesia as a potential model for resolving a similarly tense 
political situation in Southwest Africa, later Namibia. Sue Onslow, “The South Africa Factor in Zimbabwe’s 
Transition to Independence,” in Cold War in Southern Africa: White Power, Black Liberation, ed. Sue Onslow 
(Abingdon, U.K. and New York, NY: Routledge, 2009), 126. The South African government supported similar 
“internal solutions” at home, in its policy of creating so-called decolonized and home-ruled “Bantustans,” in its 
backing of various groups in Namibia, and, further afield, in its support for opposition forces like Joseph Savimbi’s 
National Union for Total Independence of Angola (UNITA) against the Cuban-backed People’s Movement for the 
Liberation of Angola (MPLA). See Jeremy Harding, “Apartheid’s Last Stand,” London Review of Books 38, 6 
(March 2016): 9-20. 
7 Historians, biographers, and commentators have disagreed on the ideological thrust and consistency of 
“Thatcherism” as a cohesive ideology. Thatcherism, as a discursive formation, first entered public debates in the 
early 1980s. While Thatcher did not often personally invoke the term, questions about Thatcherism were often put to 
her. Thatcherism, she argued, was a response to the question of who governs Britain; she sought to empower people 
 82 
Rhodesia crisis as a vehicle for understanding the fractured nature of the political culture of 
British Conservatism in the early 1980s, which was inherently bound up in the concerns of the 
late empire. 
This Zimbabwe-Rhodesia moment also speaks to the nature of decolonization at large. 
The historiography of contemporary Zimbabwe has been characterized by a teleological focus on 
the nation-state as the sole indicator of political progress in Africa. For many scholars, the 
Patriotic Front’s victory was almost inevitable and Muzorewa was nothing more than a 
collaborator.8 The historian Luise White has delivered an important corrective to this line, 
arguing that triumphalist narratives of Zimbabwe’s national liberation have telescoped the period 
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have often been described as economic—not least, a commitment to supply-side economics and the strict control of 
the money supply to combat inflation, at the potential risk of mass unemployment. Thatcher’s official biographer, 
Charles Moore, has helpfully placed more emphasis on the cultural, nationalist, and political implications of 
Thatcherism, including its tacit defense of liberal empire. Charles Moore, Margaret Thatcher: From Grantham to 
the Falklands, vol. I (New York: Knopf, 2013). See also, Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders, eds., Making 
Thatcher’s Britain (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012). 
8 According to this understanding, Muzorewa and his black colleagues were not historical actors in their own right 
but were acted upon by Smith. See, for example, David Caute, Under the Skin: The Death of White Rhodesia 
(London: Allen Lane, 1983), 173-175; 184. For similar portrayals, see Martin Meredith, The Past is Another 
Country: UDI to Zimbabwe (London: Pan Books, 1980), 326; David Martin and Phyllis Johnson, The Struggle for 
Zimbabwe: The Chimurenga War (London: Faber and Faber, 1981), 318; Patrick Bond and Masimba Manyana, 
Zimbabwe’s Plunge: Exhausted Nationalism, Neoliberalism and the Search for Social Justice (Trenton, NJ: Africa 
World Press, 2002), 9; Eliakim M. Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, 1961-1987: A Political History 
of Insurgency in Southern Rhodesia (Trenton, NJ: Africa World Press, 2005), 215; Chengetai J.M. Zvobgo, A 
History of Zimbabwe, 1890-2000 and Postscript, Zimbabwe, 2001-2008 (Newcastle upon Tyne: Cambridge 
Scholars Publishing, 2009); Alois S. Mlambo, A History of Zimbabwe (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
2014). 
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of 1965 to 1980, such that Zimbabwean history is often viewed retrospectively and 
disconcertingly as a linear march to Mugabe.9  
By focusing on Muzorewa and the political vision he articulated in a specific context, this 
chapter recaptures the imagined futures of this moment of decolonization; it contextualizes 
emerging political discourses, explores why people were attracted to them, and ultimately asks 
why these visions faltered or succeeded. For many, the Internal Settlement represented one of 
these new and legitimate political “openings” in the long process of decolonization. The first 
sections describe Abel Muzorewa’s political imaginary of decolonization and the responses in 
southern Africa to the Internal Settlement, recognizing that neither the Bishop, nor the Patriotic 
Front, operated in a vacuum. It then pans to Britain, following the competing discourses of 
decolonization as they emanated out of southern Africa, only to refract through Westminster and 
the existing divisions within the UK Conservative Party. 
 
“Independence, Especially in Africa, Can Go Sour on People” 
After Bishop Muzorewa signed up to the Internal Settlement on 3 March 1978, he left 
immediately for a lobbying tour of London, Washington, and, finally, the United Nations. From 
New York, he telephoned his party headquarters back home, instructing officials to organize a 
rally for the day of his return. Such a gathering, especially if it were well attended, he argued, 
might go a long way toward softening Western leaders’ resistance to the Internal Settlement. By 
                                                        
9 White, Unpopular Sovereignty, 2. White rightly highlights Muzorewa’s use of both the Rhodesian Security Forces 
and his own auxiliary army, Pfumo reVanhu, against the Patriotic Front in 1978-79. She argues this underpins the 
“squalid” and “seedy” story of the Bishop. Ibid., 209. 
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proving that the agreement had achieved popular support, Muzorewa hoped to win international 
recognition for the state.10 
On Sunday, March 19, Muzorewa was whisked from Salisbury Airport to Highfield, an 
African suburb southwest of the city, to deliver his speech to supporters. Inching forward, the 
Bishop’s white Mercedes jostled with a jubilant and surging crowd. As he emerged from the 
backseat of the car, Muzorewa—dressed in the black suit and white collar of a Methodist 
cleric—was met by the deafening roar of the crowd. Mounting a platform, he saw a sea of people 
before him. Even to Muzorewa, ever the optimist, the sheer size of the crowd came as a shock.11 
Attendance estimates ranged from 200,000 to over a million people.12 Muzorewa used this 
opportunity to praise the multiracial virtues of the Internal Settlement, while condemning his 
domestic and foreign enemies. He would later declare that, in this display of popular support, 
“the world had received the answer [i.e. proof] it wanted.”13 But what exactly did Muzorewa 
stand for? What had drawn hundreds of thousands of Zimbabweans to a hastily arranged rally to 
hear a speech about the Bishop’s collaboration with a man who had once declared that majority 
rule would not come to Zimbabwe in a thousand years? What future did Muzorewa, and by 
extension the Internal Settlement, represent to these people?  
                                                        
10 Bishop Abel Tendekai Muzorewa, with Norman E. Thomas, ed., Rise Up and Walk: An Autobiography (London: 
Evans Brothers Limited, 1978), 240. 
11 Ibid. 
12 The Associated Press estimated the crowd at 200,000. AP Reports, “Rhodesia Muzorewa Rally,” AP Online 
Archive, 19 March 1978, http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/ youtube/81b257ac2e0e125cc181f3457f0c7f6a. In his 
autobiography, Muzorewa claimed that over a million people turned out. The meeting was, he said, “one of the 
largest gatherings in the history of Africa” and “it was certainly a larger gathering than any ever held in Zimbabwe.” 
The Bishop argued that the crowd represented one third of the electorate. Muzorewa, Rise Up and Walk, 240. 
13 Muzorewa, Rise Up and Walk, 240.  
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The Bishop’s vision of decolonization was based on the idea of black majority rule, 
operating within a politically stable and economically prosperous multiracial society. In May 
1978, he laid out a sharp geopolitical assessment to John Burns of the New York Times. All 
earlier models of African decolonization had failed; weak political systems had succumbed to 
dictators who pilfered relatively prosperous economies.14 Muzorewa outlined a similar critique in 
his 1978 memoirs: “Too many African states are ruled by small elite cliques who monopolize all 
state power in their own hands and direct the affairs of the state primarily for their own welfare.” 
Elites in systems like these determined everything; they packed parliament, the civil service, and 
industry with loyal stooges. “In such states,” he went on, “the people become mere spectators—
receivers of crumbs dropped by the oligarchic octopus.”15 In turn, the combined weight of 
political and economic instability set off a cycle of coups, counter-coups, and ethnic conflict.16  
Muzorewa aspired to something better than the “oligarchic octopus.” For the Bishop, 
independence was not only about political sovereignty, but also economic security. “Today you 
go to Zambia or Mozambique,” he told the New York Times, “and you find people queuing for 
bread and meal, for salt at 4 a.m. And by the time you are almost at the door it is no longer there. 
I am saying that if independence means just a flag and people are starving, [and] people become 
                                                        
14 When pressed by William F. Buckley, Jr. on Firing Line in 1978 to explain why certain African countries opposed 
the Internal Settlement, the Bishop replied that “when we examine what their transitional arrangements were when 
they took over the reins of power, we find that they had much inferior arrangements than what we extracted from 
Smith ourselves.” Firing Line with William F. Buckley Jr., “The Rhodesian Dilemma,” taped on 21 July 1978, 
available from Amazon Instant video, http://www.amazon.com/dp/B007Q3QUUS/ (accessed 23 March 2016). 
15 Muzorewa, Rise Up and Walk, 254. In effect, Muzorewa was describing the historical phenomenon of what Fred 
Cooper has termed the “gate-keeper state.” In many respects, the Bishop’s critique was prescient. Once independent 
under Mugabe, Zimbabwe fell prey to a cycle of corruption. As Cooper notes, “Zimbabwe’s elite has been 
Africanized by the kind of crony capitalism typical of gate-keeper states: the state does little to encourage an 
autonomous, African business class, but uses its own strategic location to provide opportunities to clients. The poor 
remain poor, and much of Zimbabwe’s population remains in the badly eroded, badly supplied rural sectors.” See 
Cooper, Africa Since 1940, 138. 
16 John F. Burns, “Muzorewa Is ‘Humiliated’ But He’s Not ‘Destroyed,” New York Times, 7 May 1979. 
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poorer than they were under colonialism. I am saying it was worthless.”17 Transfers of 
sovereignty in Africa had not been properly planned. Instead of instituting systems of 
government that would safeguard what he called “true freedom,” nationalist leaders became 
enamored of the “trappings of independence”—things like new flags, diplomatic recognition, 
and promises of wealth.18 “Independence, especially in Africa, can go sour on people,” he 
declared.19 He claimed his goal was to avoid this trend. 
In a speech to the National Press Association in Washington, DC a year later, the Bishop 
continued to develop this idea that political autonomy had to be underpinned by a stable 
economy. Independent African leaders, he said, “now rely on charitable handouts,” alluding to 
the IMF’s aid policies in Africa. “They go round with their begging bowls to keep their countries 
running.”20 What good was majority rule, the Bishop seemed to be asking, if the majority 
remained impoverished? “Independent they may be,” he declared, “but it is paper 
independence.” The key to true freedom was the position of what he called the nation’s “white 
Africans.” 21 By ensuring that white capital stayed in the country, political stability would be 
maintained, allowing him to deliver real social reforms to benefit the population as a whole.  
For Muzorewa, Zimbabwe’s relative uniqueness in Africa—its multiracial society—
would provide the foundation and stability to erase the vestiges of its discriminatory economy.22 
                                                        
17 Muzorewa, quoted in John F. Burns, “Muzorewa Is ‘Humiliated’ But He’s Not ‘Destroyed.”  
18 Muzorewa, Rise Up and Walk, 242. 
19 Ibid, 259. 
20 Muzorewa, “The New Reality in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia,” address to the National Press Club, Washington DC, July 
1979, UDPW/48/388, Patrick Wall papers, Hull History Centre (henceforth, HHC), Hull, UK. 
21 Ibid. 
22 Muzorewa’s political party, though at root an Africanist party, had forged early links with the Rhodesian Centre 
Party, an integrated political movement that argued for a multiracial state. After the demise of Henry Kissinger’s 
Anglo-American peace initiative and the 1976 Geneva talks borne out of it, Muzorewa delivered a rallying cry for 
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But reforms would take place under the rule of law. On the important issue of land reform, 
Muzorewa argued that Zimbabwe’s most fertile tracts, which had been disproportionately 
reserved for white farmers under the Land Tenure Act 1969—leaving the black population on 
overpopulated and overworked Tribal Trust Lands—had to be properly redistributed to rectify 
the grievances of a colonial economy that was exploitative by design. But when land was 
nationalized and redistributed, white farmers would have to be compensated at fair market 
values.23 He would support a mixed economy, one that valued personal initiatives and incentives 
for economic growth, but which maintained state control of services essential to the national 
interest. He termed this system “Zimbabwean Socialism.” Hence, the Bishop sought to maintain 
a balance between reassuring the white community and promising true social reform to the black 
majority. 
Muzorewa’s reputation hinged on his firm pledge to end the ongoing conflict with the 
Patriotic Front. “Use your vote and stop the war,” declared one piece of government propaganda 
printed in newspapers and magazines before his election. “Your vote will show that you are 
united behind your leaders and their determination to stop the fighting.”24 But as scholars have 
been quick to point out, once in power, Muzorewa increasingly utilized the organs of the 
                                                        
multiracialism at a press conference in Salisbury, appealing to his supporters “to bring into the grassroots of the 
ANC all, regardless of color, religion or race, who accept to be free Zimbabweans [sic] and are willing to join us in 
rebuilding Zimbabwe and creating a democratic, non-racial, and prosperous society.” Muzorewa, Rise Up and Walk, 
222-223.  
23 For the Bishop’s land policy, see Muzorewa, Rise Up and Walk, 247-250. 
24 TNA: PREM 19/106, “Use Your Vote and Stop the War” pamphlet in Zimbabwe-Rhodesia Government 
publication entitled “One-Man One-Vote Election: That Is What the People Want,” n.d., c. April 1979. 
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Rhodesian state and his own auxiliary army, Pfumo reVanhu, to assail the Patriotic Front, both 
within Rhodesia’s own borders and in Zambia and Mozambique.25  
While he had made his name in non-violent protests, Muzorewa was never a pacifist, 
instead defending the justifiable use of force. Outlining an almost biblical parable in which an 
innocent family is attacked by a stranger, Muzorewa declared that a strict adherence to 
non-violence, in Gandhi or King’s stead, was futile. “I would pick up the nearest weapon and 
strike the madman,” he stated. “It would be gross foolishness to stand by and watch [the 
assailant] kill my loved ones.” The Bishop’s philosophy of the use of force could be distilled into 
what he termed “righteous violence.”26  
Casting the use of force in religious terms was not out of character for Muzorewa. The 
Bishop was, first and foremost, an evangelical leader. The realms of faith and spirituality were 
hotly contested in 1970s Rhodesia, and much has been written about religion and the liberation 
struggle, including the role of both Christian missions and traditional African faith leaders like 
spirit mediums.27 For his part, Muzorewa, an elected Bishop of the United Methodist Church 
(UMC), combined his pastoral role with a track record of radical politics.  
                                                        
25 Luise White, Unpopular Sovereignty, 15. White states that “Muzorewa’s political party maintained some 
credibility with the political parties and armies in exile until he became the figurehead president [sic] of the short-
lived Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and his guerrillas became a private army.” Ibid., 213. Muzorewa was prime minister, not 
president—but the implication here is that he turned collaborationist and kitted out a poorly trained private army, 
which he let loose in 1978. Ibid., 291. Chung makes a similar argument. “Muzorewa was a peace-loving and 
obedient cleric.” But his “regime came to be identified with a devastating period of bloodshed combined with the 
rhetoric of liberation.” Fay Chung, Re-living the Second Chimurenga: Memories from the Liberation Struggle in 
Zimbabwe (Uppsala: Nordic Africa Institute, 2006), 230.  
26 Muzorewa, Rise Up and Walk, 176. 
27 On African spirit mediums, see especially the seminal study, David Lan, Guns and Rain: Guerrillas and Spirit 
Mediums in Zimbabwe (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1985). As far as mainline Christian churches are 
concerned, see the slightly dated, but nonetheless helpful overview: Terence O. Ranger, “Religious Movements and 
Politics in Sub-Saharan Africa,” African Studies Review, 29, 2 (1986): 1-69; Carl Hallencreutz and Ambrose Moyo, 
Church and State in Zimbabwe (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1988). For the Anglican church, see Michael Lapsley, 
Neutrality or Co-option? Anglican Church and State from 1964 until the Independence of Zimbabwe (Gweru, 
Zimbabwe: Mambo Press, 1986). For the Catholic church, see Ian Linden, The Catholic Church and the Struggle for 
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Muzorewa’s own United Methodist Church was widely associated with the liberation 
struggle. 28 At UANC rallies, individuals often raised placards in support of the Bishop, and in 
AP footage of one such rally in 1977, a banner plastered across the front of a bus was 
emblazoned with his distinctive face, including horned-rimmed glasses and cleric’s collar. 
“HAIL THE MESSIAH,” it read (see Figure 2.1).29 Muzorewa often invoked religious rhetoric 
in his politics, which fueled criticism of him by some commentators on the left. When he 
                                                        
Zimbabwe (London: Longman, 1980) and Janice McLaughlin, On the Frontline: Catholic Missions in Zimbabwe’s 
Liberation War (Harare: Baobab, 1996). For the Methodist church, see Terence O. Ranger, Are We Not Also Men? 
The Samkange Family & African Politics in Zimbabwe, 1920-64 (Harare: Baobab, 1995). For the evangelical 
Lutheran church, see Ngwabi Bhebe, The ZAPU and ZANU Guerrilla Warfare and the Evangelical Lutheran 
Church in Zimbabwe (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1999).  
28 See Ranger, Are We Not Also Men?, 206.  




pe=IncludedProducts&page=81&b=06e570 (accessed 12 February 2019). His public appearances took on what the 
religious studies scholar Carl F. Hallencreutz describes as “confessional elements.” Carl F. Hallencreutz, “General 
Introduction, Policy of Religion: The New Framework” in Church and State in Zimbabwe, eds. Carl F. Hallencreutz 
and Ambrose M. Moyo (Gweru: Mambo Press, 1988), 11. 
Figure 2.1 Poster affixed to the front of a bus at a Muzorewa rally in December 1976. Associated Press online archive. 
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appealed to “Let us establish a state under Almighty God,” the historian Paul Moorcraft 
complained in 1979 that “there was a whiff of Ayatullah Khomeiny [sic] about the triumphant 
Bishop, a streak of puritanism as he mapped out his strategy.”30 Nevertheless, Muzorewa’s 
promises to end the war, combined with the passion and fervor of the pulpit, helped him to 
secure popular favor. 
In charting out his enhanced understanding of decolonization, Muzorewa sought to 
rationalize his support for the Internal Settlement, but it took nearly a year of wrangling before 
its key tenets were enshrined in a new constitution, which was approved by white voters in a 
whites-only referendum in January 1979. Elections following the new constitution were then 
held in April 1979, under the full franchise, in what one British diplomat in Salisbury described 
as a “degree of euphoria in the country which I have not seen before.”31 In the end, on the basis 
of a 64 percent turnout, Muzorewa won 67 percent of the popular vote. This translated into 51 of 
100 seats in the House of Assembly. Having attained the confidence of Parliament, the Bishop 
was sworn in as Prime Minister of the new state: “Zimbabwe-Rhodesia” (see Figure 2.2). 
Contemporary and subsequent criticism of the Internal Settlement has focused rightly on 
the fact that almost all consequential sections of the constitution were entrenched, meaning that 
they could only be amended by a three-fourth’s vote of the legislature. As the House of 
Assembly contained 28 seats reserved for white MPs, elected on a whites-only electoral roll, the 
Bishop would find little scope for the type of multi-racial coalition building necessary to alter the 
                                                        
30 Paul L. Moorcraft, A Short Thousand Years: The End of Rhodesia’s Rebellion (Salisbury: Galaxie Press, 1980), 
213. For Caute, he was a “tiny Methodist” who “said very little, [and] tended to sulk and quibble and equivocate.” 
Caute, Under the Skin, 174-175. 
31 TNA: FCO 36/2419, Wilson to FCO, Telno. 176, 23 April 1979. 
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established constitution.32 Many saw controversial clauses that sought to root out discrimination 
as having the opposite effect, bolstering white supremacy. The constitution created Public 
Service Boards to oversee the appointment of civil servants, judges, and policemen. In theory, 
these boards sought to ensure the independent staffing of key state institutions. But, in practice, 
they were made up largely of whites. Moreover, the entire constitutional consensus of codified 
white reserve powers was to last ten years, or the life of two parliaments—whichever came first. 
Only then would a judicial panel adjudicate on whether the current arrangement should be 
amended or retained. But as Public Service Boards would dictate the composition of the 
                                                        
32 Zvobgo, A History of Zimbabwe, 175. 
Figure 2.2 Bishop Muzorewa on the campaign trail in 1979. David McKittrick, “Bishop Abel Muzorewa: Cleric and 
Politician Who Served as Prime Minister of Zimbabwe,” Independent, 3 May 2010. 
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judiciary, the final arbiters of the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian constitution invariably would be white.33 
Adding insult to injury, Ian Smith remained in the Cabinet as minister without portfolio.  
Muzorewa ultimately achieved (and later lost) popular support on the basis of an 
understanding of decolonization that diverged from the model of “flag decolonization” that 
characterized many African independences of the 1960s. “As one of the last few countries in 
Africa still to achieve sovereignty,” he declared, “we have been given a golden opportunity to 
study Africa’s progress after independence.” Zimbabweans could learn from the mistakes of the 
past and try for something better. “It will be our fault if we do not utilize this opportunity to try 
to learn from the pitfalls into which other states have fallen.” It was on this basis that 
Muzorewa—Bishop, radical, activist, and advocate of “righteous violence”— staked his 
imagined political future for Zimbabwe. 
 
Other “Realities” of Decolonization 
Abel Muzorewa was not, however, the only African leader articulating a vision of a new 
Zimbabwe—or, indeed, the only one that justified resorting to violence. His idea of 
decolonization as an economically stable multiracialism did not develop on its own, but was 
shaped by, and in opposition to, the variegated discourses articulated by nationalists and by the 
presidents of the Frontline States—as well as by international factors like the sluggish global 
economy and the Cold War. Most African countries supported the transfer of power in 
                                                        
33 As one of Muzorewa’s colleagues complained, under such a system, Salisbury would not see an African 
commissioner of police until the year 2000. For his public criticisms, Byron Hove was sacked from the Transitional 
Government only two weeks after his appointment as co-Minister of Justice. The Hove Affair became one of the 
central dramas of the Internal Settlement. Byron Hove, quoted in Associated Press, “UK Minister Hove Interview,” 
30 April 1978, AP Online Archive, http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/2c016a633e 380 
44f6962c728544bcc75 (accessed 21 May 2016). An outspoken lawyer exiled in London for 12 years, Hove was 
seen as a “surprising” choice for inclusion in the Bishop’s ministerial team. For more on Hove and his activist 
history, see John Burns, “Ousted Black in Rhodesia: Byron Reuben Mtonhadzi Hove,” New York Times, 2 May 
1979. 
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Zimbabwe under what Kenneth Kaunda referred to as “classical” decolonization—meaning a 
1960s-style political transfer under British control.34 The Frontline States and their leaders were 
themselves the products of Whitehall-led independences, so they naturally felt that the process of 
decolonization they had experienced was more than appropriate for Rhodesia.  
Kaunda argued in his June 1979 letter to Thatcher that Britain needed to be attuned to the 
status of what he called “rising and fading centers of power.” Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was 
hemorrhaging European emigrants and capital; it was a fading power center.35 The UK 
government’s continued support of the Internal Settlement risked handing over influence in 
southern Africa to the Soviet Union, or perhaps a combination of China and North Korea. In the 
end, the onus was on Britain to settle the Rhodesia crisis through a constitutional conference of 
all parties. “Britain has an inescapable duty to God, humanity, and the people of Rhodesia to see 
                                                        
34 TNA: PREM 19/107, Lord Harlech to Lord Carrington, “Rhodesia,” Telno. 426, 14 June 1979; TNA: PREM 
19/107, “Essential Facts, Meeting with Mrs. Chibesakunda,” 15 June 1979. 
35 Though he believed it to be a “fading power center,” Kaunda still saw the Internal Settlement as a threat to his 
own authority as president of Zambia. Of course, his government was threatened by Salisbury’s regular military 
incursions into sovereign Zambian territory. But the Internal Settlement also arguably threatened Zambia’s domestic 
political order. By 1979, activists from Muzorewa’s UANC and the breakaway ZANU faction led by Ndabaningi 
Sithole were operating relatively freely in local politics in Zambia among the many migrant and exiled 
Zimbabweans there. Their activism did not sit well with local officials from Kaunda’s United National 
Independence Party (UNIP). In August 1979, the governor of Ndola Urban District wrote to his party’s provincial 
political secretary. “These factions [UANC and ZANU-Sithole] are quite active in my District,” he stated. “What is 
actually happening at the moment is that when the Police receive a report of these activities and move in to check, 
they find it difficult to deal effectively with the people concerned in the absence of the law to enable them to contain 
the situation.” The governor went on: “As a result of this, the Police are reluctant to take appropriate action. This 
state of affairs frustrates the public, and Police become embarrassed by the situation which is subsequently created.” 
A. Kamalondo to C.C. Sikumba, “Activities of UANC Muzorewa and Sithole factions in Zambia,” SEC/14, 27 
August 1979, no. 204, EAP 121/2/5/4/33, papers of the United National Independence Party of Zambia (UNIP), 
British Library Endangered Archive Programme, London (henceforth, BL-EAP). The provincial secretary wrote to 
Party authorities in Lusaka seeking guidance. Was UNIP in favor of banning factions of the Internal Settlement from 
operating in Zambia? If so, why had no law been passed? The party’s archival record does not contain an official 
reply to his queries. This correspondence, however, shows the extent to which politics during the liberation struggle 
operated both above and below national borders in southern Africa. C.C. Sikumba to R.C. Kamanga, “Foreign 
Nationalist Movements operating in Zambia, PPS/CB/60 CONF,” 12 October 1979, no. 207, EAP121/2/5/4/33, 
papers of UNIP, BL-EAP. 
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this problem settled correctly once and for all,” he concluded.36 The classical prescription, 
similar in form to other cases of independence, was the only surefire way forward, and Kaunda 
was not alone in his support. Julius Nyerere of Tanzania, Hastings Banda of Malawi, and Sereste 
Khama of Botswana all supported a British solution, as did Mozambique’s Samora Machel.  
But, having waged a liberation struggle for the better part of a decade, Joshua Nkomo and 
Robert Mugabe were unwilling, at least at first, to simply relinquish the gains they had made on 
the battlefield, especially to a political process administered by London. Instead, they continued 
to embrace Nkomo’s famously propagated dictum (via Mao Zedong) that Zimbabwean 
independence would only be won “through the barrel of the gun.” The Rhodesian Security 
Forces had yet to lose a military engagement. But there was a sense of inevitably on the side of 
the liberation struggle. Moreover, the idea of violence as a legitimate means of decolonization in 
the Rhodesian context was officially validated on the international stage at a Lusaka conference 
organized by the Afro-Asian Peoples’ Solidary Organization in April 1979. The conference, 
attended by a collection of governments, NGOs, and solidarity organizations, passed a resolution 
which “support[ed] the people of Zimbabwe, under the leadership of the Patriotic Front, for 
having taken up arms as a legitimate form of struggle to eliminate national oppression in order to 
achieve genuine independence.”37  
Some months later, the Patriotic Front began to articulate what Mugabe called “a new 
basis for discussion.” The Patriotic Front represented self-decolonization. “Through their armed 
struggle,” Mugabe explained, “the freedom fighters had in effect carried out the decolonizing 
                                                        
36 TNA: PREM 19/107, Kaunda to Thatcher, 8 June 1979. 
37 “Resolution on Zimbabwe,” Doc. No. 7/18, The International Conference in Support of the Liberation Movements 
in Southern Africa and in Solidarity with the Frontline States, 10-13 April 1979, Lusaka, Zambia, EAP 121/2/5/4/33, 
papers of UNIP, BL-EAP.   
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process to the situation when the settler regime was now on the verge of defeat.”38 The people of 
Zimbabwe, not the British government, were the proper decolonizing source. In any peaceful 
compromise, there would be no reneging on the gains that they had already won.  
When the Patriotic Front was finally browbeaten to the negotiating table in the fall of 
1979 by the Frontline States, Joshua Nkomo argued, much like the Bishop, that Zimbabwe 
presented a unique situation in the history of British decolonization—“because this is the first 
time that two decolonizing forces have to co-operate in this task,” he declared, adding that “the 
Patriotic Front, representing the people of Zimbabwe, are here as the effective decolonizing 
factor while Britain is here asserting her diminished legal authority.”39 Despite Britain’s 
self-proclaimed prowess in bringing colonies to independence, Nkomo pointed out that it had 
already failed dramatically in Zimbabwe—letting a band of rogue racists commandeer the 
process for some fifteen years. Only after Thatcher’s election, and a dramatic shift in British 
policy, would Nkomo and Mugabe begin to agree with the Frontline States’ presidents that a 
British-initiated process, one in which they might win many concessions, was the best way 
forward. But for now, the Patriotic Front stuck to their guns—quite literally.40 “The task has had 
to be undertaken by the people,” Nkomo declared. “Through their sweat and blood, the process is 




                                                        
38 TNA: PREM 19/110, Farquarson to FCO, Telno. 126, “Mugabe Press Conference,” 27 August 1979.  
39 TNA: PREM 19/111, Joshua Nkomo, “Patriotic Front of Zimbabwe, Opening statement at the Lancaster House 
Conference, London,” 11 September 1979. 
40 Joshua Nkomo, The Story of My Life (London: Methuen, 1984), 141. 
41 Ibid. 
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The Rhodesia Tightrope  
When Thatcher became leader of the opposition in 1975, she inherited a Conservative 
Party in which the future of Rhodesia had been a particularly divisive policy issue for over a 
decade. UDI in 1965 had spurred the formation of a whole constellation of extra-parliamentary 
pressure groups, known collectively as the “Rhodesia lobby.” One of these groups, the Monday 
Club, which was officially an organ of the Conservative Party, predated UDI, but the Anglo-
Rhodesian Society was established in direct response to the events of 1965.42 These two groups, 
among many others, sought to channel grassroots activism into pro-Rhodesian policies at 
Westminster, and they succeeded in fomenting several backbench rebellions among disaffected 
Conservative MPs during the 1960s and 1970s.43  
But the Tory divisions over Rhodesia became only more pronounced in 1978 after 
Bishop Muzorewa and his African colleagues convened the Internal Settlement with Ian Smith. 
As Muzorewa outlined his political imaginary of decolonization as a new conception of 
multiracial democracy, backed by a strong economy, his case was taken up in Britain by the Tory 
rightwing. On the left of the Conservative Party, moderate voices appealed for a British-
administered solution that would bring all parties together, including the Patriotic Front, in such 
a way that would end the violence—essentially, Kenneth Kaunda’s “classical” decolonization. 
Thus, the faultlines from the multiple “realities” of decolonization—which had long riven 
southern Africa—reverberated through Westminster, dividing the Conservative Party at its most 
                                                        
42 See especially: Philip Murphy, Party Politics and Decolonization: The Conservative Party and British Colonial 
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43 See, for instance, Mark Stuart, “A Party in Three Pieces: The Conservative Split over Rhodesian Oil Sanctions, 
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important moment in a generation. Seated perilously in the middle of these two camps, and 
continually wavering back and forth between them, was Margaret Thatcher.  
Thatcher’s sympathy for white settler communities in southern Africa was no secret.44 In 
opposition, however, she always endeavored to maintain at least the façade of being 
uncommitted on the issue. Her shadow foreign secretary, John Davies, agreed with her approach, 
reminding the Shadow Cabinet in a brief in late 1976 that “we are not as a Party required to 
pursue a comprehensive tactical policy in our present position.”45 Like any good opposition, 
Thatcher and her Shadow Cabinet colleagues wanted to start their potential administration with a 
free hand. So, for instance, in successive votes in Parliament on British economic sanctions 
against the Smith regime—which had to be renewed each November—she whipped her MPs to 
abstain. And in 1978, when two of her senior frontbench spokesmen, John Biggs-Davison and 
Winston S. Churchill, Jr. (Churchill’s grandson), both senior voices in the Rhodesia lobby, 
defied her instructions and voted against the renewal of sanctions, she promptly sacked them. 
Thatcher’s muddled approach to Rhodesia infuriated many of her colleagues on the right of the 
party who had supported Bishop Muzorewa publicly.46  
In light of this, the annual Conservative Party Conferences, which took place every 
October, just before the yearly renewal vote on Rhodesian sanctions, acquired a disproportionate 
                                                        
44 For the influence of her husband Denis and his connections to southern Africa, including his South African 
cousins, the Pellatts, see Moore, Margaret Thatcher: From Grantham to the Falklands, 175-76. Denis revealed his 
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45 John Davies, “Rhodesia: A Paper by Mr. John Davies, LCC/76/150,” 13 December 1976, LCC 1/3/13, 
Conservative Party Archive (henceforth, CPA), Bodleian Library, University of Oxford. This is the typical role of a 
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46 Moore, Margaret Thatcher: From Grantham to the Falklands, 373. 
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degree of importance. In this period, the drama of party conferences unfolded live on 
wall-to-wall BBC radio and television coverage. The Rhodesia lobby thus sought to embarrass 
Thatcher into taking pro-Rhodesia positions in such a public forum. At successive annual 
meetings from 1975 to 1979, the lobby pressured the Conservative Party leadership to select 
pro-Smith, and later pro-Muzorewa, resolutions for debate on the conference floor. Only local 
Conservative constituency associations had the power to nominate potential resolutions for 
discussion at the conference; if successfully passed, these resolutions were meant to bind the 
leadership to a policy directive. But Thatcher resisted these potentially inflammatory resolutions, 
and, as she and the party leadership retained the power to select which proposed resolutions 
would be debated on the conference floor, she was able to foil the lobby’s efforts to pin her 
policy down.  
This back and forth became harder to manage over time, especially after Muzorewa 
entered the picture and resolutions began calling for the recognition of the Internal Settlement. 
“It should not appear that the Party’s policy [has] been changed by activists at the Conference,” 
Lord Carrington warned the Shadow Cabinet in October 1978.47 Carrington, then the Tories’ 
leader in the House of Lords, would soon become the chief architect of Thatcher’s Rhodesia 
policy after her election. The chairman of the Conservative Party, Lord Thorneycraft, was even 
more blunt: “Why on earth should the next Tory Government by [sic] landed in still more trouble 
by an impractical motion about sanctions that would create nothing but complications?” Thatcher 
agreed, stating that this point should be put directly to delegates.48 
                                                        
47 UK Conservative Party, “Minutes of the Leader’s Consultative Committee,” 17 October 1978, LCC/1/3/16/1, 
CPA, Bodleian.  
48 UK Conservative Party, “Minutes of the Leader’s Consultative Committee,” 5 October 1978, LCC/1/3/16/1, CPA, 
Bodleian.  
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For each year that Thatcher dealt with this party conference rigmarole, the Conservative 
Party continued to publish in its conference booklet the proposed resolutions that had not been 
selected for debate. These lists give a good indication of the mood in the party. The local 
Conservative Association of Southend East, for instance, proposed a resolution in 1978, stating 
that “this conference is of the opinion that appeasement of anti-Rhodesian Government elements 
should cease and that this country should encourage fully the internal settlement.”49 Ostensibly 
directed at the policy of the governing Labour Party, the resolution’s critical language doubled 
conveniently as a critique of the Conservative leadership. The overwhelming majority of 
proposed resolutions followed this pro-Rhodesia line, making Thatcher’s efforts to remain aloof 
all the more difficult to defend. 
 In private, however, Thatcher favored Bishop Muzorewa. A devout Methodist herself, 
and admirer of politicians who took fiscal discipline and the looming Soviet threat seriously, she 
liked the Bishop and his politics and felt that the Internal Settlement offered a legitimate way 
forward.50 In the lead-up to the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian and British elections, respectively in April 
and May 1979, Thatcher and her surrogates talked discretely about recognizing the Internal 
Settlement if she won. But this gap between her public and private rhetoric very nearly set off a 
party rebellion. In late January, Lord Salisbury threatened to run advertisements in national 
newspapers criticizing the Tory leadership for betraying Rhodesia. “The Conservative Party 
should be attacked publicly on their failure to take a stand on Rhodesia,” Salisbury told his own 
                                                        
49 UK Conservative Party, 95th Conservative Conference [booklet], 151, NVA 2/2/41, CPA, Bodleian.  
50 Thatcher’s Methodism was an important guiding moral framework. For an exploration of how her religious views 
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Morality, and Religion,” in Making Thatcher’s Britain, eds. Ben Jackson and Robert Saunders (Cambridge: 
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(London: Biteback Publishing, 2015). 
 100 
invitation-only lobbying group, the Watching Committee.51 He was one of the most high-profile 
British supporters of Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. In a letter to Patrick Wall, a like-minded British MP, 
then serving as president of the Monday Club, Salisbury wrote that the only way forward on 
Rhodesia was to prop up an “effective government based on multi-racial support in which it was 
accepted that the whites had a vital part to play for some time to come.” His willingness to attack 
Thatcher shows the extent to which Muzorewa’s new approach to decolonization was beginning 
to resonate abroad as an alternate and legitimate vision of political transition. But Lord Salisbury 
was eventually dissuaded from going public by a group of concerned Tory MPs who— 
considering their own reelection campaigns in Britain—were horrified by the thought of 
blindsiding their own leader. In the end, he settled for a much more modest critique, penning two 
circulars distributed to all members of the Anglo-Rhodesian Society. These letters merely 
warned against Soviet and Cuban intrigue in southern Africa and argued for British diplomatic 
recognition of a “strong and independent” multiracial Zimbabwe-Rhodesia.52 
As both the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian and British electoral campaigns progressed, the 
Rhodesia lobby was, however, able to win some concessions from Thatcher and her Cabinet 
colleagues. At a meeting of the Conservative Party Foreign Affairs Committee in early February, 
Francis Pym—who had become Thatcher’s shadow foreign secretary after John Davies was 
diagnosed with cancer—announced that the party would send official election observers to the 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesian elections. This policy was a direct challenge to the Labour Prime Minister 
                                                        
51 Minutes of the Watching Committee, 25 January 1979, BD/1/436, John Biggs-Davison papers, Parliamentary 
Archive. 
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James Callaghan, who continued to ignore the legitimacy of the Internal Settlement and the 
planned elections, refusing to provide British government observers.53  
Stalwarts of the lobby pressured Pym for more. On March 5, Patrick Wall wrote to 
UCLA Professor of Industrial Relations John Hutchinson—who acted briefly as the Bishop’s de 
facto spokesman and communications link to the Western world. “We [the lobby] have got 
Francis Pym, the shadow foreign secretary, to say openly that [he] support[s] the holding of the 
coming elections in Rhodesia,” Wall bragged; however, he reported that they had been 
unsuccessful in getting him to say outright that a Conservative government would recognize 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia and remove sanctions. By early April, however, Pym was pushed even 
further. At a campaign rally in Swavesey, outside Cambridge, he set out the party’s foreign 
policy manifesto, addressing his remarks on Rhodesia to “Soviet/Cuban colonial domination in 
Africa.” Pym criticized the Callaghan government for ignoring the Internal Settlement, which 
“thus [offered] encouragement to men of violence.” If the Zimbabwe-Rhodesian elections took 
place in free and fair conditions, and if turnout was high, Pym declared, “it will be the duty of 
any British government to bring Rhodesia back to legality and do everything possible to make 
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sure that the new independent state receives international recognition.”54 Pym’s newfound public 
support for the Internal Settlement, a move surely endorsed by Thatcher, staved off further 
attacks on the party leadership.  
In the end, recognition of Rhodesia’s Internal Settlement fell to the margins as an 
electoral issue in favor of the more domestic concerns of the UK’s crippled economy; this, of 
course, was the election immediately on the heels of the so-called “Winter of Discontent,” in 
which industrial action halted many local government services like trash collection in London 
and grave-digging in Liverpool. It was also the electoral debut of the PR firm Saatchi and 
Saatchi, which developed the iconic Tory campaign slogan “Labour Isn’t Working.” Set against 
the image of an ever-growing dole queue, this placard became a key signal of the election. For 
some of the most ardent rightwing Tories—Thatcher’s strongest supporters at the best of times 
and fiercest critics on a bad day—Rhodesia had the potential to be a game-changing electoral 
issue, and they were dismayed that their leader was not using it to mobilize the base. “If you lose 
the Election it will be because you have not had the moral courage to play this trump card,” 
General Sir Walter Walker wrote to Thatcher—“a card that is worth at least one million votes to 
you.” A retired British Army General and former NATO commander, Walker continued his 
stinging rebuke on the eve of the British election. “I and many who think like me intend to 
abstain from voting unless you are able to make the above pronouncement [supporting the 
Bishop],” he declared.55  
                                                        
54 TNA: FCO 36/2419, Francis Pym, “Campaign Speech at Swavesey,” 9 April 1979. After widespread outrage at 
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In the end, Walker’s threats were empty, as Thatcher won the May 1979 election with a 
5.1 percent swing—the largest since 1945—and a majority of forty-three seats in the House of 
Commons.56 The General’s broadside, however, represented a much wider problem. His 
comments served as an omen of just how ugly the brewing feud over these contested visions of 
decolonization would get. Far from entering Downing Street on a wave of unified party support, 
Thatcher crossed the threshold of Number 10 looking ominously over her own shoulder.  
 
The “Britain Will Take Over” Plan  
On the very day of her election victory, Thatcher received a memo from the Cabinet Secretary 
John Hunt about how the government should respond to Bishop Muzorewa’s victory in the 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesian elections.57 This memo was one of the first prime ministerial documents 
Thatcher ever reviewed, and it is covered in her searing marginalia.58 After speaking in generally 
negative terms about Zimbabwe-Rhodesia, Hunt wrote that its new constitution left “serious 
doubt as to whether real power will be exercised by representatives of the black majority.” With 
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a flurry of wavy lines and question marks—written hallmarks of Thatcher’s disapproval—she 
scrawled in the margins: “Tell me another country in Africa which has one person/one vote for 4 
different political parties. MT.” This memo provides the clearest window into Thatcher’s 
position on Rhodesia upon coming to office, and it was a strong articulation of the Bishop’s line 
that Zimbabwe-Rhodesia was a “special case” of decolonization.59 Although Thatcher may have 
wanted to recognize Muzorewa’s government immediately, she was hamstrung by the political 
complexities of the issue within her own party, and by her growing belief that diplomatic 
recognition alone would not stop the war. Instead, Hunt urged great care on the matter; she 
should continue to give an “impression of being willing to seize the opportunity now present,” 
while avoiding any firm commitments. Thatcher decided to hold fire. “I agree we need care,” she 
wrote back, “but a little courage is necessary too.”60 
 The traditional understanding of what followed next is that, after her election, Thatcher 
was persuaded by her foreign secretary, Lord Carrington, to moderate her own position on 
Rhodesia. She then performed what was perceived as a radical policy U-turn.61 Before becoming 
Prime Minister, Thatcher had been quite blatant about her intent to ignore foreign policy as much 
as possible. She had already told John Hunt, “I’m going to have a very good Foreign Secretary 
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and I shan’t go on any foreign trips at all. My job is to turn the economy around.”62 Lord 
Carrington was an able, experienced, and quite grand political figure in the party, and in what 
can sometimes be read as a very gendered analysis, historians have often cast him as the ultimate 
voice of reason over a seemingly dogmatic, impulsive, emotional, and xenophobic Margaret 
Thatcher.63 It is true that Thatcher admired Carrington and that he was an important moderate 
voice in Cabinet. But this narrative tends to occlude the fact that Thatcher had just spent four 
years in public, performing a political balancing act on the Rhodesia question, in which she was 
continually forced to temper her own responses. She was now well practiced in the art of 
deadening her own personal opinion for the sake of political expediency.  
As her biographer Moore notes, in her early years, her waffling policy approach to 
Rhodesia signified two archetypal characteristics of early Thatcher: (1) “a habit of expressing 
herself. . .in almost unbearable directness,” and (2) “a readiness to give in, protesting, to people 
who knew more than she about a particular subject.”64 Rhodesia was just one of many other 
examples.65 Thatcher was driven to be pragmatic in her politics—especially on Rhodesia—due 
to circumstances, not because she wanted to. Contrary to the established narrative, her Rhodesian 
realpolitik did not signify a radical policy departure; it represented her basic approach to 
governing—at least in the years before the Falklands War. Moreover, this narrative tends to go 
no further in its analysis than the moment of Thatcher’s U-turn; it fails to interrogate the specific 
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points of Carrington’s argument that convinced her to temper the passionate defense of 
Muzorewa that she had scrawled in the margins of John Hunt’s memo.  
She was ultimately won over by an FCO proposal that played to her own strongly-held 
nationalist views. The head of the Rhodesia department, Robin Renwick, pitched to Thatcher 
what he called “something really radical”—the idea that Britain should simply take over the 
situation, dictating terms and forcing Muzorewa, Smith, and the Patriotic Front to the negotiating 
table.66 Thatcher, who had been elected in part by invoking deep rhetorical allusions to Britain’s 
decline under socialism and the necessity of reasserting the state’s place in the world, 
immediately took to the idea. No longer would the FCO entertain arguments about involving the 
Americans or other contact groups in peace talks, as the Callaghan government had. She should 
pursue what Renwick happily termed a “Britain will take over” plan.67  
In quick succession, then, and for the sake of political pragmatism, Thatcher had moved 
from supporting Muzorewa’s vision of a gradual approach to decolonization—the idea that 
Rhodesia was a unique bastion of multiracial democracy with no potential parallel in Africa—to 
supporting a so-called “classical” decolonization, one in which Britain oversaw a traditional 
transfer of power to a Westminster-style parliamentary democracy. She began to understand the 
situation in Rhodesia as offering up many potential paths forwards, each with various openings 
and opportunities or closures and pitfalls. In the months that followed, she sought to synthesize 
these disparate visions as much as possible into a process that worked for all. As Lord Carrington 
articulated in his memoirs, albeit clumsily, Rhodesia “was one of those occasions. . .when her 
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heart and basic instincts (which I don’t think changed) were subordinated by her to what her 
intellect came to decide made political sense.”68  
In early July 1979, Bishop Muzorewa visited London, where Thatcher made it plain that 
his constitution would have to be amended to eliminate its excessive reserve powers for the 
white community. Reserve seats for white MPs were acceptable, but the white community could 
not hold an effective blocking power over the will of the black majority. On July 25, in a 
statement to the House of Commons, she cemented her position on the matter. The 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesian constitution would have to be reformed, she declared, and “we shall aim 
to make the proposals comparable to the basis on which we granted independence to other 
former British territories in Africa.”69 Gone was any hint of Zimbabwe-Rhodesian 
exceptionalism. Muzorewa’s regime would be bound to the historical precedent.  
 By chance that summer, the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting (CHOGM) 
was scheduled to take place in Lusaka, Zambia—with Rhodesia as the centerpiece of discussion. 
The press eagerly anticipated a political brawl at the conference, which was scheduled to begin 
on August 1.70 Tensions were further escalated on the eve of the meeting when, in response to 
Britain’s perceived support for Bishop Muzorewa, the Nigerian military government announced 
the impending nationalization of British Petroleum’s operations in the oil rich Niger delta. This 
report provoked the Guardian to wonder how the Prime Minister would “react to the kind of 
humiliation that years ago might have made Lord Palmerston reach for his gunboats.”71 
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Thatcher, too, expected a hostile reception in Zambia.72 Emerging from the plane onto the tarmac 
of Lusaka International Airport in the dead of night, she donned dark sunglasses, convinced that 
someone in the welcoming reception was going to throw acid in her face. “She had two 
pairs. . .in her handbag,” recalled Lord Carrington, who had tried to calm her nerves on the long 
flight.73 “You totally misunderstand Africans!” he reassured her. “They’re more likely to cheer 
you.”74 As Thatcher disembarked, Carrington remembered seeing a “sea of black faces all 
smiling [and] she took her dark glasses off and she walked down the gangway of the airport as if 
there was no problem at all.”75 Her nerves were also likely soothed by the sight a familiar face in 
the receiving line—Natwar Singh, the Indian diplomat who had introduced her to the guru, 
Chandraswami, four years earlier. He had since been posted to Zambia. As Singh leaned forward 
to greet her, he whispered that the holy man had been right in his predictions. “High 
Commissioner, we don’t talk about these matters,” she responded.76  
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In its early decades, CHOGMs were quite extensive affairs for heads of government, such 
that while the Queen spent just two days in Zambia, Thatcher spent a week.77 She quickly found 
that African leaders were not the cartoonish villains depicted in the pages of the Daily Express or 
the Daily Mail, gaining deep respect for Julius Nyerere and Hastings Banda and cultivating a 
lasting friendship with Kenneth Kaunda.78 She and Kaunda famously delighted the press by 
dancing together on two separate occasions (see Figure 2.3). For his part, after some critical 
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Commonwealth Secretary General at the Royal Institute of International Affairs, Chatham House, London, 21 
September 1979,” Commonwealth Information, 6-7, MS 380390, Box 9, Commonwealth Secretariat papers, School 
of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) Library.  
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organization as a useful means of influencing Thatcher. This symbiotic relationship flies in the face of a recurrent 
historiographical argument that Thatcher had an inimical relationship with the Commonwealth, and especially its 
African membership, a judgment that stems largely from her stubborn position on South African sanctions in the 
later period of her tenure. As Anthony Seldon and Daniel Collings have argued, “Although [Thatcher] helped pilot 
through a successful Rhodesian agreement, giving the former colony independence in 1980, she was renowned as 
being unsympathetic to the aspirations of black nations, while her contempt and refusal to support Commonwealth 
sanctions against South Africa excited widespread hostility among Commonwealth leaders.” Seldon and Collings, 
Britain Under Thatcher, 74. The period of difficulty surrounding sanctions has masked the generally workable 
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Grenada, both in the much wider context of the Cold War.  
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comments about Thatcher’s predecessors, Edward Heath and James Callaghan, Kaunda declared 
happily that he “was now meeting a British leader who could make decisions: he would pray for  
her.”79 Samora Machel, the revolutionary president of Mozambique later declared a similar 
admiration for Thatcher. “We supported Margaret Thatcher because she was brave. She wasn’t 
afraid to read the pages of history – unlike earlier governments,” he declared, adding, “You may 
ask, ‘Why support a woman from the Conservative Party?’ When she is right, when she is 
strong, then we support her.”80 
                                                        
79 TNA: FCO 36/2544, Brian Cartledge, “Points from President Kaunda’s reply to the Prime Minister’s [MT’s] 
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80 Samora Machel, quoted in End of Empire, directed by Brian Lapping and Norma Percy, Granada Television, 
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Figure 2.3 Margaret Thatcher and Kenneth Kaunda share a dance at the Lusaka CHOGM in August 1979. Institute of 
Commonwealth Studies, “August 1979 – The Lusaka CHOGM,” 9 August 2016, https://commonwealthoralhistories.org/2016/ 
august-1979-the-lusaka-chogm/. 
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 In Lusaka, a conclave of key leaders hashed out a framework for negotiations that would 
carry the stalled peace process forward. All parties would be invited to a British-chaired 
constitutional conference, without preconditions, to be convened by Lord Carrington in the fall 
of 1979 at Lancaster House in London. The venue was laden with symbolism. Lancaster House, 
just off the Mall and a stone’s throw from Buckingham Palace, had served as the scene of past 
independence conferences. Even the thorniest issues would be on the conference table—white 
reserve powers, the redistribution of land, the integration of the liberation fighters into the 
national army, the status of white civil servants’ pensions, dual nationality, and beyond. While 
Bishop Muzorewa and Ian Smith agreed immediately to attend the conference, Robert Mugabe 
and Joshua Nkomo had to be heavily pressured by the Frontline States into accepting their 
invitations; however, they quickly realized that they could win significant constitutional 
concessions under the UK-chaired process. 
As Thatcher and Lord Carrington left Lusaka, they had achieved the previously 
unthinkable. Confronted by the British press corps about her apparent U-turn as she departed, 
Thatcher reflected: “I was never as hard as they thought.”81 And when pressed further on how 
she would face up to the rumblings of a Tory rebellion back home, she replied, “Peter and I will 
be able to cope, won’t we?” She was gently seeking a public reassurance from her trusted 




                                                        
81 TNA: PREM 19/109, Telno. 859, “Margaret Thatcher’s Lusaka Press Conference,” 6 August 1979. 
82 Ibid. 
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 “The Apotheosis of the Blessed Margaret” 
As predicted, Thatcher returned from Lusaka to an untenable situation within her own 
party. She was chided by a faction of right-wingers for her supposed “betrayal,” while at the 
same time, toasted for what many others saw as a sensible change of heart—or, what one 
supportive newspaper happily termed the “Apotheosis of the Blessed Margaret.”83 Though 
Rhodesia as a policy issue did not map perfectly onto the existing fractures within the party 
between an insurgent “New Right,” slowly increasing in power, and the paternalistic Tory 
establishment, guided by a commitment to Britain’s postwar politics of consensus, it laid bare 
these and other divisions as no other issue could. Thatcher’s pivot from one political imaginary 
                                                        
83 David Adamson, “The Apotheosis of Mrs. T,” Daily Telegraph, 9 August 1979. On her departure from Lusaka, 
Adamson added: “If her RAF VC10 had been drawn skywards by cherubims, probably few Zambians would have 
been deeply surprised.” 
Figure 2.4 Photo, featured in the Express, of Margaret Thatcher with locals as she departed Zambia. The small image in the 
lower-right is of Lord Carrington, with camera in hand. The article explains that Carrington snapped a picture of this scene for his 
personal collections. “Snap! The Most Diplomatic Pictures Are in the Express: Maggie’s Winning Smile,” Daily Express, 9 
August 1979.  
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of decolonization to another generated a very public feud that had the potential to create severe 
consequences for her government.  
The Rhodesia lobby set to work on one final push in defense of Muzorewa and the 
political future he represented. But they had to move quickly before any substantive agreement 
could be hammered out first at Lancaster House. While the Rhodesia Herald wondered if 
Thatcher was “a Labour Prime Minister in drag,”84 Julian Amery, the unofficial leader and 
spokesman of the lobby, wrote privately to her. An MP and former FCO minister, as well as an 
inveterate defender of the empire and personal friend of Ian Smith, Amery had much clout 
among Conservatives, and Thatcher had even considered him as a potential foreign secretary 
when forming her Cabinet.85 “People will interpret Lusaka as Soviet appeasement,” he warned 
the prime minister. Unsurprisingly, he and others set out to do just that, mobilizing a highly 
public assault on Thatcher.86 The plan was a “sell-out,” Amery told the Sunday Telegraph. It was 
“very doubtful diplomacy.”87 The implication was that, just like Neville Chamberlain, Mrs. 
Thatcher had returned from abroad, waving a piece of paper. 
Responses to the Lusaka conference also exposed the Conservative Party’s racist 
underbelly, especially in the rightwing press. Billing an op-ed on Rhodesia from “Our Tribal 
Correspondent,” the Daily Mail reported on the fratricidal disputes among Tories over Rhodesia 
with reference to “tribal” conflict between “bwanas,” or party grandees, who performed a “war 
                                                        
84 “Comment: Lusaka Let Down,” Rhodesia Herald, 6 August 1979, 6.  
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86 Julian Amery to Margaret Thatcher, 9 August 1979. AMEJ 2/1/96 (file 3 of 3), Julian Amery papers, CAC. 
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dance for the Great White Queen”—in other words, Mrs. Thatcher.88 In a separate example, the 
Daily Mail’s political cartoonist “Jon” depicted the Prime Minister in blackface, liberally 
applying more suntan oil in front of the mirror, presumably as a means of further ingratiating 
herself with African leaders (see Figure 2.5).89 In Lusaka, Thatcher had become black, Jon 
seemed to suggest. Meanwhile, in the Express, the cartoonist Michael Cummings parodied 
Thatcher’s dances with Kaunda. Nose to nose, the Zambian president whips Thatcher into the 
air, his hand resting awkwardly on the prime minister’s lower back, her legs twisted. One of 
Thatcher’s high heels flies off into the distance. “It's such a splendid training for my next 
dancing partner,” Thatcher proclaims, “the Tory right wing”—which is depicted as a looming, 
                                                        
88 Ann Leslie, “From Our Tribal Correspondent in Darkest Blackpool: I Witness War Dance for Great White 
Queen,” Daily Mail, 12 October 1979.  
89 William John Philpin Jones (Jon), Thatcher applying suntan oil, Daily Mail, 2 August 1979.  
Figure 2.5 Jon's political cartoon of Thatcher attempting to ingratiate herself with African leaders—by getting a suntan. Jon, 
Daily Mail, 2 August 1979. 
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grotesque, almost Bismarckian aristocrat, waiting to cut in. In the background, Lord Carrington 
nervously conducts an African jazz band (see Figure 2.6).90 
Perhaps unsurprisingly, Thatcher’s team in Downing Street did not like this very public 
dissection of the prime minister’s credibility. Though Thatcher’s change in policy from 
supporting Muzorewa to the “Britain will take over” plan was fairly self-evident, her advisors 
were at pains to emphasize the Prime Minister’s supposed rhetorical consistency on the issue. 
They even went so far as to distribute a memo comparing Thatcher’s public statements before 
the Lusaka Conference with those made during and afterwards.91 In her exchanges with the 
                                                        
90 Michael Cummings, “Marvelous, Dr. Kaunda! It's such a splendid training for my next dancing partner. . .,” Daily 
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91 TNA: PREM 19/109, Leonard Allinson to FCO, “CHGM: Press: Comparative Statements on Rhodesia,” Telno. 
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Figure 2.6 A political cartoon mocking Thatcher’s dance with Kaunda. Michael Cummings. Daily Express, 8 August 1979. 
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press, the Prime Minister referred specifically to this memo, advising journalists that if they 
studied the matter closely, they would find “very considerable similarities, not only in thought 
but in actual phraseology itself. . .Indeed, I think you might even have had an analysis indicating 
that,” she added.92 
Her advisors were quick to work against these charges of political inconsistency for two 
reasons—one originating within the party and one without. First, there was great consternation 
among the May 1979 intake of new Conservative MPs, some seventy of them, on questions of 
logistics and discipline in the House of Commons. Arrangements for paired voting caused the 
most stress.93 Paired voting is an informal parliamentary convention where two MPs from 
opposing parties agree to be jointly absent from specific votes. This reciprocal arrangement, 
sanctioned by both parties’ whips, ensures that MPs need not be present to cast a vote at every 
division because, in effect, their mutual absence cancels each other out.94 But the new intake of 
MPs felt spurned by a system that rewarded seniority first in the formation of voting pairs, and 
over a period of several months, they brought their grievances to the 1922 Committee—the 
Conservative Party’s parliamentary group for backbench MPs. To be without a pair invariably 
meant late nights and long hours in the lobbies of the House, and it was just this sort of collective 
disgruntlement that might be exploited by skilled orators over a fractious issue like Rhodesia. In 
the midst of Julian Amery’s autumn rearguard assault on the party leadership, Michael Jopling, 
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the Tory chief whip, predicted ominously to the 1922 Committee’s executive that “the 
disciplines the Conservative Party have enjoyed in recent decades are not so evident at the 
present time, as the pressures of this winter will become greater in the Parliamentary Party than 
anything experienced by even the older and longer standing Members of Parliament.”95  
It seemed to be the perfect parliamentary storm for the Tories. The party leadership, 
which should have been basking in the honeymoon period following a strong election victory, 
was instead confronted by Julian Amery’s war of attrition on the margins of the party. This is 
borne out in ample correspondence to Amery in the fall of 1979. Though not new to Parliament, 
the Conservative MP William Shelton wrote in October to congratulate Amery on his 
“impeccable” judgment on Rhodesia in a recent speech. “After Lusaka—and the situation into 
which our Government had got itself—I came to the conclusion that the only way forward was to 
support Margaret, and I wrote and told her so,” he told Amery. “I wish that I had the opportunity 
of discussing it with you first,” he added wearily.96 Amery’s plan to sow the seeds of doubt 
among his colleagues seemed to be working. 
Thatcher and her advisors also had cause to worry about the effect of her political 
inconsistency on the Conservatives’ domestic policy agenda. The Guardian’s Patrick Keatley 
noted Downing Street sought to blunt the impact of Thatcher’s U-turn by artfully comparing her 
evolution on Rhodesia to the gradual unfolding of the layers of an onion.97 But these comments, 
he told a BBC Radio 4 audience, were “aimed, oddly enough at the trade unions in Britain.” The 
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Prime Minister’s staff did not want unions to “feel that she could easily be changed on her 
policies on domestic economic matters in Britain.” He added that “they want to show that she is 
a person who stands firm and doesn’t shift.”98 And if Thatcher was not already considering the 
wider implications of Rhodesia on her domestic agenda—as well as the historical hangover of 
the last Tory Prime Minister Edward Heath’s many policy U-turns in the early 1970s—she was 
likely reminded of the high stakes on August 7. While broadcasting live from Lusaka on the 
News at Ten with Peter Snow, Thames TV’s union electricians walked off the set in strike.99 In 
the middle of Thatcher’s interview, as she explained the policy intricacies of the Commonwealth 
communiqué, ten million television screens in Britain suddenly went blank, only to be replaced 
by a form message attributing the interruption to industrial action. Though a network spokesman 
stressed that the timing of the walk-off was “purely coincidental,” the crossover of the domestic 
with the late imperial would have been obvious to Thatcher and, likely, to those politically 
informed viewers tuning into the evening news.100 
The final significant Tory showdown on Rhodesia came appropriately enough at the 
Conservative Party’s annual conference in October 1979—a gathering that Amery had 
personally warned Thatcher was likely to be “divisive,” its impact on party morale 
“traumatic.”101 In Blackpool, sympathizers from the Rhodesia lobby followed the same playbook 
that they had pursued at these events in years past—but, this time, with an added intensity. They 
mobilized an eleventh hour effort to force the party leadership to carry a resolution calling for the 
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immediate recognition of Muzorewa’s Zimbabwe-Rhodesia. This move was an attempt to 
overturn the whole negotiated framework of Lusaka and the Lancaster House talks, then ongoing 
in London. In the run-up to the conference, T.D. Lardner Burke, chairman of the 
Anglo-Rhodesian Society, whose father was a former Rhodesian Minister of Justice under Ian 
Smith, wrote to local Conservative groups, asking them to support resolutions favoring 
immediate diplomatic recognition. As in years past, party leaders had the power to select just one 
resolution for debate from the lot. They carefully chose an innocuousness option—a resolution 
that merely expressed that the conference “look[ed] forward” to the moment when Her Majesty’s 
Government could recognize a “multiracial Zimbabwe.”102 It made no mention of who should be 
at the helm of such a government; Bishop Muzorewa had been utterly ignored. 
Spurned by the selection process, members of the lobby tried other tactics.103 “In order to 
ensure that delegates at the Blackpool Conference were given the opportunity to hear the case for 
Zimbabwe-Rhodesia,” Lardner-Burke reported, “a meeting in the Conference Centre was jointly 
arranged by the Monday Club and ourselves.” Nearly seven hundred people turned up to hear 
three speakers: Zimbabwe-Rhodesia’s Foreign Minister David Mukome, Deputy Minister of 
Lands and Natural Resources Rowan Cronje, and Julian Amery himself. Up until the conference, 
Downing Street had been relatively successful at parrying direct attacks on Thatcher; however, 
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the adverse effect of this was to deflect considerable rage onto Lord Carrington. As the Daily 
Mail reported, Monday Clubbers, joined by the assembled ranks of the Anglo-Rhodesian 
Society, chanted “Carrington out!” at their meeting.104 In the plenary session, the foreign 
secretary personally recalled the numerous “Hang Carrington” banners decorating the hall.105 For 
Lardner-Burke, the rally “was a resounding success, and no doubt played a major part in 
influencing the proceedings the following day.”106 
 Foiled by party rules at every turn, the lobby exercised their last option. They took their 
grievances directly to the conference floor, attempting to raise a series of amendments to the 
resolution during debate. The best they could manage was a feeble addendum that merely 
compelled the government to “lift sanctions as soon as practically possible.”107 The British 
government had continued to apply sanctions on Rhodesia in order to force the Smith regime to 
remain at the negotiating table at Lancaster House. Thus, the critical matter of when to ease 
sanctions had been reserved to Thatcher and Carrington’s judgment. But one of the most 
controversial moments of the debate came during the speech of a delegate from the Young 
Conservatives, the youth wing of the Tories. Rising to object to the resolution and to give his 
opinion of Thatcher’s exploits in Lusaka, Ian Wallace declared, “I only hope that when Mrs. 
Thatcher finished her dance with Kenneth Kaunda in Lusaka that she carefully wiped away any 
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of the traces of the blood in which that man’s hands are steeped.” 108 This bitter comment elicited 
a sharp reaction from assembled delegates who shouted Wallace down.109 The crowd’s rhythmic 
slow-clapping, an effort to prorogue the remainder of the young man’s speech, prompted a 
reproach from the Party Chairman, Lord Thorneycraft. “Ladies and gentlemen,” he intervened, 
“we have always valued good manners in this hall.”110  
Wallace, young and easily intimidated, was followed at the rostrum by the much more 
imposing figure of Julian Amery. “The Conservative Party cannot weigh the pro-Soviet, 
totalitarian, terrorist Patriotic Front on the same scale as the pro-Western, pro-democratic 
government of Bishop Muzorewa,” Amery growled. “So long as the British Government 
supports sanctions and continued sanctions, we are supporting the Patriotic Front and we are 
supporting the drive of Soviet imperialism in Africa.”111 The Iron Lady had rarely been accused 
of enabling Soviet imperialism; she sat stony-faced throughout the debate.  
But for all of its bluster, the right-wing rebellion came to nothing. Lord Carrington rose 
to the platform to deliver the government’s official response to the debate. He understood the 
high stakes. “I have seldom taken more trouble with any speech’s composition,” he later 
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remarked.112  In a persuasive and passionate defense of himself and Thatcher, Carrington 
rationalized the government’s approach to Rhodesia (see Figure 2.7). He did not discount the 
merits of the Internal Settlement. “If in the months after 1978 Britain had offered help and advice 
rather than carping criticism,” Carrington stated, “I believe that a constitution without defects 
and acceptable to international opinion might very well have been produced.”113 The 
responsibility for this mess lay with the previous Labour administration. But, he added, the 
Thatcher government’s unilateral recognition of the Internal Settlement, at this stage, as parties 
were toiling away at the Lancaster House talks, would do nothing to stabilize the Muzorewa 
regime. Indeed, it would only embolden the opposition to it still further. He and Thatcher had 
chosen a different course, one which “[sought] to build upon this new situation” afforded by the 
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Figure 2.7 Margaret Thatcher waves to delegates at the 1979 Conservative Party Conference, flanked by Lord Carrington 
(right) and Francis Pym (left). Pym would ultimately succeed Carrington as foreign secretary in April 1982. Julia Langdon, 
“Lord Carrington Obituary,” Guardian, 10 July 2018, https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2018/jul/10/peter-carrington-lord-
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Internal Settlement.114 In this way, Lord Carrington articulated the middle way that Thatcher had 
spent the summer trying to chart between two very contested decolonizations. For a moment, the 
conference sat on a knife’s edge. But, in the end, Carrington’s performance was enough to 
silence the critics. “The Blackpool Conference marked a turning point,” he later added. “I felt 
considerable relief.”115  
The Rhodesia lobby’s efforts to derail the independence of Zimbabwe and the peaceful 
resolution of the war had failed. But it showed how one wing of British politics had taken up the 
cause of a very specifically defined discourse of decolonization, originating in Africa. In 
London, the Lancaster House talks carried on, acrimonious at times, into December 1979. Just 
before Christmas, the parties reached agreement. Muzorewa would stand down in favor of the 
re-imposition of temporary rule from London under a British governor-general. As diplomats 
realized the scope of the task ahead of them—the almost instantaneous reconstruction of the 
colonial state some 15 years after UDI—they sought out the dusty tomes and retired, greying 
faces of the long defunct Colonial Office. Lord Soames, Winston Churchill’s son-in-law, was 
dispatched to Salisbury to resurrect British administration of the colony of Southern Rhodesia. 
His task was to prepare all party elections, which would include the Patriotic Front, but 
competing separately as ZANU and ZAPU. For their part, Mugabe and Nkomo had agreed to a 
cease-fire. Soames assumed command of the Rhodesian Security Forces and, at least tacitly, the 
liberation armies; guerrilla fighters were then sequestered into demobilization camps within 
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Rhodesia.116 By the end of the Lancaster House talks, if not before, the Internal Settlement was 
dead. Though he still had an election to fight, Bishop Muzorewa’s political vision of 
decolonization as an economically reassuring policy of multiracialism had been put on ice—or 
so it seemed, until it was taken up by an unlikely advocate. 
 
“To the Casual Visitor, No Change Seemed to Have Occurred” 
In February 1980, Robert Mugabe’s ZANU won a landslide victory in Lord Soames’s 
independence elections, receiving sixty-three percent of votes on the common roll and an 
outright majority in the one hundred seat House of Assembly. Joshua Nkomo’s ZAPU won just 
twenty seats. Bishop Muzorewa’s UANC achieved a dismal and embarrassing eight percent of 
the vote, which translated into just three seats. Ian Smith’s Rhodesia Front carried all twenty 
white reserve seats, which had been retained under the Lancaster House agreement, but reduced 
from twenty-eight. International election observers certified the process as fair, though reporting 
equal amounts of voter intimidation by all sides.117 
Nkomo, of the minority Ndebele people, had a much smaller base of support in 
Matabeleland upon which to draw; at the same time, Muzorewa and Mugabe, both Shona, 
jockeyed for one block of votes. But in the eyes of the electorate, Muzorewa had been 
completely discredited as prime minister. He had willingly relinquished power to the British, 
without a fight—at least, that’s how it looked. Moreover, he had consented to a 
British-administered process of decolonization, which privileged political sovereignty above, in 
his mind, economic security. The Bishop had reneged on his promise to bring a new, fairer 
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political vision to southern Africa.118 As the British Conservative MP Patrick Wall explained in a 
letter to a South African friend, the Bishop’s apparent hypocrisy, “together with the fact that Mr. 
Mugabe was the only person who could end the war, was sufficient to give him a large 
majority.”119 Wall, then serving as president of the Monday Club, was no radical or socialist. But 
he ended his letter on a personal assurance: “I have known Mugabe some time and believe him 
to be a highly intelligent man,” adding, “We will do our best to try and stop him moving toward 
Marxism.”120 
In fact, Robert Mugabe had gone out of his way to appear non-threatening to the British, 
to white Rhodesians, and to the Rhodesian Security Forces during the campaign. Summarizing 
his impressions of a trip to Zimbabwe just after Mugabe had been sworn in as prime minister, 
T.P. Lawler, secretary of the newly rechristened “Anglo-Zimbabwe” Society, noted that “to the 
casual visitor, no change seems to have occurred.”121 In April 1980, just as Mugabe took office, 
                                                        
118 According to the inveterate South African newsletter writer Erik Rydbeck—a Johannesburg resident whose long 
serialized letters show up in the papers of many of the starlets of the Rhodesia lobby—“the Bishop’s image was 
effectively destroyed at the Lancaster House talks in the eyes of his fellow Shonas – the majority – when he all the 
time was seen as the chap who gave in to the British, while Mugabe and Nkomo held out for more and more 
concessions.” Rydbeck also relayed the comments of a Rhodesian friend and factory manager whose employees 
voted for Mugabe over Muzorewa because the Bishop had “not given them peace, free schooling and more land as 
promised.” Rydbeck added, sarcastically, “After three months in office!” Erik Rydbeck, newsletter to friends, “Nr. 1 
– Series E5 – 1980,” 15 March 1980, UDPW/48/342, Patrick Wall papers, HHC. 
119 Patrick Wall to E.H.R. Titren, 8 April 1980, UDPW/48/340, Patrick Wall papers, HHC. 
120 Ibid.  
121 T.P. Lawler, quoted in “Minutes of the Fourth Meeting of the Council held at Gascoyne Holdings, 22 Charing 
Cross Road, London, WC2,” 16 July 1980, UDPW/48/343, Patrick Wall papers, HHC. On his trip, Lawler was 
surely mixing in the most exclusive circles of Salisbury’s white community. But in fact, there was change. In late 
May 1980, A. Foxall, an employee at a hotel in Bindura in central Zimbabwe, wrote to Patrick Wall. “I have also 
had the hotel to look after as the manageress needed a short holiday. Taking this over for a time has given me an 
insight of [sic] the serious change that has taken place in this part of our business. The Europeans have more or less 
deserted us because the Africans have more or less taken over the bars and lounge. At the request of some of our 
European customers, we raised the prices in our cocktail bar very considerably, hoping to at least keep a small part 
for the whites to be on their own. This has not worked out and we find Africans coming in, buying one drink and 
sitting with it all night. This kind of trade is no good, but there is little we can do about it.” Foxall’s letter shows the 
immediate effects of integration and the social opportunities for Africans after independence. At the same time, 
Foxall noted that “Robert Mugabe is an eminently sensible man” who understood the logic of retaining white capital 
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Roy Welensky, the last prime minister of the dissolved Central African Federation—who was 
then still living in Zimbabwe—wrote to his friend Alan Lennox-Boyd, the one-time British 
Colonial Secretary. “The new prime minister [Mugabe] has not put a foot wrong,” Welensky 
declared.122 Mugabe, once the biggest threat to white Rhodesians, quickly became the 
community’s guarantor of stability. They came to see him as an acceptable break on the more 
radical elements within ZANU. “I only hope that nothing happens to Mugabe,” Welensky wrote 
to Lord Boyd the following December, “because he seems to be the one man that stands a chance 
of pulling us through it. I certainly don’t share his views as a Marxist,” Welensky added, “but he 
is sufficiently pragmatic to recognize the need to maintain law and order and to have a 
responsible government.”123  
Mugabe was, however, not as diplomatic with his African political adversaries. The new 
prime minister quickly began to consolidate power using the very same draconian emergency 
powers that Ian Smith had invoked after UDI.124 By the fall of 1980, demobilized soldiers from 
ZANU and ZAPU militias were waging pitched battles in the streets of Zimbabwe’s second city, 
Bulawayo.125 In 1982, Mugabe expelled Joshua Nkomo from the Government of National Unity 
on trumped up charges of fomenting a coup, and he was ultimately forced into exile. Nkomo’s 
                                                        
in the country—at least, he predicted, “for a honeymoon period of say two years.” A. Foxall to Patrick Wall, 28 May 
1980, UDPW/48/343, Patrick Wall papers, HHC. 
122 Roy Welensky to Alan Lennox-Boyd, 9 April 1980, MS. Eng. c. 3419 Rhodesia, 1980-83, Alan Lennox-Boyd 
papers, Bodleian Library, Oxford.  
123 Roy Welensky to Alan Lennox-Boyd, 2 December 1980, MS. Eng. c. 3419 Rhodesia, 1980-83, Alan 
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125 Mlambo, A History of Zimbabwe, 196. 
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Ndebele supporters retreated into the bush to wage their own guerrilla war against the 
government. Nor did Bishop Muzorewa escape ZANU’s wrath in this period. In November 1981, 
the Bishop wrote to Thatcher requesting urgent UK financial assistance to build a perimeter wall 
and erect flood lighting around his Salisbury home—which itself had been built with British 
government aid. He also asked for money to fund the salaries of his personal security guards and 
to help defray the costs of his two sons’ educations abroad.126 After initially expressing some 
interest in granting the Bishop further help, especially for his children, Thatcher chose not to 
pursue the matter any further. It was the British government’s final disavowal of Muzorewa and 
the legacies of the Internal Settlement.  
Throughout all of this political unrest, Roy Welensky reported to Lord Boyd, life for 
wealthy rural whites went on as normal. “In many ways,” he wrote, “the people who live in the 
countryside are happier than those in the towns. Apparently the farmers are getting a good break 
because of the Government’s urgent need for food and foreign exchange.”127 Until the early 
2000s, Mugabe refused to upset the white community, especially those with a strong financial 
stake in the country. In many ways, then, Mugabe had himself appropriated the Bishop’s 
emphasis on the importance of economic and political sovereignty as markers of true 
independence.128 Though just a few months earlier, the Bishop had drawn massive crowds, by 
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1980, he had lost credibility dramatically—not least, in part, because Mugabe had co-opted and 
then began to implement Muzorewa’s own political message. 
In Britain, Thatcher walked away from the Rhodesian crisis unscathed. In fact, she had 
gained experience and credibility on the international stage and, for the time being, she had 
neutralized the political threat from those seeking to outflank her on the right. She had also 
cultivated a useful network of Commonwealth leaders, forged in the fires of Lusaka. And, in 
Mugabe, she had gained an unexpected ally. As Thatcher offered him an £80 million loan after 
independence, the UK Exchequer explored new investment opportunities in Zimbabwe to help 
offset Britain’s recession. After fifteen years as a pariah state, Zimbabwe’s infrastructure was in 
dire need of an upgrade. At a time of recession at home, Land Rover, Aveling-Barnford, Rolls 
Royce, and other British companies jockeyed for the opportunity to standardize the market with 
UK-manufactured commodities.129 The postcolonial development economy swung into full gear.  
For her part, in June 1980, Thatcher personally intervened to ensure that an extra £22 
million in Rhodesian debt—the legacy of UDI—be written off, all against the expressed wishes 
of the UK Treasury.130 This generosity was a gift to Mugabe’s cash-strapped government, and he 
                                                        
129 The UK Foreign & Commonwealth Office and Treasury pushed hard for the development of private sector 
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had not even asked for it. When the news reached Mugabe’s Cabinet meeting, ZANU ministers 
stood and clapped, in honor of Mrs. Thatcher.131 In the span of just a year, Margaret Thatcher 
showed how politically tactile she could be. In May 1979, dressing down her officials for 
suggesting that a British envoy meet with Mugabe on her behalf, she scrawled across the top of 
the memo: “No. Please do not meet members of the ‘Patriotic Front.’ I have never done business 
with terrorists until they become prime ministers.”132 Given her approach after Mugabe’s 
election, it was an apt description of her views. Thatcher’s early championing of Robert 
Mugabe’s government would soon become inconvenient history for her—but not for some time. 
Peter Carrington, the Prime Minister’s recurrent fall guy, did not extricate himself so 
easily from the legacies of the Rhodesia crisis. Outside London, in the leafy suburban shires, 
Carrington’s enemies looked for revenge in their own way. In February 1981, H. Margaret 
Crawford submitted an “Accusation of High Treason” against Lord Carrington and other FCO 
staff to Dorset police. Relying on the precedent of the Anthony Blunt affair—in which the 
leading art historian confessed to aiding and abetting the Soviet Union the 1950s and 1960s as a 
member of the Cambridge Five spy ring—Crawford argued that that Carrington and his advisors 
“have ‘given the Sovereign’s enemies aid and comfort’ in Zimbabwe, Zambia, and 
Mozambique.”133 The accusations were not pursued by the police. Reviled by Julian Amery and 
the now largely defunct Rhodesia lobby, Carrington’s critics in the House of Commons bided 
their time until they could attempt to oust him from office. Some two years later, in early April 
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1982, they would find their chance. Deep in the South Atlantic, the Argentine military junta 
would occupy the Falkland Islands. On the Noble Lord’s watch, Britain had betrayed two 
separate white settler communities within the span of three years. The charges would prove too 
damning for Carrington to fend off.134  
 
Conclusion 
Margaret Thatcher’s response to Muzorewa and the Internal Settlement demonstrates the 
very basic but often unrecognized fact that Britain was still an imperial state in the 1980s. For the 
first year of her tenure in office, the British political scene was inundated by the drama of the 
Rhodesia crisis. Politicians, especially Tories, sat starkly divided over the competing political 
imaginaries of decolonization emanating out of southern Africa, each offering a different way 
forward. Thatcher wavered between recognizing Muzorewa’s idea of decolonization, which 
sought to avoid the fate of Africa’s failed states. At the same time, prone to taking the politically 
expedient route, she became enamored of another option, one that conveniently intersected with 
her own nationalist conception of Britain as a great world power.  
Though she and her staff did their level best to convince journalists, the public, and 
perhaps themselves that the prime minister had been a beacon of consistency on Rhodesia, 
Thatcher cast aside one decolonization to embrace another. She did so not because Lord 
Carrington had miraculously lifted the scales from her eyes, but because “early Thatcher” was 
dogged by intraparty opposition—besieged by the “wets” in her party, but also outflanked by the 
“dries.” In the end, her first year in office was shaped by contested political imaginaries of 
decolonization in both Zimbabwe and late imperial Britain.
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CHAPTER 3: THE CONSTITUTION EXPRESS: LATE BRITISH DECOLONIZATION 
IN INDIGENOUS CANADA 
 
In early June 1980, Canadian Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau arrived at 10 Downing 
Street on a constitutional mission. In a quirk of history in the 1980s, Ottawa still had to seek 
permission from London to amend its constitution—the British North America Act, 1867. Since 
the Canadian federal and provincial governments had been unable to agree on an amending 
formula before the Statute of Westminster was ratified in 1931, Britain had consented to retain 
the act indefinitely.1 Over the next five decades, a succession of prime ministers, including 
Trudeau, had sought unsuccessfully to forge a domestic political consensus upon which to 
request full legal separation from Britain, a process dubbed “patriation” in Canada.2 But 
following Quebec’s failed referendum on independence in 1980, Trudeau embarked upon his 
first official meeting with Margaret Thatcher determined to initiate the legal chain of events that
                                                        
1 The statute devolved legislative powers over domestic and foreign affairs to the Dominions. Robert Sheppard and 
Michael Valpy, The National Deal: The Fight for a Canadian Constitution (Toronto: Fleet Books, 1982), 199-200. 
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would finally bring the constitution home.1 In the end, he would need the UK Parliament to pass 
one final amendment to the act, devolving its powers to Canada.2 
While agreeable to Trudeau’s request, Thatcher worried about the unintended 
consequences of this seemingly procedural issue. She feared that patriation could become 
politically complicated in Britain, distracting from, or even undermining, her own legislative 
agenda.3 Over lunch at their June tête-à-tête, she told Trudeau that to limit the scope for 
disruption, she would restrict her ministers from meeting with Canadian lobbyists opposed to his 
plans. “If, for example, queues of Indians knocked on the door of No. 10,” Thatcher added 
casually, “the answer would be that it was for Canada to decide her future and not HMG.” In 
return, Trudeau vowed that he “would try to make things as easy as possible.”4  
In these offhand comments about the specter of “Indians” on her doorstep, Thatcher 
tacitly recognized that Indigenous activism in Britain was neither unusual nor unexpected. For 
centuries, the center of empire featured as an entangled space of Indigenous protest and 
resistance in what the historian Coll Thrush has called an “unbroken tradition of Indigenous 
political journeying.”5 But Thatcher’s reference to “queues of Indians” also demonstrated at least 
                                                        
1 Trudeau had long sought the patriation of the constitution, notably in line with his republican leanings. For a 
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some appreciation for the tense domestic political situation in Canada. In the 1970s, 
representatives of dissenting provinces, separatist movements, and Indigenous nations had 
questioned the very nature of the Canadian confederation and their place within it, nearly tearing 
the country apart.  
As these divisions persisted into the early 1980s, Trudeau suggested he might patriate the 
constitution unilaterally, without first seeking the consent of the provinces or Indigenous 
peoples. While this threat goaded his critics, the final provocation was Trudeau’s request to 
Thatcher to insert a written “Charter of Rights and Freedoms” into the UK legislation that would 
devolve to Canada as part of the constitution. Decrying this codified bill of rights as a federal 
power grab by stealth, aggrieved representatives—notably from Indigenous nations and 
provincial governments—flocked to London in a bid to persuade British lawmakers to thwart 
Trudeau’s patriation.6 Far from making the process easy for Thatcher, in the estimation of the 
young Tory MP Jonathan Aitken, Trudeau had “export[ed] Canada’s constitutional crisis to 
Westminster.”7 On the heels of Rhodesia, the Thatcher government faced yet another late 
imperial disruption. 
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Many Indigenous leaders opposed Trudeau’s patriation because they believed it 
threatened to nullify their historic bilateral treaties with the British crown, including the Royal 
Proclamation of 1763 and the Treaty of Niagara of 1764—the agreements that had established 
nation-to-nation relationships between Indigenous peoples, the British government, and, later, its 
settler colonies. They argued that these treaties constituted a “trust relationship” by affirming that 
Indigenous sovereignty and rights existed well before the arrival of Europeans. Indigenous 
activists never agreed upon a single vision of a postcolonial future.8 But as the independent 
nation-state was a political non-starter, many held to the general principle of asserting 
Indigenous sovereignty from within Canada.9 They argued that Indigenous peoples, as one of the 
three founding parties of the Confederation, should be considered legally on par with the 
provinces.10  
Indigenous peoples also mobilized because of their declining socioeconomic standing, 
including in 1980 an unemployment rate of 68 percent, an average life expectancy ten years 
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shorter than other Canadians, and a three times higher chance of dying a violent death.11 For one 
activist, the blame for Indigenous peoples’ low standard of living was not difficult to assign; they 
had been poorly treated “since the Canadian hicks took over trying to administer her mother’s, 
Britain’s, obligations toward our people.”12 Such was the raw deal they had received from 
Ottawa since Confederation in 1867 that, by the early 1980s, many Indigenous leaders viewed a 
continuing relationship with Britain as their best chance of achieving some measure of 
self-determination and a better life. In the early 1980s, Indigenous activists took this alternative 
vision of decolonization to the streets of London and the halls of Westminster to push for 
sovereignty and rights. Maintaining the link with Britain thus became an essential part of some 
Indigenous peoples’ political toolkit of decolonization. 
This chapter considers the position of Indigenous peoples, especially in British Columbia, 
who deviated from the “colony to nation-state” script and timeline of decolonization. Beginning 
with a discussion of why Indigenous people perceived their relationships with the crown as a 
trusteeship, or “sacred trust,” this chapter then tracks one specific activist campaign organized by 
the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs (UBCIC). Nicknamed the “Constitution Express,” 
this protest unfolded in two phases: first, in a cross-country train journey in November 1980 to 
pressure the Canadian government and, second, in a November 1981 swing through Western 
Europe, culminating in activism in London.  
In an effort to safeguard their relationship with the crown, ordinary people on the 
Constitution Express went to Britain with a pragmatic strategy in mind: to lobby any group with 
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the capacity to offer substantive political support to their cause. In the process, they navigated 
the splintered political landscape of Thatcher’s Britain—one riven by deep political, ideological, 
and ethnic divisions, perhaps more so than at any time since 1945. Maneuvering between the 
nuances of British political and cultural difference, they articulated and exercised their own 
visions of decolonization, pursuing continued ties to the UK as the guarantor of Indigenous 
sovereignty and rights in a federal Canada.  
  
“The King’s Law” 
For 250 years, the Royal Proclamation of 1763 has been the cornerstone of Indigenous 
peoples’ trust relationship with the crown. In the aftermath of the Seven Years’ War, the 
victorious British government attempted to make peace with Indigenous leaders, the bulk of 
whom had allied with its enemy, France. But unlike the French, the British had never conquered 
Indigenous nations, and, indeed, the onset of Pontiac’s War in May 1763 served to confirm their 
fears about the imminent threat to the exposed North American colonies. Peace became a 
military and strategic imperative.13 As a result, in his Royal Proclamation—which dealt primarily 
with the logistics of the postwar transfer of French and Spanish colonies to Britain—King 
George III declared that Indigenous peoples “who live under our protection, should not be 
molested or disturbed.”14 The proclamation thus recognized the sovereignty of Indigenous 
nations, already connected to the crown by diplomatic and trading relationships that had built up 
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over time.15 It also prohibited settlers from seizing Indigenous lands west of a boundary line in 
the Appalachian Mountains unless those lands had been formally sold or ceded by treaty. Only 
then would Indigenous title to land and resources be considered extinguished. Moreover, the 
provisions of the Royal Proclamation were drafted to apply generally to all unceded Indigenous 
territory.16 
In 1764, at the behest of the British government, Indigenous leaders representing nations 
from the northeast and the Great Lakes region of North America signed the Treaty of Niagara, 
which translated the promises of the Royal Proclamation into a formal diplomatic agreement.17 
As proof of Indigenous peoples’ own understanding of the treaty as affirming their sovereignty, 
it was concluded only after chiefs exchanged with British officials a “Two Row Wampum,” an 
intricate white and purple beaded belt depicting two boats progressing down a river. These 
vessels signified the sovereign jurisdictions of two allied nations, Indigenous peoples and the 
British—happily parallel, but separate.18 Wampum retained great significance to Indigenous 
peoples centuries later, even as Patrick Madahbee, an Ojibwa chief from the Union of Ontario 
Indians, visited the Foreign and Commonwealth Office in London in November 1980. He 
brought with him a wampum belt, which he said “signified the covenant between the British and 
Indian nations” as old allies. According to one civil servant, Madahbee’s “inference was of 
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course that [the British] should now support our Indian friends in the conflict against another 
Frenchman, Pierre Trudeau.”19   
All subsequent treaty-making in Canada was concluded on this initial legal foundation.20 
For the Cree political activist and writer Harold Cardinal, the treaties with Britain represented an 
“Indian Magna Carta.”21 And in British Columbia, where UK officials only engaged in 
treaty-making in their initial contact zone on Vancouver Island, the Royal Proclamation 
remained especially important to Indigenous conceptions of sovereignty on unceded land.22 
According to Kukpi7 (Chief) Wayne Christian of the Splatsin nation in central British Columbia, 
allusions to the “King’s Law,” deriving from the Royal Proclamation, had filtered west and 
retained a central place in his nation’s oral histories as representative of Indigenous peoples’ 
nation-to-nation relationship with Britain. When British officials made their way onto the interior 
plateau of British Columbia in the nineteenth century, they gave local leaders maces, topped with 
reproductions of the crown itself. These staffs, which were passed down alongside oral 
testimony, came to represent the commitments spelled out in the Royal Proclamation.23 In 1980, 
Louise Mandell, a young lawyer employed by the Union of BC Indian Chiefs, articulated the 
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feelings of many ordinary Indigenous people. “Great Britain,” she wrote, “was, and continues to 
be, under a sacred trust to the Indian people, their lands, and their governments from the 
onslaught of more powerful countries.”24  
But while Indigenous peoples closely safeguarded knowledge of the Proclamation and of 
Niagara down the generations, British officials had lost sight of the importance of these treaties 
by the mid-nineteenth century. This shift reflected changing European strategic imperatives on 
the North American continent, as Indigenous peoples lost their ability to leverage their position 
on the “middle ground” between competing empires.25 American and British officials thus went 
from considering Indigenous peoples within a military calculus to one centered on dispossession 
and settlement.26 In 1867, the British North America Act officially created the Canadian 
confederation; its Section 91(24) devolved “exclusive legislative authority” over “Indians and 
Lands reserved for the Indians” to the federal government.27 And in 1876, Ottawa passed the 
Indian Act, which extended federal legislative control to Indigenous peoples in all parts of 
Canada—including determining the very definition of who could claim status as an Indian.28  
                                                        
24 Louise Mandell, “Sovereign Nations: The Legal Case,” Indian World 3, 8 (November 1980). The italics are mine. 
For a discussion of similar language in article 22 of the League of Nations Covenant, see James Youngblood 
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Publishing, 2008), 24-25. 
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(Cambridge: Cambridge UP, 1991). 
26 J.R. Miller, “Petitioning the Great White Mother: First Nations’ Organizations and Lobbying in London,” in 
Canada and the End of Empire, ed. Philip Buckner (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004), 304-
305. 
27 Government of Canada, Section 91(24), “Constitution Acts, 1867 to 1982,” 22 February 2019, http://laws-
lois.justice.gc.ca/eng/Const/page-4.html. 
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Over a century later, because Pierre Trudeau sought to patriate only the British North 
America Act (but without the Royal Proclamation, Niagara, and other longstanding treaties), 
Indigenous peoples had no guarantee that Ottawa would honor the rights enshrined in them after 
the connection to the UK had been severed. One of the first well-publicized opportunities for 
Indigenous leaders to articulate their grievances and a political imaginary of decolonization came 
at the Russell Tribunal in Rotterdam in November 1980, which took up the case of exploited 
Indigenous peoples in the Americas. The Union of BC Indian Chiefs submitted evidence that 
argued that Britain’s role in decolonization was in “strengthening its colonies to a position of full 
statehood.”29 Such was the justified process in Canada, with the development of national, 
provincial, and municipal systems of government. The UBCIC, however, argued that Britain had 
“legal and equitable obligations to Indian Nations,” dating back to the eighteenth century.30 With 
Britain as trustee, Indigenous peoples could work toward strengthening their communities as 
autonomous political units, operating within Canada, but on an equal status with the federal 
government and provinces. This political development was what the UBCIC called “Indian 
Government.”31 For the activist Arthur Manuel, the ultimate goal was clear. “A decolonized 
person,” he argued, “is a person who is formerly colonized but has since attained the maturity to 
                                                        
29 “The Substance of Great Britain's Obligations to the Indian Nations. Presented at the Fourth Russell Tribunal, 
Rotterdam, Netherlands,” November 1980, 1, UBCIC Constitution Express Digital Collections, 
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30 Ibid. 
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Resource Centre, Vancouver, BC (henceforth UBCIC-RC).  
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take his or her place among the community of men who have no masters and have respect for the 
human dignity of all mankind.”32 
For its part, the British government attempted to distance itself from the situation in 
Canada by arguing that it had devolved its responsibility for Indigenous peoples to Ottawa by 
1867, and certainly by 1931. But how could Britain’s obligations in a diplomatic treaty be 
devolved to a third party—Canada—without first seeking the consent of the other signatory—
Indigenous peoples? This question drove the legal arguments upon which Indigenous activists 
took their case to Ottawa, and then later to Westminster. 
 By contrast, the Canadian federal government’s true position was best articulated in an 
October 1980 letter from Trudeau to Del Riley, president of the National Indian Brotherhood—
the body representing status Indians.33 Trudeau insisted that he was “personally convinced that 
[Indigenous peoples] will lose nothing in this act of patriation,” because afterwards, “Canadians, 
with new-found pride in their own Constitution and in their new maturity as a country, will be 
more than ever generous in considering the needs and wishes of our first citizens.” In a typical 
refrain, the prime minister argued that aboriginal rights were, as of yet, undefined. “It will be 
your task to come to a full and common understanding of the collective rights you have claimed 
by virtue of your treaties and your aboriginal standing,” Trudeau told Riley. “You will have to 
persuade the Governments of Canada that the special rights you claim are reasonable and that 
they should be guaranteed in the Constitution.”34  
                                                        
32 Arthur Manuel, quoted in “Proceedings (Original), Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs, 14th Annual General 
Assembly, Williams Lake, BC,” 26-28 October 1982, 81, Fourteenth Annual General Assembly Meeting Minutes 
and Resolutions Binder, UBCIC-RC. 
33 “Status Indians” were recognized by the federal government under the terms of the Indian Act. Sanders, “Prior 
Claims,” 253.  
34 TNA: FCO 82/830, Pierre Trudeau to Del Riley, 30 October 1980. 
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According to Trudeau’s timeline, Indigenous rights would only be secured in the 
constitution after patriation—a process not subject to Indigenous consent or even consultation.35 
Indigenous peoples would then bear the task of persuading a paternalistic federal government 
that they deserved a carve-out for their sovereignty and rights. And in the end, all of this would 
hinge on the Canadian public’s generosity. Trudeau had redeployed Ottawa’s classic argument 
that Indigenous peoples were wards of the state, not the agents of their own national futures. 
 
“The Beginning of the People’s Government” 
Trudeau’s patriation smacked of a controversy that had swept through Indigenous 
communities over a decade earlier. In 1969, after just a year in office, Trudeau, supported by 
Minister of Indian Affairs Jean Chrétien, published an infamous White Paper that proposed 
repealing the Indian Act and abolishing Indian status altogether.36 In this policy, the 
assimilationist goals of the Canadian state merged with Trudeau’s liberal politics. He believed 
that no sub-section of Canadians should hold a special status or exclusive rights, arguing that all 
citizens must be equal under the law. “It’s inconceivable,” Trudeau told a Vancouver audience in 
August 1969, that “one section of the society [has] a treaty with the other section of the society.” 
Old treaties, he argued, could not forever bind their signatories, so that Indigenous peoples, he 
                                                        
35 On the issue of Indigenous consent, Indigenous peoples were only given “observer status” in constitutional 
negotiations between the federal and provincial governments in the late 1970s. Noel Starblanket, president of the 
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added sharply, “may be able to receive their twine or their gun powder.”37 Assimilation was the 
only way to solve Canada’s so-called “Indian problem.”38 In response, Indigenous peoples rose 
up against the White Paper until the Trudeau government was forced to withdraw it.39 Out of this 
activism came organizations like the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs that sought to 
channel dissent against the provincial and federal governments and to establish an ideological 
foundation for Indigenous self-determination.40  
In 1980, Indigenous peoples similarly organized against Trudeau’s patriation, which the 
UBCIC’s newsletter, Indian World, described as “a convenient way to carry [through] the final 
extinguishment of all the lands and rights we have as the aboriginal people.”41 In opposition to 
this agenda, Indigenous peoples had a powerful advocate in George Manuel, the prolific activist 
chief of the Neskonlith nation in central British Columbia, then serving as the UBCIC’s first 
executive president. Manuel had gained fame internationally both as a past president of the 
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National Indian Brotherhood and as the founding president of the World Council of Indigenous 
Peoples. From this position, he propagated the idea of the “Fourth World,” or a global network 
of Indigenous solidarity working together toward true decolonization.42 With Manuel at its helm, 
the UBCIC became a key voice of Indigenous opposition to patriation.  
On 25 November 1980, the organization launched a highly publicized cross-country 
protest, dubbed the Constitution Express. Staff members chartered a ten-carriage train to travel 
from Vancouver to Ottawa where activists could put the case for proper Indigenous consultation 
on the constitution directly to the federal government. As hundreds of people boarded the train, 
the sound of drumming and singing echoed through the departures lounge at Pacific Central 
Station in Vancouver, the western terminus of the trans-Canada railway.43 The railroad, once the 
engine of empire used to facilitate the colonization of the west, was now being co-opted as a 
vehicle for decolonization (see Figure 3.1).44  
                                                        
42 George Manuel and Michael Posluns, The Fourth World: An Indian Reality (New York: Free Press, 1974). 
43 “Indians create colorful scene at train depot,” Prince George Herald, 24 November 1980 
44 “Constitution Express,” 5 November 1980, Bulletins, UBCIC Constitution Express Digital Collections, 
http://constitution.ubcic.bc.ca/node/155. 
Figure 3.1 A UBCIC political cartoon depicts decolonization in action—the Constitution Express chasing down a diminutive 
Trudeau and his patriation plan, November 1980. Courtesy of the Union of British Columbia Indian Chiefs. 
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Manuel understood the importance of the Constitution Express as a broad-based people’s 
movement, and its perception as such by the public and Canadian press. He had witnessed the 
benefits of this kind of campaign just a few months earlier during the “Indian Child Caravan.”45 
In response to the British Columbia government’s policy of placing supposedly “at risk” 
Indigenous children exclusively in white foster homes—what Wayne Christian called “an act of 
genocide”—the Splatsin community had organized a series of car convoys from around the 
province to bring activists to the Vancouver home of Grace McCarthy, the provincial minister of 
welfare.46 Christian was assisted in planning this protest by a South African exile and member of 
the African National Congress (ANC), Jacob Marule, who located the minister’s house by 
knocking door to door in McCarthy’s wealthy West Side neighborhood.47 With hundreds of 
Indigenous activists on her doorstep, McCarthy agreed to work with the Splatsin nation on the 
jurisdiction of Indian children.48 Proving that mass protests could work, Christian declared that 
the caravan “was the beginning of the people’s government.”49 
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The politicization that had fueled the Indian Child Caravan fed directly into the Ottawa 
Constitution Express. Aboard the train, staff from the UBCIC disseminated information and ran 
political seminars aimed at educating passengers on the basics of the constitution. Activists 
banned alcohol and lived communally on the journey, sharing traditional and non-traditional 
foods.50 They paid their respects to the elders who travelled with them. The UBCIC also 
provided its own security with a group of specially trained people, tasked with guarding against 
any infiltrators or agitators.51 Prevented from traveling with the group by a recurring heart 
condition, George Manuel followed the progress of the now well-publicized Express from an 
Ottawa hospital bed. He believed that the protest gave Indigenous peoples the opportunity to 
exercise self-government under the full gaze of Trudeau, the provinces, and the public. In this 
concerted way, the Constitution Express became a moving space of Indigenous sovereignty, 
bound for Ottawa. 
The Express reached the capital after four days of travel. But the train journey was not 
without a poignant display of intimidation by the Canadian state. After a short break in 
Winnipeg, UBCIC staff returned to the platform only to find that the normal train guards who 
had travelled with them over the Rockies from Vancouver had all been swapped out with large, 
bulky, intimidating men.52 The motives behind this move quickly became clear. Some two hours 
later, the train suddenly stopped in the middle of the western Ontario wilderness.53 After a long 
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 147 
delay, UBCIC vice president and George Manuel’s son, Bob, announced that the Express had 
allegedly been the target of a bomb threat.  
When officers of the Royal Canadian Mounted Police (RCMP) boarded the train, 
declaring that they needed to search each carriage, the presence of these new train guards 
suddenly made sense. They were undercover officers from the RCMP, searching the Constitution 
Express for weapons that might be used in a sneak attack on Ottawa. The search turned up 
neither bombs nor bullets, and the Constitution Express continued on its way without incident, 
some six hours late.54 But “it was pretty tense from then on,” one Union employee, Winona 
Wheeler recalled.55  
In anticipation of the Express, the Trudeau government cordoned off Parliament Hill with 
riot control barriers, a move in stark contrast to the peaceful intentions of the planned Indigenous 
protests. The government’s overreaction helped win public sympathy for the Indigenous cause.56 
Based on five straight nights of primetime national news coverage, Manuel congratulated the 
Express for “crawl[ing] into the homes of over 20 million Canadians.”57 But while the journey 
brought Indigenous peoples’ grievances to the forefront of the constitutional debate, it failed in 
its main endeavor to gain equal participation and Indigenous consent in the ongoing 
constitutional discussions between Ottawa and the provinces.  
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As a result, Christian gathered a select group of about fifty activists who boarded a 
chartered bus for the United Nations.58 In New York, they delivered a “Bill of Particulars” to 
Secretary General Kurt Waldheim, calling on the body to act as a mediator between Indigenous 
peoples, Ottawa, and the British government.59 Small groups then met separately with the 
representatives of some fourteen diplomatic missions, many of them former colonies now sitting 
as independent members of the Special Committee on Decolonization, including stalwarts of the 
Non-Aligned Movement like India, Cuba, and Tanzania.60 They delivered statements at these 
diplomatic missions, outlining Indigenous positions on sovereignty, land title, and rights.  
These short briefings surprised most delegations, previously enamored of a romantic 
vision of Canada as a wealthy but genial country with a good track record on human rights. “I 
don’t think they ever gave much thought to how the wealth of Canada comes from the 
resources,” Christian later noted of the string of UN meetings, “and we never surrendered those 
resources.”61 This successful foray onto the global stage provided a taste of true international 
recognition and a further opportunity to exercise Indigenous sovereignty. It spurred activists’ 
desire for more.62  
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“To Fight by Any Means, and at Any Cost” 
A month later, the Constitution Express’s lobbying of former colonies at the UN seemed 
to be paying off. On a tour of “third world” countries to promote his pet project, ending the so-
called North-South divide in the distribution of global wealth, Trudeau deplaned in Lagos, 
Nigeria.63 But instead of finding Nigerian President Shehu Shagari on the tarmac as expected, 
Trudeau instead was treated to a spectacle of “bright-costumed dancers and fierce drumming.”64 
The Nigerian leader failed to appear for bilateral meetings the next day, and when Trudeau 
finally tracked the president down, Shagari bluntly cast doubts on the sincerity of the West’s 
interest in global wealth inequality.65 
For George Manuel, who maintained deep and enduring connections to sub-Saharan 
Africa through his contacts at the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, Shagari’s actions were 
proof that the Indigenous message about Trudeau’s duplicity was beginning to filter into the 
international consciousness. In his monthly presidential statement in Indian World, Manuel 
wrote: “The Constitution Express sensitized third world countries into realizing that they do have 
third world brothers in Canada, who suffer the same type of exploitation from the same 
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developed countries, using the same economic and political techniques to deprive our people of 
land and resources.” Trudeau got the message, Manuel declared, when he “was greeted not by 
the President but by tribal dancers to remind him that Nigerian people are aware of how Canada 
treats its Indigenous brothers.”66 
Manuel perceived Trudeau’s trials in Nigeria as a good omen for Indigenous peoples’ 
international campaign against patriation. Following the operations in Ottawa and at the UN, he 
outlined two paths forward. The first required Indigenous people “to adjust, to cooperate, to be 
silent, to submit, to obey, to compromise,” leading to “the rewards of deprivation, poverty, and 
genocide,” while the second was “to fight, by any means and at any cost, to recover our pride, 
our dignity, our aboriginal rights.”67 Manuel favored the latter.  
In the spring of 1981, he asked Wayne Christian to organize a large delegation of 
ordinary people from across British Columbia to travel to London on a second Constitution 
Express.68 As with the Ottawa Express, the goal would be to demonstrate Indigenous sovereignty 
in action, with ordinary people taking to the global stage as both diplomats and agents of their 
own futures. At the same time, the London Express would physically underline the argument 
made by Indigenous activists that the British Parliament must play the key role of trustee under 
the terms of the Royal Proclamation and the Treaty of Niagara.  
Based on his previous experiences, Christian believed that the best way to generate 
support for the anti-patriation cause was, firstly, to stage a string of highly-publicized visits to 
European capitals. “I am proposing that we walk from Germany to London, England,” Christian 
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announced, or at least “walk[ing] into the major cities and bring[ing] our concerns to their 
attention.” He hoped that the extraordinary spectacle of Indigenous activists marching through 
cities in continental Europe would build pressure on the British and Canadian governments 
before the Express converged on Westminster. “If we take our people in there now,” Christian 
told a Special General Assembly of the UBCIC in May 1981, “there'll be no way that we can get 
the type of support and action that we need. We have to bring it from the outside into London.”69  
Christian and others were determined to correct the misleading narrative propagated by 
Ottawa that Canada was a political and economic meritocracy committed to its international role 
as a peacekeeping nation.70 “Trudeau pretends to international greatness in human rights,” Indian 
World declared after the Ottawa Constitution Express, adding that “we will demonstrate. . .that 
he has little regard for the rights and laws of the people in his own country.”71 In fleshing out 
Trudeau’s hypocrisy, the leaders of the UBCIC hoped to advance their own constitutional 
agenda. “You have to go public on what is happening,” Christian implored his colleagues in May 
1981, “[so that] we can have a direct impact internationally and on what happens in the [UK] 
House of Commons.”72 
To generate support for the trip to Europe, the UBCIC sought to harness the political 
energy of the first Constitution Express, which had swept through local communities in the 
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winter and spring of 1980-81.73 As Indian World noted in March 1981, “The [Ottawa] Express 
quickly transformed from a one-time protest event to a political movement itself.”74 From 
Vancouver Island and the Lower Mainland into the Interior, communities organized potlatches to 
discuss the constitution ahead of the London Express. The potlatch—a complex gift-giving 
ceremony—is the central political, economic, and religious institution in Indigenous 
communities of the Pacific Northwest.75 Over nine hundred people attended one such meeting in 
Kamloops.76 Aside from confirming popular support for political action in the UK, Christian 
observed that this single potlatch represented “people gathering together to talk, share, sing, 
dance, and generally bring back the Indian way of life.”77  
On 1 November 1981, over two hundred activists departed Vancouver for Europe to 
protest Trudeau’s patriation.78 Their seventeen-day itinerary was grueling: Hanover, Göttingen, 
Bonn, Paris, Brussels, Amsterdam, The Hague, and, finally, London.79 Each stop had been 
carefully orchestrated by small UBCIC advance teams dispatched to schedule public meetings, 
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press conferences, and marches and to secure accommodation and transportation.80 Vera Manuel, 
George Manuel’s daughter, was sent to West Germany by the UBCIC where she spent weeks 
forging personal connections with local people as a way of gaining their support. In this way, the 
concerted efforts of fourteen people, nine of them women, created a support network and 
itinerary in Europe for the London Express. 81 
Activists deplaned in Hanover, jetlagged and disoriented, but excited. From the outset, 
their eighteen-hour days were filled with events. Every morning, the organizers assigned 
individuals to small groups and sent them to specific locations, like universities, to address 
interested clubs and societies. In each country, one night was reserved for a cultural gathering of 
singing, dancing, and drumming.82 Through these political and cultural engagements, activists 
put to good use the PR lessons they had learned on the earlier Ottawa Express.  
They achieved a significant coup when George Manuel engineered a meeting in Bonn 
between Wayne Christian and former West German chancellor Willy Brandt, then serving as 
president of the Socialist International. Brandt and Pierre Trudeau were political confidantes, 
sharing an interest in issues of international development. Indeed, the previous year, the former 
chancellor had chaired an independent committee—the so-called Brandt Commission—to 
investigate the structural development issues fueling the North-South divide.83 But after 
Christian carefully spelled out for Brandt his political objections to patriation and Indigenous 
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peoples’ unenviable economic position in Canada, the former chancellor pledged to raise the 
matter with his good friend, Trudeau.84 
In addition to the meeting with Brandt, the Constitution Express’s continental tour was 
successful in stirring up local press interest. In Paris, activists emerged from their temporary 
accommodation on a barge moored on the Seine to march from the Canadian Embassy to the 
British Embassy, escorted by the French police.85 In connecting one embassy to the other, the 
Paris march provided a deliberately physical reminder that Britain still bore both a moral and 
legal obligation to Indigenous peoples. Christian and other key leaders then entered the British 
Embassy to alert officials of their intentions to travel to the UK.86 They later met with Régis 
Debray, foreign policy advisor to President François Mitterrand.87 
In Belgium, while some of the activists attended International Women’s Day in Brussels, 
most of the Constitution Express made its way to the hallowed graveyards and monuments of the 
First World War. As one group marched through the town of Ypres, accompanied by a local 
brass band, spiritual leaders led a contingent to Flanders Fields near Langemark to honor the 
contributions of Indigenous soldiers who served in the war.88 While deeply emotional, this 
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solemn tribute also highlighted the military connections between Indigenous peoples and the 
crown since the Treaty of Niagara.89  
Some individuals on the Constitution Express took their own initiatives, traveling much 
further afield in Europe. For example, Jerry and Dorothy Jack of the Nuxalk nation joined a 
demonstration by the indigenous Sami people of northern Norway against a hydroelectric dam 
that was slated to displace the local population and ruin valuable reindeer pastureland. After 
Jerry Jack helped to block construction equipment at the site, Norwegian police arrested him. 
Pictures of Jack, “spread-eagled but passive,” and the story of his subsequent deportation 
splashed across the front pages of Oslo’s major newspapers.90  
Wherever the Express went, the group was given massive publicity and a rousing 
welcome. A Canadian Embassy plant in the audience of one public meeting in Amsterdam 
telexed back to Ottawa that the hall was “packed with spectators who seemed enraptured to see 
so many Indians in one place.”91 For members of the Constitution Express, engaging Europeans 
was an altogether different experience from dealing with many Canadians. Europeans were 
uninformed, but not malicious or dismissive.92 They subscribed to the common trope of 
Indigenous nations in North America as “vanishing peoples,” who had succumbed to disease and 
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colonialism.93 But as Vera Manuel noted, “There was not that underlying guilt, ignorance, and 
disrespect shown to Indians by Canadians in our lands.”94 This equal exchange was empowering.  
But on 5 November 1981, dramatic news from Ottawa reached the Express in Paris. 
Trudeau had signed an accord with seven of the eight dissenting provincial premiers, long 
opposed to patriation. That September, the Canadian Supreme Court had ruled that Trudeau’s 
threat to unilaterally patriate the constitution without the consent of the provinces was legally 
possible but would violate political convention. The prime minister would need to carry with him 
a “substantial measure of consent” from provincial premiers. In subsequent negotiations, the 
dissenting premiers turned on their erstwhile ally, Quebec, and struck a compromise with 
Trudeau. He agreed to their terms on a constitutional amending formula, while the premiers 
would support Trudeau’s Charter of Rights and Freedoms, though subject to the provinces 
having a legislative override on some clauses.95  
But to the great detriment of Indigenous peoples, the one section of the draft constitution 
that provided a baseline recognition of aboriginal rights—an agreement the federal government 
had struck with some (but not all) Indigenous leaders in January 1981—had been axed.96 Though 
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the UBCIC had not supported this January agreement, members of the Constitution Express 
perceived the elimination of these basic safeguards as the key issue that had brought Trudeau and 
the premiers together. They sensed the double-dealing that had characterized so much of the 
state’s historical relations with Indigenous peoples. 
That same night, Trudeau jetted off to an exclusive gala at the Waldorf Astoria in 
Manhattan where the Council of Churches of the City of New York awarded him its “Family of 
Man” gold medallion for services to human rights and “his appreciation of the cultural diversity 
Figure 3.2 Donald Trump addressing a Manhattan crowd at the “Family of Man” awards dinner in November 1981 where Pierre 
Trudeau received a gold medallion from the Council of Churches of the City of New York. Thirty-six years later, Prime Minister 
Justin Trudeau gifted this photo to Trump, then US president, at their first official meeting. Courtesy of the Council of Churches 
of the City of New York. 
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of his nation.”97 The irony in the timing of these plaudits seemed to escape everyone but 
Indigenous people, and especially those activists in Paris on the Constitution Express. Feted as a 
global defender of the politically and economically downtrodden, Trudeau received his gilded 
award from the event’s headliner, a young New York City real-estate heir and socialite named 
Donald J. Trump (see Figure 3.2).98 Taking note of the hypocrisy of this moment, Indigenous 
activists vowed to pour even more energy into the Constitution Express. 
 
“Not Just Some Disgruntled Ethnic Minority” 
As George Manuel and Wayne Christian had intended, the Constitution Express’s swing 
through continental Europe built up political pressure on Margaret Thatcher’s government to 
recognize Britain’s treaty obligations to Indigenous peoples. People across Western Europe, 
Britain, and Canada soon flooded British public officials with impassioned letters and petitions 
about the plight of Indigenous peoples.99 “I always thought that things were slowly improving 
for American and Canadian Indians, but the Canadian government are wanting to destroy their 
country’s native people,” one correspondent wrote to Thatcher. “To me and thousands of others 
in Britain, the Canadian government men are all modern day General Custers,” he added.100 
Junior FCO minister Richard Luce reported that by April 1982, his department had received 
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some 9,700 pieces of mail concerning the issue of the Canadian constitution.101 The Labour MP 
Bruce George, well-known as an Indigenous advocate in Parliament, declared that he alone had 
received some 3,500 letters, only five of which had been personally abusive to him—or spoke 
favorably of Trudeau.102 
Despite this groundswell of popular support, the FCO continued to prevent British 
ministers from meeting with any representatives of Indigenous peoples, falling back on Ottawa’s 
tired justification that there was no united Indigenous opinion of patriation.103 Instead, 
low-ranking career civil servants at the FCO would continue to meet with chiefs and activists at 
their request. But this policy became difficult to maintain after the November 5 accord. The 
gutting of Indigenous rights—an act that Trudeau later briskly referred to as “the aboriginal 
thing”—proved so objectionable that even the prime minister’s few Indigenous supporters could 
not stand by it.104 “What can I say?” remarked Charlie Watt, co-chairman of the Inuit Committee 
on National Issues, which had supported patriation. “Whatever rights we had protected now are 
gone.”105 In November, an FCO memo recorded the first British acknowledgment that 
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Indigenous activists had formed a united front in response to the Accord. Several groups had met 
with British civil servants, and while “the Indians [had] deployed differing arguments, [they] all 
point[ed] in the same general direction.”106 
Once activists from the Constitution Express arrived in London on November 13, they 
were shepherded into British political and social institutions by sympathetic politicians and 
community leaders. In these exclusive spaces, they railed against Trudeau and spoke about the 
importance of Indigenous links with the British crown. Activists also recruited people to their 
cause, especially those with established connections to Indigenous peoples, like the Tory MP 
Mark Wolfson, who had once worked as a teacher among the Nisga’a in British Columbia, as 
well as his colleague, Winston Churchill Jr., who claimed to have Iroquois ancestry through his 
paternal American grandmother.107 Churchill “gave tea and sympathy” to six chiefs who 
presented him with an embroidered leather waistcoat that he said would be perfect “for riding 
purposes.”108  
The majority of supportive MPs and peers were motivated by the paternalism inherent in 
the project of empire, believing Parliament had a moral responsibility to save downtrodden 
people like Canada’s Indigenous peoples. It was a sentiment that some activists were willing to 
exploit. “We know you are concerned for the future of those countries you release from colonial 
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status,” read one circular sent to MPs, after presenting the full case against patriation.109 But 
British politicians’ assumptions ranged from the relatively benign to the outright ignorant. In one 
telling exchange in the House of Lords, a peer asked an assembled group of activists where they 
came from. When a chief replied, “Saskatoon, Saskatchewan,” the peer was taken aback and 
exclaimed to his staff, “They don’t speak English!”110   
After calling at Lambeth Palace, five activists successfully lobbied Robert Runcie, the 
Archbishop of Canterbury, to commission and distribute an information briefing on patriation to 
the Lords Spiritual—the twenty-six Anglican bishops serving in the House of Lords.111 
Indigenous leaders then met representatives of the Queen at Buckingham Palace to present their 
petition against patriation, as well as a gold ring and pendant symbolizing the continued 
Indigenous bond with the crown.112 But the most powerful and symbolic event of the 
Constitution Express was a potlatch at Methodist Central Hall, Westminster, which was attended 
by over a thousand people, including many British MPs and peers. Billed as a celebration of ties 
with the crown, the London ceremony contained oratory, singing, dancing, and gift-giving in a 
demonstration of the most important social and political ritual of Indigenous peoples in British 
Columbia. Louise Mandell later wrote that British politicians were “invited to watch an Indian 
political institution in operation in Westminster,” which was particularly poignant given that 
potlatch had been banned by the Canadian government from 1884 to 1951.113 But now, deep at 
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the political center of the British Empire, the Indigenous peoples of British Columbia effectively 
demonstrated their desire for continued association with the UK, while at the same time 
highlighting their distrust and defiance of the settler state. The centerpiece of the potlatch came 
when two Nuxalk chiefs took to the stage. In front of the transfixed crowd, Chief Lawrence 
Pootlass plucked two eagle feathers from the headband of his colleague, acting as a stand-in for 
Trudeau. Stepping aside, Pootlass set the feathers on fire, formally stripping the prime minister 
of an honorary chieftaincy bestowed upon him by the Nuxalk people in 1975. On this London 
stage, Trudeau had been excommunicated from the nation.114  
There was only one awkward moment in a potlatch that Mandell otherwise remembered 
as “chaotically stunning.”115 In the 1980s, Britain boasted a sizeable number of clubs devoted to 
celebrating North American Indigenous cultures.116 Fueled by a growing interest in New Age 
religions, these groups were commonly referred to as “Red Peoples Societies.”117 The members 
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of one such club, the Peace Pipe Lodge from Truro, which claimed to be the “Cornish 
representatives of the Canadian Indians,” regularly attended local fairs in the West Country 
dressed in their representations of Indigenous clothing (see Figure 3.3).118 They erected tipis and 
performed mock rituals. For Christian, these people enjoyed “playing Indian.”119 But even with 
their uncomfortable appropriation of Indigenous culture, they often proved to be useful local 
allies, penning letters and providing accommodation. They also attended the London potlatch, 
and though UBCIC officials specifically requested that they not “dress up” for the event, they 
ignored the appeal. As a result, while delivering a pointed political statement about Indigenous 
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Figure 3.3 Members of Truro’s “Peace Pipe Lodge” perform their interpretation of an Indigenous ritual in front of onlookers at 
the Helston Association Football Club Bonanza in Cornwall, some eight months after the London Constitution Express—July 
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sovereignty at the heart of empire, the potlatch also exhibited the bizarre juxtaposition of dozens 
of British people, dressed in Indigenous attire of the Prairies, mingling with hundreds of actual 
Indigenous people in blue jeans.120  
The Thatcher government realized that now united in their opposition to the November 5 
accord, Indigenous lobbyists in the UK had hit their stride.121 By November 10, Richard Luce 
warned civil servants that “the Indians [were] putting forward an emotionally strong and 
appealing case.” He “hop[ed] that HMG’s position [was] solid and that we are prepared with 
good arguments rebutting the Indians’ case when, as seems likely, MPs raise this question.”122 
Officials did not have long to wait before MPs’ inquiries began to appear. By November 23, the 
Conservative chief whip in the House of Commons, Michael Jopling, wrote to the FCO in search 
of arguments that could be deployed to calm the querulous Tory ranks. “It might prove very 
useful with our backbenchers,” Jopling wrote, “if we could cite examples of earlier 
Independence Acts where significant groups within the territory were opposed to the proposals at 
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the time; but legislation was, nevertheless, put through Parliament.”123 FCO staff chased 
Jopling’s request for over a month, passing research briefs between them. Belize, Antigua and 
Barbuda, Kiribati, Nigeria, Zambia, Uganda, and Kenya all offered hopeful comparisons to 
Canada. But as one minister later wrote to Jopling, the Indigenous case was unique in one key 
respect: that dissent to the independence act was coming from a racial minority.124 This 
significant factor intensified British MPs’ calls for Canada to respect Indigenous peoples’ rights 
as a minority.  
But some activists bristled at the characterization of their struggle in terms of minority or 
civil rights.125 Manuel’s youngest son, Arthur, argued that Indigenous peoples were “not just 
some disgruntled ethnic minority or special interest group.” Rather, they were Canada’s 
founders—“colonized peoples,” fighting for self-determination and sovereignty.126 This reaction 
goes some way to explaining why members of the Constitution Express developed few links with 
social advocacy groups in London. For example, George Manuel was aware of what he called 
the ongoing “race riot” between “the black and English people” in Britain.127 Dramatic scenes of 
violence had broken out in Brixton and Toxteth in April and July of that year. But he and 
Christian were leery of Indigenous protests being co-opted by these and other local social 
movements. “We don’t want any demonstrations in London,” Christian told activists in 
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Vancouver before departing, “because we have heard of all the problems that exist there.” He 
went on: “We’re really trying to explain the positive aspects of what we’re fighting for,” adding 
that “we don’t want to be taken over by any right-wing or left-wing group.”128 Instead, the 
members of the Constitution Express would concentrate on projecting themselves as diplomats, 
simultaneously showcasing their nation-to-nation relationships with Britain and Canada.129 
 
“Imperatives Greater than the Guidance of the Whip’s Office” 
The Constitution Express arrived in London at a uniquely divisive moment in Britain’s 
postwar political history. Margaret Thatcher had received widespread support among Tories 
during her first months in office, even in spite of the divisions over Rhodesia. As discussed, 
much of the blame for Thatcher’s Rhodesia policy fell on Lord Carrington. But by October 1981, 
she had burned through her political capital. As unemployment soared, the Times touted a series 
of opinion polls suggesting that Thatcher was the most unpopular prime minister since polling 
began in 1945, with a meager 28 percent approval rating.130 Despite pressure from her 
colleagues, she remained committed to supply-side economics, privileging the need to control 
inflation over unemployment. Her Tory rivals, whom Thatcher and her allies branded “the wets” 
for their attachment to a moderate brand of “One Nation” conservatism, began to plot against her 
leadership.131  
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Christian had explained the divisions among British Conservatives, as he understood 
them, to his colleagues in Vancouver before setting off for Europe. “Margaret Thatcher is having 
a very difficult time at this point,” he announced. “She has got people who are pulling rank on 
her; they are pulling out or are ready to pull out.”132 It was for this reason, and because other 
groups had already intensely lobbied the Labour Party, that Bob Manuel, George’s eldest son, by 
then serving as president of the UBCIC, decided that the Express would focus on the Tories. “It’s 
the Conservatives we really have to work on,” he told a gathering of chiefs at the UBCIC in 
September 1981.133 This strategy was a mark of the organization’s pragmatic approach: members 
of the Constitution Express were willing to lobby almost anyone in service to their cause. 
At the same time, however, the Labour Party was riven by its own internal divisions. 
Insurgent MPs, led by veteran backbencher Tony Benn, and backed by radical grassroots 
activists, sought to redirect the party toward the hard left. In response, four dissenting Labour 
MPs—all former Cabinet ministers—engineered a dramatic split, forming the breakaway 
center-left Social Democratic Party (SDP).134 As the Constitution Express campaigned in 
London, another hard-fought contest was taking place in the Crosby by-election outside 
Liverpool. Shirley Williams, a charismatic former Labour minister who had lost her seat in 1979, 
stood as the SDP candidate in the suburban constituency. Set to the tune of the Chariots of Fire 
theme song, her official campaign anthem, Williams took to the hustings and eventually 
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overturned a seemingly unassailable Tory majority of nineteen thousand votes.135 Henceforth, all 
safe seats, whether Labour or Conservative, were deemed at risk. Joining an official electoral 
alliance with the Liberal Party, this new third force of British politics, the SDP-Liberal Alliance, 
was primed for government. With Thatcher at her nadir and Labour’s Michael Foot performing 
no better, the Alliance achieved fifty-one percent of voters’ support in a December 1981 opinion 
poll, a staggering twenty-two point rise in the span of just three months.136 A political sea change 
seemed to be in the offing. As a result, despite their stated intent to focus on the Conservatives, 
Indigenous activists also saw political opportunities in the divisions of the left. The success of 
the SDP was an important development, and the party was making “big inroads” in the British 
political landscape, Christian told colleagues.137  
 Amid these highly charged divisions, Indigenous activists also tuned into a familiar 
discourse in Britain, discovering a country equally beset by its own ongoing discussion on 
sovereignty and the constitution.138 The notion of a “constitutional crisis” was especially strong 
in the Conservative Party. In 1974, Edward Heath had called and subsequently lost an election 
premised on the question of “Who governs Britain: Parliament or the trade unions?” In the years 
of Tory opposition that followed, party members raked over the question of the constitution, such 
that in 1978 alone, the annual Conservative Party Conference boasted forty proposed motions on 
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the order paper related to the subject.139 In a conference debate on one such motion, Shadow 
Minister Francis Pym, speaking for the party leadership, declared that “the left is hell-bent on 
destroying our institutions and replacing them with their own kind of direction and 
intimidation.”140  
Like Trudeau, Thatcher explored constitutional reform as a way to permanently enshrine 
her vision of society. In 1975, she directed her party’s policy committee to study the feasibility 
of a bill of rights as a way of guarding against attacks on individual and property rights by a 
future Labour government, held hostage to the hard left. Fifteen months later, Sir Michael 
Havers presented a paper to the Conservative Shadow Cabinet, concluding that the Tories should 
support a bill of rights or a simple proposal to bring the European Convention on Human Rights 
into British law.141 As a result, the Conservative’s 1979 election manifesto formally committed 
the party to convening all-party talks on a bill of rights, and when Thatcher was questioned on 
the subject during the campaign, she noted that it was “a proposal which deeply interests me,” 
though adding the caveat that “we must be careful to protect the authority of Parliament.”142  
Here Thatcher pinpointed the inherent difficulty of a codified bill of rights in a system 
with an unwritten constitution—one in which Parliament, not the people, was sovereign. A bill 
of rights would be subject to litigation in the courts and, in the end, the impetus of lawmaking 
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would shift from Parliament to the judiciary. For Lord Moran, British High Commissioner to 
Canada, Trudeau’s proposed Charter of Rights represented “a complete departure from the 
British concept of a sovereign parliament,” and a “lurch in the direction of the American system 
with Supreme Court rulings overriding everything else.” He told the FCO that “it remains 
extraordinary that we should be asked to pass it.”143  
Among British MPs, Enoch Powell raised this line of argument most forcefully. Powell 
embodied the divisions among Conservatives like no other politician—lionized by some for his 
incendiary “Rivers of Blood” speech in 1968, while castigated by others as a racist. “In the sense 
of being an entrenched and justiciable document,” he told the Commons, “a charter of liberties or 
a bill of rights is incompatible with parliamentary sovereignty.”144 In his view, the Thatcher 
government had been woefully ignorant of the implications of assenting to a Canadian bill of 
rights at Westminster. The legislation would go “on our own statute book by our own legislating 
act,” he noted, meaning that it could establish precedents in British law. “We are in the deepest 
sense concerned with our own business, with the nature of Parliament and with what the 
sovereignty of Parliament means,” Powell added.145 The Canadian bill of rights might nullify 
historic Indian treaties, but in the worst-case scenario, it might dilute the concept of 
parliamentary sovereignty in Canada and Britain.  
After the Conservative election victory in May 1979, Thatcher’s true opinion of bills of 
rights quickly solidified, as did many of her other policy positions. At Prime Minister’s 
Questions that December, she stated that it was “doubtful whether, having the doctrine of 
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parliamentary sovereignty, we could ever entrench a Bill of Rights in this country.”146 But it was 
likely the charged debates over the Canadian constitution that ultimately dissuaded her from 
allowing the party to pursue further plans.147 In October 1980, she told two visiting Canadian 
ministers, “The addition of a Bill of Rights to the [patriation] legislation being passed through 
the Westminster parliament was likely to mean that the issue would become more controversial 
in this country and that, as a consequence, its passage would be more prolonged.”148 Lord 
Carrington agreed, telegramming Lord Moran in Ottawa shortly thereafter that a bill of rights 
“would cause problems in Westminster.” MPs and peers who were expert in constitutional law 
“in both Houses of Parliament would have major reservations about giving swift endorsement to 
such a proposal which has constitutional implications for Britain.”149 Thatcher and Carrington 
were both right, as MPs later took personal stands against their party lines. “There are 
imperatives that are greater than that of the guidance of the Whips Office,” the Tory MP Derek 
Walker Smith told the Commons. “Those imperatives are at the heart of the matter—the 
principles of constitutional propriety and the rule of law.”150  
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For those backbench MPs worried about looming threats to parliamentary sovereignty, 
the marginalization of Canada’s Indigenous peoples provided a real-time example of the dangers 
inherent in unpicking the fundamentals of the Westminster parliamentary tradition. The 
Conservative MP Sir Bernard Braine later told the Commons that Indigenous rights in the draft 
Canadian constitution were “vague to the point of implying that there may be no aboriginal 
rights at all.”151 For Labour’s Bruce George, the situation was worse given the nefarious track 
record of the Trudeau government on Indigenous rights, which had favored “a process of paper 
genocide” that could legislate Indian status out of existence.152 The whole sordid history of the 
treatment of Canada’s Indigenous peoples was morally indefensible, he argued, adding that 
Ottawa’s policies on Indigenous peoples “[made] the South African Bantustan policy seem 
almost liberal”—a cutting reference to the apartheid regime’s policy of confining Africans to 
so-called tribal homelands.153  
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By the time the Constitution Express arrived in London, British MPs had been long 
engaged in their own discussions of sovereignty. These debates prepared the ground for 
Indigenous activists, as they attempted to translate their anti-patriation agenda to a local political 
audience. But once opened to scrutiny in the British Parliament, the Canadian constitution was 
refracted through the politics of a uniquely divisive moment. The contentious debates over the 
potential side effects of Trudeau’s Charter did little to convince Thatcher of the merits of a 
codified bill of rights.  
 
 “Blood Would Be Spilled” 
As they scanned the British political landscape for potential allies receptive to the 
message of Indigenous sovereignty, activists on the Constitution Express also took note of the 
resurgent nationalist divisions in Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland. As in Canada, the 1970s 
in Britain had been a decade of competing nationalisms, fueled by the Troubles in Northern 
Ireland, the development of North Sea oil, the relative political successes of the Scottish National 
Party (SNP) and Plaid Cymru (the nationalist party in Wales) and calls for regional devolution. 
Indeed, as Francis Pym told Canada’s high commissioner in London, Jean Wadds, the “extended 
discussions about devolution to Wales and Scotland between 1977 and 1979 had made members 
of all parties aware of the significance of the issues now being debated in Canada.”154 The 
Scottish and Welsh debates had culminated in 1979 in failed referendums on greater home 
rule.155  
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In London, the Union of BC Indian Chiefs worked in close collaboration with the 
Federation of Saskatchewan Indians (FSI), whose members had established activist networks in 
Scotland after discovering that their message about devolved powers within a federal system 
worked well in the political culture of Britain’s Celtic fringe. The FSI arranged public meetings 
at the University of Edinburgh, canvassed print and television media, and met with executives of 
all of Scotland’s major political parties. According to the FSI’s newsletter, the Saskatchewan 
Indian, activists found Scottish Liberals and Conservatives “more ready to understand our fears 
for aboriginal rights than their English colleagues.”156  
The same was true of Scottish Nationalists. For SNP president Donald Stewart, the 
Indigenous appeals hit close to home. “If honorable members wish to regard solemn agreements 
as scraps of paper, they must accept the responsibility for doing so,” he told the House of 
Commons. “I know what it is like for people to be moved from their land,” he said, referencing 
the Highland Clearances of the nineteenth century.157 Saskatchewan chiefs made the rounds 
among the Scottish nobility, including the venerated elder John Tootoosis who visited the Earl of 
Balfour on his estate in northern Scotland.158 Whereas Indigenous leaders had not engaged in 
extensive coalition building with social advocacy groups in London for fear of being overtaken 
and associated with minority rights causes, they were willing to pursue alliances with parties in 
Scotland whose support for greater home rule, and even independence, mirrored their own calls 
for Indigenous sovereignty within Canada. It mattered little to them whether their Scottish allies 
identified as Labour, Liberal, Tory, or SNP.  
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As a result of these political operations, much of the impassioned correspondence from 
concerned British people, writing on behalf of Indigenous peoples, came from Scotland and 
Wales. “Having been brought up in the Western Isles of Scotland,” one woman wrote to 
Margaret Thatcher, “I feel I can identify with [Indigenous peoples in Canada] as we have our 
own culture, music, etc., different from the remainder of Britain, and would not take too kindly 
to someone trying to change that way.”159 Other correspondents wrote to the Scottish press, 
including Janet Scott of Glasgow, whose interest was piqued by a fleeting glimpse of two men in 
“feathered headdresses” marching in London’s annual Remembrance Day procession down 
Whitehall.160 One of these men turned out to be Patrick Madahbee, the same Ojibwa chief from 
southern Ontario who had proudly displayed his wampum belt to civil servants at the FCO.161 
Interested in the chiefs’ role in the ceremony, Scott wrote to the Scottish weekly Sunday Post to 
ask about these “Red Indians.”162 The Post’s response came in the form of a full-length article. 
“The Indians want Britain to ensure the rights and land they hold dear will not be lost or 
threatened,” the paper replied. “Indeed, as well as honouring their dead at the Cenotaph last 
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Sunday, they were silently asking us to honour our old promises to them.”163 This simple yet 
elegant articulation of the Indigenous mission in Britain, translated for a popular audience, was 
exactly the type of public appeal that ministers feared, potentially leading ordinary people to 
mobilize their local MPs to slow down the legislative process.  
This Sunday Post article made its way to Gwynedd in northwest Wales, where the story 
of Britain’s obligations to Indigenous peoples elicited another passionate response conditioned 
by local history. “We British people are honour bound to protect the interests of the native 
Indians,” Chris J. Jones wrote to Margaret Thatcher, forwarding along a copy of the Post 
article.164 “Incidentally, we, in this Country [Wales], mercifully enjoy relative freedom from 
tuberculosis,” he added in a reference to the perilous history of epidemics among Canada’s 
Indigenous communities, “and I do hope that the Canadian Health Authorities have arrived at 
equal control of T.B. among their native Indians.” Jones noted that in his native Welsh, 
tuberculosis translated to “certain death.”165 
 Like their Scottish colleagues, Welsh nationalists were equally supportive of the 
Indigenous cause in Britain. Indigenous peoples in North America, notably from the American 
Indian Movement, first established links with Plaid Cymru in the 1960s on the basis of a shared 
history of oppression by the forces of imperialism.166 The party’s political leverage on the 
Canadian issues, however, was stronger because of Westminster’s continued legal connection to 
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Canada.167 Plaid Cymru’s General Secretary duly notified Trudeau’s office that his party was 
“certain to oppose any constitutional changes which do not give adequate safeguards to Indian 
nations and we will advise our Members of Parliament accordingly.”168  
While easily negotiating the comparatively placid political contexts of Scotland and 
Wales, Indigenous activists encountered a much more complicated and volatile political situation 
in Northern Ireland. On October 27, the Provisional Irish Republican Army (IRA) planted a 
bomb in a hamburger shop on Oxford Street in London. Based on a tip-off, police promptly 
evacuated the shop, though an explosives officer was killed attempting to defuse the bomb. They 
also neutralized a second device at the nearby Debenhams department store. According to the 
Provisional IRA, this new spate of attacks signaled an expansion of their terms of engagement to 
include soft civilian targets.169 As a result, the Metropolitan Police scoured the capital for five 
hundred pounds of gelignite explosives reportedly smuggled in by militant Irish republicans.170 
The architects of the Constitution Express took the political situation in Northern Ireland 
very seriously. As George Manuel explained privately to his colleagues in Vancouver, well 
before activists left for London: “It’s the same as our struggle [and] it’s getting far more 
publicity than we will probably ever get.”171 Wayne Christian likewise referenced the cause 
célèbre of the political prisoner Bobby Sands whose death on a hunger strike in May 1981 had 
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led the Provisional IRA to renew its tactics of targeting civilians on the British mainland.172 But 
some members of the UBCIC expressed doubts about sending activists into this violent political 
scene. We “will have to be very careful,” one chief, John George, warned Christian at a Chiefs 
Council in September where the logistics of the trip were first discussed in full.173 Christian 
assured the chiefs that he would “brief our people on the first day about how different politics in 
Europe is.”174  
Even still, some activists found the general security situation in Europe initially 
unsettling. “When we got into the Hanover airport,” the activist Wilf Adam later reported to his 
Lake Babine nation, “there were police with submachine guns walking around. We thought they 
were coming for us, but they weren’t,” he added—“which was a relief.”175 In London, an activist 
from Williams Lake reported that, just like Londoners, “we felt the fear that was constant 
because of the bombings and murders that have become an everyday part of life.”176  
Indigenous activists on the Express experienced this surge in violence in Britain right at 
the time of their own increasing exasperation with Trudeau’s November 5 Accord. It was hardly 
surprising, then, when excluded Indigenous leaders began to threaten violence in Canada in the 
mold of the insurgent republican campaign in Northern Ireland. “Already we are confronted with 
internal violence in our own community,” Chief Sol Sanderson of the Federation of 
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Saskatchewan Indians told a London press conference on November 5.177 If Trudeau failed to 
consult Indigenous peoples before patriation, Sanderson’s organization would resort to violence 
“like the IRA in Britain.”178 At another London press conference a week later, Chief Roy Jimmie 
from the UBCIC recalled that, a year before, Indigenous leaders had declared a “state of 
emergency,” leading to the original Ottawa Constitution Express. But after the federal 
government’s betrayal of Indigenous rights, he noted, “there are some Indian peoples in Canada 
that have declared war.”179  
For Indigenous leaders, the November 5 accord had raised the stakes of the constitutional 
drama significantly. Their reactions signaled the quickening pace of events, as some parts of the 
movement shifted toward a more militant position. The heated rhetoric would have been 
unacceptable to most ordinary British people, terrorized daily by the specter of IRA violence, 
which continued unabated with the bombing of Harrods in 1983 and the attempted assassination 
of Margaret Thatcher in Brighton in 1984. But the majority of reports were confined to the 
Canadian press. Some Indigenous leaders clearly sought to use the threat of violence as leverage 
against the federal government. For his part, Trudeau needed no cautionary tales about the 
dangers of terrorism. He had been in office during the October Crisis of 1970, when the Front de 
Libération du Québec (FLQ) kidnapped the British trade commissioner in Canada and murdered 
Quebec’s minister of labor. Trudeau had dealt with the crisis by imposing virtual martial law in 
Quebec under the War Measures Act.180 Moreover, the Canadian government already had good 
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reason to feel uneasy about the threats of an Irish-inspired conflict in Canada. The day after the 
Oxford Street bombing, Ottawa’s high commission in London was evacuated after a bomb 
threat. While no explosives were found, staff reported that the male caller who made the threat 
spoke with an Irish accent, “softened by a Canadian or American twang.” He delivered a simple 
yet menacing threat: “This is the Canadian Liberation Army, and a bomb will go off within one 
hour.”181  
On November 19, energized by the publicity of their long European tour and incensed 
with Trudeau, the members of the Constitution Express returned to Canada. But before 
dispersing to all corners of the province, many activists joined a UBCIC protest already 
underway in Vancouver.182 Earlier that day, some four hundred activists had occupied the 
Museum of Anthropology (MOA) at the University of British Columbia, a world-renowned 
institution home to thousands of Indigenous objects. Before hapless security guards and docents 
could make sense of what was happening, hundreds of people swept through MOA’s front doors, 
hands raised and fists clenched.183 They filled the main gallery, using it as a forum to discuss 
their constitutional grievances, and remained there for twenty-four hours, flanked by the 
towering totem poles of their ancestors (see Figure 3.4).184  
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Later that day, Grand Chief George Manuel addressed the assembled crowd at a 
reconstructed longhouse on MOA’s grounds. Indigenous peoples “must be prepared to spill our  
own blood,” the normally moderate and measured Manuel told his audience.185 “When your 
identity has been threatened, when your relationship with the only homeland you have is being 
exterminated through the constitution,” he passionately declared, “then the people have to take 
serious action to retain their identity. In the long run,” he added flatly, “it is of some value to 
proceed much like the Irish Republican Army.”186 According to the Globe and Mail, one of 
Canada’s most esteemed Indigenous elder statesmen had “exhorted violent confrontation 
reminiscent of Wounded Knee in 1973 and Kenora in 1974.”187 Bob Manuel echoed his father’s 
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threats a few days later, predicting that most Canadians would empathize with Indigenous 
peoples. “If their land was going to be taken away, they would fight, [and] their blood would be 
spilled,” he declared. “We’ve got to be prepared for that too,” he added.188 
Whether real or rhetorical, George Manuel’s threats in Vancouver to emulate the IRA, so 
soon after the Constitution Express had traveled through a bomb-ravaged London, seemed 
designed to raise the stakes against the federal government’s continued exclusion of Indigenous 
peoples.189 But the general shift in discourse shocked many and was denounced by several 
activist groups, including the powerful Indian Homemaker’s Association—a political 
organization made up of Indigenous women’s clubs.190 Even Christian recalled his own concern 
at Manuel’s overheated rhetoric. “I didn’t condone those kinds of comments,” he later noted, 
“because I think that would have taken our young people down a road that would not have been 
acting as our ancestors acted.”191 Had Manuel’s comments been reported in Britain, the reaction 
would have been even more explosive, alienating British MPs and the public, and likely 
undermining the combined efforts of the Constitution Express. As it happened, no British news 
outlet carried the story.  
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“Fuddle Duddle the Constitution” 
 In the days immediately following the Constitution Express’s dramatic return to 
Vancouver, Trudeau was by chance on a three-day tour of British Columbia. Hearing that he was 
in the interior city of Kamloops, two hundred people representing five local Indigenous nations 
converged on the prime minister’s downtown hotel. They carried signs emblazoned with “Fuddle 
Duddle the Constitution,” an allusion to a 1971 incident in the Canadian House of Commons 
when Trudeau allegedly mouthed the words “fuck off” to opposition members across the 
chamber, only later to suggest to the press that he had said “fuddle duddle or something like 
that.”192 
 With little choice but to accede to the protesters’ demands for an impromptu meeting in 
the hotel parking lot, Trudeau had a cordial discussion with Chief Mary Leonard of the 
Kamloops nation before turning to Wayne Christian.193 Now well-known for his leadership role 
in Europe, when Christian confronted Trudeau about the “lies” that Ottawa was spreading around 
the world—in other words, that Indigenous people were satisfied with their lot in the 
constitution—the prime minister “stiffened visibly.”194 “What lies?” Trudeau barked, demanding 
to know how many people Christian represented. When he replied that he spoke for some five 
thousand men, women, and children, Trudeau scoffed. “Many more native leaders representing a 
lot more people told us in Ottawa last February what was acceptable,” he retorted, referencing 
the basic agreement that had recognized limited Indigenous rights in the draft constitution, only 
                                                        
192 Deb van der Gracht, “Prime Minister Pierre Trudeau didn't realize how close his. . .,” UPI, 24 November 1981, 
http://www.upi.com/Archives/1981/11/24/Prime-Minister-Pierre-Trudeau-didnt-realize-how-close-
his/5184375426000/. 
193 Taylor, “Rights Abrogated,” Tse'-Ka-Lum, 2 (December 1981), 2. 
194 “Trudeau Takes Tough Line over Rights Lies Challenge,” Vancouver Sun, 23 November 1981. 
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for them to be stripped on November 5. “Settle your lies between yourselves and don’t accuse 
me of lying,” he added, before storming back inside. For Christian, Trudeau’s sharp reaction was 
all the proof he needed that the Constitution Express had succeeded in highlighting Canada’s 
hypocrisy on the global stage.195  
  But on November 26, pressured by the success of the Constitution Express and in the 
face of large-scale protests and threats of violence, the federal and provincial governments 
reached agreement, and the Canadian House of Commons voted to reinstate the most basic 
protections of Indigenous rights in the constitution (see Figure 3.5).196 Subject to the demands of 
several provincial governments, including British Columbia, the qualifying adjective “existing” 
was inserted into the section, so that it read, “The existing aboriginal and treaty rights of the 
                                                        
195 Christian, interview with the author, 12 May 2017. 
196 “Aboriginal Rights Reinstated,” Vancouver Province, 27 November 1981. See also Henderson, First Nations 
Jurisprudence, 33. 
Figure 3.5 Indigenous activists hold aloft the Union Jack on their march through Edmonton in late November 1981. The protest 
drew 3,500 people to the Alberta Legislature building. “Indian Marchers Converge on the Legislature Building in Edmonton,” 
Calgary Herald, 20 November 1980. 
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aboriginal peoples of Canada are hereby recognized and affirmed.”197 Indigenous leaders saw 
malicious intent behind this wording, interpreting the insertion of “existing” as an effort to freeze 
any definition of aboriginal rights in 1981. This language would ultimately enter the Canadian 
constitution as Section 35.  
With all provinces, save Quebec, now backing Trudeau’s line on patriation, it quickly 
became apparent to Indigenous activists that their political efforts could not prevent patriation on 
the federal government’s terms. As a last-ditch effort, they channeled all of their energy and 
resources into the British court system. Though the courts ultimately rejected any British legal 
obligations to Indigenous peoples, Lord Justice Denning wrote his judgment in such a way as to 
be politically helpful in their campaigns back home.198 Indigenous rights and freedoms were 
originally guaranteed by the British crown and then by the crown in right of Canada, Denning 
wrote. “No Parliament should do anything to lessen the worth of these guarantees,” he added. 
“They should be honoured by the Crown in respect of Canada ‘so long as the sun rises and the 
river flows.’”199 Denning’s lyric ending invoked the language of a 1794 treaty between King 
George III and an Indigenous chief in New Brunswick.200 
In March 1982, the House of Lords passed the final version of the Canada Act, 1982, 
officially devolving the powers of the British North America Act, 1867, to Ottawa. Of the thirty 
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hours allocated for debating patriation in the British Parliament, twenty-seven of them had 
covered the plight of Canada’s Indigenous peoples.201 In the normally staid Lords, tempers 
frayed when the attending FCO minister tried to curtail a rogue peer’s attempted filibuster. In 
response, Lord Morris quipped of the minister, “I am delighted that the noble Earl has at last 
spoken from his feet rather than from his bottom.”202 The robust parliamentary end to the affair 
was a testament to the political and popular impact that the Indigenous lobby had in Britain.203  
The story of the Constitution Express challenges and reframes our root assumptions about 
British decolonization. Indigenous peoples’ engagement in the British political arena in 1980-82 
was part of a long history of activism in Britain, dating back to the eighteenth century. George 
Manuel, Wayne Christian, and the Constitution Express’s subsequent efforts to find political 
allies at Westminster to scupper Trudeau’s patriation laid bare Britain’s uniquely sharp divisions 
between right and left and among competing nationalisms in the early 1980s. Indigenous 
activists traversed this scene to voice and implement their own contextual visions of 
decolonization as continued association with the British crown on a nation-to-nation basis. After 
years of neglect and abuse by Ottawa and the provinces, maintaining this seemingly colonial 
relationship with Britain offered the best hope at the time for winning genuine sovereignty and 
rights within Canada.  
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CHAPTER 4: “OUR OWN BLOOD AND BONE”: RACE AND BELONGING IN 
BRITAIN DURING THE FALKLANDS CRISIS1 
 
In 1988, the up-and-coming Hollywood actor, Denzel Washington, crossed the Atlantic 
Ocean and put on his best South London accent to star in a low-budget British film. Billed as an 
“Urban Western,” For Queen and Country was produced by the same company that made Hanif 
Kureishi’s cult classic My Beautiful Laundrette in 1985. The film follows Washington as Reuben 
James, a British Army veteran of the Falklands War (see Figure 4.1). After his long deployment 
in the South Atlantic, Reuben leaves the service and returns to his council estate. His very first 
interaction back home foreshadows the trouble he will face in reintegrating into civilian life. 
Passing through a pedestrian tunnel, he is confronted by a policeman. “Where do you think 
you’re going, black boy? Where you been?” the officer demands, pinning Reuben up against a 
wall. “The Falklands,” he replies. The policeman is incredulous. “Listen pal, that was an English 
war, not a jungle war,” he says. But before the cop can go any further, his older, apparently wiser 
partner finds Reuben’s Army ID in his wallet. They let him go.2 
Reuben struggles to adjust to life in a dirty, decaying London, rife with violence. Two 
kids break into his flat and steal his Falklands campaign medals. His best friend, Fish, a fellow 
veteran, lost a leg in the war and is nursing an alcohol addiction. Against all odds, Reuben avoids
                                                        
1 Material from this chapter is drawn from my unpublished MA thesis: Joel Hebert, “A Post-Imperial Frontier? 
Britishness, the Falklands War, and the Memory of Settler Colonialism,” (MA thesis, University of North Carolina 
at Chapel Hill, 2013). 
2 For Queen and Country, directed by Martin Stellman, written by Trix Worrell, Working Title Films, 1988, film. 
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the temptations of his youth—crime, drugs, and alcohol—and finds work as a cab driver. He 
strikes up a supportive relationship with his neighbor, a white single mother. But their  
spontaneous plan to take a romantic trip to Paris creates an issue. Reuben must first send off his 
British passport to be renewed. The official letter he receives in return leaves him speechless. 
“I’m sorry to have to tell you that, under the provisions of the British Nationality Act 
1981. . .you ceased to be a citizen of the United Kingdom and Colonies,” the Home Office 
writes.1  
As a nameless bureaucrat later explains to him in person, since Reuben was born in St. 
Lucia, now an independent country, he can no longer claim British citizenship by right, even 
though he has lived in the UK since age four. He can apply for citizenship, but at a cost of £200. 
                                                        
1 Ibid. 
Figure 4.1 Denzel Washington as Reuben James, veteran of the Falklands War. For Queen and Country, directed by Martin 
Stellman, written by Trix Worrell, Working Title Films, 1988, film. 
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Having risked his life for Britain, Reuben—the proud soldier—is incensed. “You can put me out 
there as a front-gunner to get my bleedin’ head blown off, and I’m British dead,” he screams. As 
the film critic Derek Malcolm commented of Reuben, “He can cope with racist hooligans, local 
crooks, and bent policemen. But not that.”2 He can’t take the state questioning his identity. 
Reuben’s relationship falls apart, and he starts working for a drug-dealer. All around him, 
violence breaks out on the estate. Riot police arrive, and in the ensuing chaos, the racist 
policeman from the underpass—Reuben’s old nemesis—shoots and kills his friend Fish, the 
disabled vet. In response, Reuben goes rogue, kills the cop, and stalks off, brandishing an assault 
rifle. We last see him in the crosshairs of a policeman’s sniper rifle. A shot rings out, and the 
screen goes to black. 
For Queen and Country was written by Trix Worrell, a 28-year-old south Londoner, 
originally from St. Lucia, as a searing commentary on British society. It was based on his own 
experience as a black man, routinely harassed by the police, but Worrell was also inspired by the 
true story of a Falklands veteran, born in Barbados, who returned from the war only to discover 
that he had lost his citizenship, thanks to the British Nationality Act.3 The film reflected the 
extent to which the Falklands War, and its legacies, became bound up with the complex and 
contested legal issues of citizenship, immigration, identity, and belonging.  
After 1968, the issue of the sovereignty of the Falkland Islands became a recurring 
geopolitical headache for successive UK prime ministers. Some 400 miles off the cost of 
Patagonia and home to about 2,000 people descended from British settlers, the Falklands had 
                                                        
2 Derek Malcolm, “The para, the power, and the glory,” Guardian, 21 July 1988. 
3 Leslie Goffe, “Home to wars,” Guardian, 10 January 1989. See also, Simon Banner, “Success is colour-blind,” 
Times (UK), 16 January 1989. 
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been claimed by Argentina since the UK reasserted control in 1833. The islands had no 
indigenous population. In 1968, angry Islanders castigated Harold Wilson’s Labour government 
for conducting secret negotiations with Buenos Aires about the status of the islands. They 
mobilized sympathetic MPs in the British Parliament who worked to undermine any negotiated 
settlement, proroguing the possibility of a peaceful resolution for the foreseeable future.  
In their stout defense of the Falklands, British MPs built up an image of the islands and 
the Islanders as ideal Britons. In March 1968, the Tory MP Sir Bernard Braine chided the Wilson 
government for betraying the Islanders, “a small people who are British through and through.” 
Braine added that “it is people we are talking about—people of our own blood and bone, whose 
feelings and aspirations should be just as much the concern of this House as those of the people 
of the Outer Hebrides or of the Isle of Wight.”4 The governor of the Falklands, Sir Cosmo 
Haskard, was even more blunt in his defense of the Islanders. “They were completely English: in 
fact, more English than the people here [in England],” he told ministers. This was because “there 
were no Argentines or Spaniards; their language, race, politics and culture were all British, and 
they would regard with horror and bitterness any attempt to hand them over.”5  
These references to blood, bone, and the ethnic homogeneity of the Islanders—cast in 
direct opposition to “othered” Hispanic people—came just weeks before the Conservative’s 
                                                        
4 Bernard Braine, Parl. Deb., H.C., 5th Series, vol. 761, (26 March 1968), col. 1457. 
5 TNA: FCO 42/49, Cosmo Haskard, quoted in “[Prospects for an agreement]: notes by A. St. J. Sugg of a meeting 
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shadow defense minister Enoch Powell made his notorious “Rivers of Blood” speech in 
Wolverhampton, in which he predicted racial conflict on the streets of Britain and declared that 
the government’s immigration policy was akin to “watching a nation busily engaged in heaping 
up its own funeral pyre.”6 The discourses of Britishness surrounding the Falkland Islanders 
reflected some of the same social and political currents. In language and representations, the 
Falklands became Britain as it might have been before the influx of Commonwealth immigrants 
and the alleged economic decline of the postwar era. Rural, isolated, and white, the islands were 
revered as a utopia.  
While the issue of the Falklands was comparatively dormant during the 1970s, it reached 
full boil after 1979. Having successfully extricated Britain from the tangled web of the Rhodesia 
crisis, Lord Carrington looked next to settle the Falklands. Margaret Thatcher came to power 
passionately defending the right of the Islanders to determine their own future. But much like her 
political trajectory on Rhodesia, she later approved an FCO plan for the resumption of talks with 
Argentina. This development reinvigorated the Falklands lobby at Westminster, with many of its 
most vocal supporters from the 1968 campaign still in Parliament. The situation became even 
more charged when the Falklands sovereignty issue overlapped with the proposals for a new 
British Nationality Act. Commonwealth immigrants to Britain were not the only populations 
targeted for exclusion from British citizenship. In order to avoid granting four million residents 
of Hong Kong the right to enter the UK without a visa, the Act excluded all residents of the 
dependent territories from automatic British citizenship. This included the Falkland Islanders. 
                                                        
6 Enoch Powell, quoted in “Enoch Powell's 'Rivers of Blood' speech,” Daily Telegraph, 6 November 2007, 
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The run-up to the war was thus characterized by the paradox of a people regularly described as 
“more British than the British” who were formally excluded from UK citizenship. 
This chapter argues that the late imperial crisis of the Falklands sovereignty debate both 
reflected and fired debates about race, identity, and belonging in Thatcher’s Britain. Some 
historians have argued that the Falklands conflict was not waged in defense of colonialism, but 
for the Islanders’ right to self-determination. It was not an imperial conflict, they contend—
whatever that means.7 But this chapter demonstrates that the legal and constitutional dynamics of 
decolonization, of who could or could not claim to be British in the 1980s, played out against the 
backdrop of the Falklands War. The first sections discuss the development of the discourse 
describing Falkland Islanders as a “control group” of Britishness, free from the variables of 
racial conflict and postwar decline. It then picks up the sovereignty debate after Thatcher’s 
election, especially in the context of the reforms to citizenship law, and carries the story through 
the war and into the period of postwar rehabilitation and development. 
 
“Referendum by Camera” 
On 2 October 1968, clutching homemade “Keep the Falklands British” signs against a 
stiff austral breeze, nearly a thousand Falkland Islanders—half the population of the territory—
converged on Arch Green, a small waterfront common at the heart of the capital, Port Stanley. 
The space was dominated by the Whalebone Arch, a bowed sculpture, erected in 1933 out of the 
jawbones of two blue whales. It had been unveiled to celebrate a hundred years of British 
                                                        
7 Howe suggests that efforts to paint the Falklands War as having any link to empire “[go] little beyond clichés,” and 
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1983. Stephen Howe, “Internal Decolonization? British Politics since Thatcher as Post-colonial Trauma,” Twentieth 
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sovereignty over the islands.8 Aubrey Matthews, an Express photojournalist, waited for the 
stream of locals to assemble in this deeply symbolic spot. He had been dispatched to the 
Falklands with instructions from his editor to take a group photograph of the Islanders that could 
represent them to a British audience.  
Just two weeks earlier, under the headline “Falklands Sell-Out,” the Express had broken 
the story that the British government would announce the transfer of sovereignty of the Falklands 
to Argentina as soon as Parliament reconvened in mid-October.9 “The idea seems to be that as 
Britain is now ‘pulling out of everywhere,’” Squire Barraclough wrote, “it is illogical to hang on 
to the Falklands, right down ‘at the end of the line’ in the South Atlantic.”10 Clippings of the 
article soon reached Stanley, setting off a local firestorm. As Governor Haskard reported to 
London, the Express article had “upset the faith here in the Colony Government and, I regret to 
say, in Her Majesty’s Government.”11  
The revelations in the article were not, however, new or surprising. For over two years, 
London had engaged in secret talks with Argentina, crafting a “Memorandum of Understanding” 
that could serve as the basis for a lasting agreement on sovereignty. British officials had made no 
attempt to notify the Islanders of their intentions to discuss sovereignty, nor to ask for their 
consent before agreeing to any transfer of power. These details had only been revealed in April 
1968, when elected councilors of the Falkland Islands’ Executive Committee were made aware 
                                                        
8 “The ‘Photograph’ Continued From Page 17,” Falkland Islands Monthly Review (no. 118), 7 October 1968. 
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1968. 
10 Ibid. 
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of the Memorandum.12 They quickly wrote a petition to all members of the British Parliament, 
appealing for help to block the government’s efforts to transfer sovereignty unilaterally. “They 
are as British as you,” the councilors noted of their Islander constituents, “mostly of English and 
Scottish ancestry, even to the sixth generation.” But whereas, in their opinion, Britain in the late 
1960s was rife with social and economic issues, the Falklands was idyllic. “There is no racial 
problem, no unemployment, and we are not in debt,” they wrote, painting a picture of a South 
Atlantic utopia.13 In response, several powerful MPs formed a non-partisan parliamentary 
lobbying group called the United Kingdom Falkland Islands Emergency Committee (UKFIEC), 
headed by the barrister and ex-diplomat Bill Hunter Christie.14 This was the first organization in 
what would go on to become a collection of groups called the “Falklands lobby”—a powerful 
body in Westminster that would maintain a continued presence in Parliament for the next thirty 
years.15 Its role was not unlike the Rhodesia lobby—and indeed, the two group’s memberships 
overlapped considerably. 
Back on Arch Green some months later, as the residents of Stanley assembled on that 
breezy October morning, Aubrey Matthews of the Express worked to facilitate what he would 
                                                        
12 The clause in the Memorandum that angered the councilors the most stated that London would be willing to 
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Islands: Economic Development, the Falkland Lobby and the Sovereignty Dispute, 1945 to 1989” (PhD diss., 
University of Oxford, 1990). 
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later call the “world’s first referendum by camera”—allowing people in the UK to see 
self-determination in action, while at the same time noting the physical affinities between 
themselves and the Islanders.16 The photocall took on an almost festival-like atmosphere. Elected 
members of the Legislative Council implored their constituents to take part in the “great 
jamboree.” But the Express’s biggest boon came when the Falkland Islands Company—
operating with a royal charter since 1852 and having since controlled a monopoly of land in the 
colony—decided to give its staff the afternoon off.17  
Some eighty percent of Stanley’s residents gathered for the photo—their numbers 
lessened only by a rampant measles epidemic that had swept through town. Searching for the 
best vantage point to capture the swelling crowd, Matthews climbed to the second-floor of a 
nearby house, setting himself up in Sigrid Barnes’s bedroom window. “The window would not 
open sufficiently wide,” he later reported in the Express, “so Mrs. Barnes, in a burst of 
patriotism, put a hammer through it, to the delight of the crowd.”18 Hanging out of the frame, he 
snapped a photo of the crowd. They cheered before spontaneously breaking into “God Save the 
Queen.” The local Falklands newspaper concluded that “such a demonstration should convince 
those who might be contemplating handing us over to Argentina that the wishes of the people of 
the Colony are to ‘Keep us British’ and ‘leave us where we are, in our homeland.’”19 
                                                        




19 “The ‘Photograph’ Continued from Page 17,” Falkland Islands Monthly Review (no. 118), 7 October 1968. 
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“A proud nation assembles,” the photo caption declared when it was finally published on 
October 9. “This is a picture not of a crowd but of a people,” Matthews added.20 The 
demonstration also stretched beyond the capital to include the outlying settlements in the rugged 
Falklands countryside, or “camp” as it was known locally. When Matthews returned to London, 
he brought back a stack of telegrams, in which a further five hundred Islanders in camp asserted 
their desire to remain under British control.21 “They write plainly and simply,” the paper’s 
editors wrote the next day, “but to read their words is a deeply emotional experience.”22 For the 
Express’s readers, the contention was clear. The Islanders had expressed their right to 
self-determination, making their choice to remain a British colony.  
Beginning in 1968, the Falklands came to represent a vision of Britain that only ever 
existed in the imagination. In a moment of social change in the UK, Matthews’s group 
photograph of a sea of white faces represented, for some, Britain as it should have been. As Cyril 
Aynsley argued in the Express, the Islanders were archetypal Britons, coming from all over the 
UK—from “the Highlands and Lowlands of Scotland to the Shires and Counties of England, and 
from Wales.”23 They had melded into a truly syncretic British people. Indeed, after detailing his 
eight thousand mile odyssey through a string of foreign capitals to reach the Falklands, Matthews 
reported that, upon docking in Stanley, he “was back home.”24  
                                                        
20 Matthews, “Standing Together, the Colony That Roars.”  
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In the aftermath of the highly publicized photo, well-wishes flooded into the offices of 
the Falkland Islands Monthly Review. “It is loyalty such as yours that has made Britain the 
power she is,” wrote Mrs. Irene Fletcher of Harrow. “And God knows we need folk like you and 
yours to keep it so,” she added. While Mrs. Hennetta Markell wrote to deliver the thoughts and 
prayers of everyone in Manchester, Mrs. Jessie Reilly of Kirkcaldy noted that, as “a Scottish 
housewife,” she wanted to congratulate the Islanders on their “determination to remain British.” 
“As a large percentage of your population is of Scottish descent,” she added, “it makes me feel 
proud.” 25 For his part, Matthews told readers that he was moved to tears by the loyalty of the 
Islanders. “Can the tears of a solitary visitor, or the fears of a whole community, swerve 
politicians from their course?” the photographer asked. “This is a matter not only for 
Westminster,” he wrote. “It touches us all.”26 
The question of the Falkland Islanders’ place of belonging in the British imagination had 
been publicly mobilized. MPs soon began forwarding angry constituent letters to the merged 
Foreign and Commonwealth Office, requesting advice on how to respond. “The Falklands are 
probably the most British of any of our past colonies or Dominions,” J.J. Cheal of St. Albans 
wrote, to Victor Goodhew, a Tory MP. “Nearly all the people are of Scots or English descent,” 
he went on, “so that the usual colonial problems between the administered country and the 
indigenous population does not exist.”27 In his forwarding letter to the FCO, Goodhew added that 
the points raised by Cheal were “typical of the views expressed by many people when I was in 
                                                        
25 “Letters of Encouragement,” Falkland Islands Monthly Review (no. 119), 4 November 1968. 
26 Matthews, “Standing together, the Colony that roars.” 
27 TNA: FCO 7/1084, J.J. Cheal to Victor Goodhew, 29 November 1968.  
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the constituency last weekend.”28 But Conservative MPs like Goodhew were not the only source 
of dissent. Rogue members of the Labour Party were also dissatisfied with the Wilson 
government’s continued discussions of sovereignty with Argentina. “Who would have guessed 
that this distant Crown Colony was so deep in so many all-party breasts?” asked the Guardian’s 
parliamentary correspondent after witnessing a particularly aggressive grilling of a minister in 
the Commons.29 By December 1968, owing to the volatility of the Falklands issue in Parliament, 
Wilson abandoned discussions of sovereignty with Argentina.  
When the Tories came to power in 1970, they deployed a new strategy, attempting to tie 
the Falkland Islands more closely to Argentina through a bilateral Communications Agreement. 
London’s intention was to allow the Argentine government to woo the Islanders by spurring 
economic growth and facilitating easier access to the outside world.30 In 1976, Lord Shackleton 
was commissioned to write a report for the British government that would deliver 
recommendations on how best to encourage development in the islands. But once published, 
ministers never acted on his advice.31  
Throughout all of this, the Falklands lobby continued to gain political clout in Parliament. 
In 1977, Bill Hunter Christie helped establish a Falkland Islands Office in London, staffed by a 
full-time director, and supported by young Islanders at university in Britain.32 For much of the 
1970s, the Falklands issue made little impression on the British public. But with the organization 
                                                        
28 TNA: FCO 7/1084, Victor Goodhew to Lord Chalfont, 3 December 1968. 
29 Norman Shrapnel, “Angry House Smells Deal Over Falklands,” Guardian, 4 December 1968. 
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of the lobby in London, all of that would begin to change in the early 1980s, especially when a 
new British government restarted negotiations on sovereignty with Argentina. 
 
The Thermonuclear Lunch 
 In late May 1979, Margaret Thatcher invited two of her most senior ministers, Foreign 
Secretary Peter Carrington and Home Secretary Willie Whitelaw, along with their wives, to 
Sunday lunch at the Prime Minister’s countryside retreat, Chequers. The two couples joined the 
Thatchers for what was meant to be a light-hearted celebration of the Tory election victory just 
three weeks earlier. But during the second course, Lord Carrington made the mistake of raising 
the intractable issue of the Falkland Islands. Even worse, he suggested that the best way forward 
on the question of sovereignty might be a leaseback arrangement similar in scope to Hong 
Kong.33  
Lunch quickly devolved. Why, Thatcher wondered, should the British government 
abandon its possessions abroad, and the British subjects living in them? For ten minutes, she 
harangued her lunchmates, thumping the table as she became increasingly agitated. “That’s the 
trouble with your Foreign Office,” she accused Carrington. “Everyone is so bloody wet!” In the 
end, Denis Thatcher was only able to calm the situation with an understated observation: “I think 
you’re being a little extravagant, my dear.” His intervention came not before the episode had 
forever gained notoriety as the “thermonuclear lunch.”34  
Thatcher’s reaction makes more sense when placed within the overall political context of 
the summer of 1979. At the same time Carrington raised the Falklands, he was also pressuring 
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Thatcher to moderate her support for Ian Smith and the white population of Rhodesia. 
Carrington’s tentative proposal on leaseback in the Falklands looked to her like another case of 
the British government abandoning Britons abroad.35 Far from supporting leaseback, Thatcher 
likely agreed with Brian Frow, director of the Falkland Islands Office, who argued that the 
colony represented a special case of decolonization—first, because no indigenous people lived 
there and, second, because independence was not a viable political option for a territory of only 
2,000 people.36 The Falklands required a bespoke sovereignty arrangement to secure its 
continuing relationship with the UK. 
That September, as Lord Carrington was hosting the Rhodesian peace talks at Lancaster 
House, he again tried to convince Thatcher of the merits of a policy of leasing the Falklands back 
to Argentina. In an FCO memo, he presented the available options on the question of 
sovereignty: first, a so-called “Fortress Falklands” policy in which the British government 
refused to talk with Argentina; second, talks where, as a rule, nothing would be conceded; or 
third, an honest effort to engage in substantive negotiations with the Argentine government. 
Carrington favored the latter approach of trying to find a middle ground between the Argentine 
claim to sovereignty over the islands and the Islanders’ refusal to countenance any type of 
association with Buenos Aires. “Our intention would be to surrender only the trappings of 
sovereignty,” he wrote in his memo, “in return for guaranteed economic and political security for 
the Islanders under British rule.”37 Thatcher was unimpressed by this analysis, underlining the 
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“trappings of sovereignty” with her trademark wavy line of contempt. Given the strength of the 
Falklands lobby in Westminster, the foreign secretary conceded that the real difficulty would be 
in winning over Parliament to any compromise. “You won’t sell it,” Thatcher wrote on the 
document.38  
She nevertheless agreed to discuss the matter at a sub-committee of Cabinet but was 
disappointed by the policy paper that Carrington provided for discussion.39 According to the 
foreign secretary, the government’s prime objective was to “defend the right of the British 
settlers to remain under British administration.”40 In her copy, Thatcher amended the wording to 
read: “defend British sovereignty and the right of British settlers to remain under British 
administration.” She also bristled at Carrington’s observation that Argentine national honor was 
at stake in the matter. “So, to the Foreign Office, our national honor doesn’t seem to matter?” she 
scribbled in the margins. Atop the cover page of the brief, Thatcher made her feelings plain: “I 
don’t like this paper,” she wrote briskly.41 In the end, she used the ongoing talks on Rhodesia as 
an excuse to put off any approach to Argentina. Talks on the Falklands “should be postponed 
until after the Rhodesian issue has been settled,” her private secretary wrote to the FCO on 
October 15.42  
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But by January 1980, with the situation in southern Africa now seemingly on track to an 
acceptable conclusion, Carrington urged Thatcher to renew her focus on the Falklands. Unable to 
delay any further, on February 22, she approved Carrington’s plan to have his junior minister, 
Nicholas Ridley, contact the Argentine Foreign Ministry. Over the course of 1980, Ridley 
attended several meetings with the Argentines at the United Nations in New York, and in 
November, he visited the Islands to try to convince the locals to come to terms with a closer 
relationship with Buenos Aires.  
Ridley received an unsurprisingly hostile reception in the Falklands—at one point 
“greeted by boos, the honking of car horns and the waving of placards and Union Jacks.”43 But 
he would receive an even worse reception among his own colleagues back in London. A few 
days after he returned, Ridley made a statement to the Commons on his visit. Little did he know 
that Margaret Thatcher’s parliamentary private secretary, Ian Gow, in concert with Julian 
Amery, had encouraged Tory MPs to give Ridley a rough ride—likely with the prime minister’s 
approval. Later that day, she received a full report from her chief whip, Michael Jopling. “Mr. 
Ridley had an awful time in the House this afternoon,” Jopling wrote, adding that he did “not 
immediately recollect an occasion when a statement has been greeted with such a degree of 
hostility from the Government benches.” The Tory MP Jonathan Aitken also remembered 
Ridley’s reception as exceptionally hostile. “Sitting in the House that afternoon, I had never 
before seen such a mauling of a minister,” he later recalled. “Leaseback was well and truly 
sunk.” 
The parliamentary assault on Nicholas Ridley reflected the fact that the Falkland Islands 
had again become a volatile issue in the House of Commons, in part due to the enhanced role of 
                                                        
43 Graham Bound, “The Visit,” Penguin News, no. 16, 16 December 1980. 
 203 
the Falkland Islands Office—whose supporters carried on making the same emotive arguments 
that the lobby had made in 1968. “The Falkland Islanders were, in many ways, more British than 
the British,” the Conservative MP Michael Shersby noted after his visit to the territory in 1981. 
“Few among the population were not of British descent,” he clarified, “and a high proportion of 
the Islanders maintained strong ties with Britain.”44 It was a sentiment shared by some Islanders, 
too. In a Penguin News article about the growing popularity of VHS technology, Graham Bound 
wrote that the arrival of video forced people who rarely left the islands to “see with their own 
eyes the brutal reality of riots in Brixton and dole queues in the News at Ten.” Bound added that 
the footage made those Islanders inclined to emigrate “realize that the quality of life in the 
Falklands is very high.”45  
Much like Rhodesia, despite her earlier views, Margaret Thatcher allowed negotiations 
with Argentina to proceed. This development reawakened the lobby, and MPs assertations that 
the Islanders were “more British” than the inhabitants of the UK. The islands were once again 
cast as exceptional in comparison to Britain. 
 
“Throw Out This Piece of Racial Thatcherism” 
 The Falklands sovereignty debate became still more controversial when it overlapped 
with policy discussions in Britain about the need for reformed citizenship laws. The 
Conservative Party election manifesto of 1979 had promised to “define entitlement to British 
citizenship and to the right of abode in this country,” while adding that their reforms would “not 
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adversely affect the right of anyone now permanently settled here.”46 By the summer of 1980, 
Home Secretary Willie Whitelaw, whose department was responsible for citizenship and 
immigration policy, began circulating new nationality proposals to Cabinet ministers.  
After 1948, the UK government had recognized the legal category of “UK and 
Commonwealth citizen,” which granted British subjects across the empire the right to live and 
work in Britain, something many pursued. But in subsequent decades, successive governments 
steadily curtailed these rights. The 1971 Immigration Act defined British subjects as “patrial” or 
“non-patrial.”47 To be considered patrial, one had to be born in the UK, identify a British-born 
parent or grandparent, or have been resident in Britain for five years. Non-patrial British subjects 
could only enter the country with a work permit. The 1971 act had the effect of excluding many 
British subjects—invariably colonized peoples—who had few familial ties to Britain, while 
granting white residents of the Dominions visa-free entry into the UK.48  
Willie Whitelaw’s nationality plan was designed to further entrench the earlier efforts to 
narrow UK citizenship, dividing it into three distinct variants: British citizenship, citizenship of 
the British Dependent Territories, and overseas British citizenship. He described British citizens 
as those people who were “connected with” Britain, while citizenship of the British Dependent 
Territories denoted that a person’s “connection” was with the remaining colonies.49 The final 
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category, overseas British citizenship, became a catch-all for former British subjects who were 
not covered by the other categories. Under the proposals, citizens of the British Dependent 
Territories and overseas British citizens—though they would continue to hold UK passports and 
receive British consular assistance—would have no automatic right to enter, live, or work in the 
UK.   
 These proposed reforms caused genuine anxiety in the Falkland Islands. As the historian 
Kathleen Paul argues, the nationality of the Falkland Islanders had been subject to frequent 
alterations based on the changing political objectives of successive British governments after 
1948. While their right of entry into the UK had been restricted under the 1962 Commonwealth 
Immigrants Act, they had seen their status restored in 1971.50 Under Whitelaw’s reforms to 
nationality law, while most Islanders would retain their visa-free status by virtue of having a 
British-born grandparent, the four hundred Islanders who could claim no such link would be 
excluded. The irony was that those Islanders with the longest lineages in the Falklands—indeed, 
those people whom the lobby would have described as the best representatives of an innate, 
“pure” Britishness—would not be British citizens, but citizens of the British Dependent 
Territories. As a result, Falklands councilors and their UK-based allies voiced strong opposition 
to the home secretary’s proposals.  
Yet in June 1981, Thatcher reiterated her support for so-called “composite citizenship” 
and refused to consider any exceptions for the aggrieved Dependent Territories.51 The best the 
Islanders could manage was an unofficial assurance from the home secretary that in the event of 
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an emergency, any Falkland Islander wishing to relocate to Britain would be considered 
sympathetically.52 At the same time, the government continued to advance Whitelaw’s plan, now 
drafted as a bill in Parliament. 
Over the summer of 1981, the Falklands lobby began to collect signatures from as many 
Islanders as possible to support their plea for an exemption from the new nationality bill. In late 
September, clad in a white t-shirt emblazoned with the words “Keep the Falkland Islands 
British,” Sukey Cameron, a young Islander living in London and employed by the Falkland 
Islands Office, made her way up Whitehall.53 She brought with her the official petition, 
containing the signatures of nearly every Falkland Islander of voting age. “We the undersigned,” 
the forty-three page document read, “earnestly request Mrs. Thatcher and her Government to 
reconsider the terms of the nationality bill to accord full citizenship to all Islanders of British 
descent.”54 Unhindered by the security barrier now at the top of Downing Street, which only 
became a permanent fixture in 1989, Cameron walked directly to Number 10, delivering the 
petition to a “rather surprised policeman” who answered the famous polished black door (see 
Figure 4.2).55 While demonstrating the strength of feeling on the subject, the petition did little to 
influence the Thatcher government. The Prime Minister was now firmly committed to the 
nationality bill, even though it excluded those people in the Dependent Territories for whom she 
had initially shown great concern.  
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Behind the official resistance to a Falklands exemption was the specter of millions of 
British passport holders living outside the UK who might insist on their right of abode in Britain. 
In this, ministers were thinking especially of the cases of Kenyan and Ugandan Asians, who had 
sought refuge in Britain in the 1970s.56 But they also had in mind many more examples of British 
subjects who might try to enter Britain in a crisis—not least the people of Hong Kong. If 
Parliament excluded the Falkland Islands from the bill, “it would be difficult to resist similar 
claims from Hong Kong,” one Home Office official commented, noting that the “immigration 
consequences. . .would be impossible to contemplate.”57 In a meeting with Nicholas Ridley in 
March 1981, representatives of the Falkland Islands Committee were again stymied by the 
minister’s refusal to consider an exemption for the Islanders because of the potential 
consequences in Hong Kong. John Dodwell, a member of the group, was unimpressed by 
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Ridley’s rationale that the bill must not be seen as discriminatory. The Islanders “were different 
from the inhabitants of most other Dependent Territories,” he told the minister. “They did not 
have the option of independence,” he argued, “so the concept of Falkland Islands nationality 
meant little to them.” Dodwell added that the Islanders “were almost exclusively of British 
origin, and he did not understand why the Government could not distinguish between them and 
those, like the Chinese in Hong Kong, who were not of British origin.”58 Ridley noted in 
response that “any attempt to develop the nationality debate on these lines would be bound to 
attract criticism of racialism.”59 One Home Office official even cautioned that differential 
treatment between the Dependent Territories could lead to legal trouble at the European Court of 
Justice.60  
In the public debate about the bill, Thatcher herself was plagued by charges of racism. In 
April 1981, the so-called Brixton riot began just before her first state visit to India. In advance of 
her arrival in Delhi, India’s English-language press panned the Thatcher government’s proposed 
changes to immigration and citizenship laws, linking the unrest in Brixton to dissatisfaction with 
the new nationality bill. “The issue is racism in Britain,” the editors of the Times of India 
commented, “and the adoption of a policy that can only make sense in racial terms. . .It is only 
Mrs. Thatcher’s Government which has devised a nationality act which openly distinguishes one 
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class of British citizens from another because of race to the disadvantage of the colored ones.”61 
The proposed nationality legislation had caused great concern in India, not least for the forty 
thousand UK passport holders living there. Most of them had moved from former British 
colonies that had achieved independence, but with the full intention of carrying on to Britain. 
The British government, however, would only allow five hundred British passport holders of 
Indian descent to enter Britain per year via a voucher scheme.62 Thousands thus found 
themselves stuck in India.  
In their bilateral meeting, Indian Prime Minister Indira Gandhi bluntly asked Margaret 
Thatcher to accept more British passport holders (see Figure 4.3). Thatcher responded that with 
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two and a half million unemployed and with the tense situation in Brixton, such a change in 
policy “would be difficult.”63 She made this point equally clear to a group of Indian MPs who 
complained about the treatment of Indian immigrants in Britain, especially upon arrival at 
Heathrow. She “stressed that there was nothing racial or religious in the bill, and that she had 
been greatly hurt by allegations to the contrary.” But she could not raise the yearly intake of UK 
passport holders in India, as “an increase in numbers would not make for racial harmony,” nor 
would it ease pressures on the job market. “The West Indians posed a particular problem,” she 
told the Indian MPs, “because unlike people from the Sub-Continent, they had no tradition as 
small businessmen and could not easily find employment.”64  
Margaret Thatcher’s visit to India also elicited sharp commentary from other parts of the 
former empire. In Zambia, where the local press had devotedly praised her handling of the 1979 
CHOGM in Lusaka, she was castigated by the Times of Zambia as “implementing Powellism and 
the objectives of that Nazi-type party, the National Front.” Dividing British citizens up into 
discrete categories, largely along racial lines, was no better than the policies of South African 
apartheid and was a “betrayal of what the Commonwealth [was] all about.” The editors advised 
the Prime Minister to “throw out this piece of racial Thatcherism.”65 
Despite these severe reactions, Thatcher returned from the subcontinent resolved to carry 
through her policies as planned. But by May 1981, members of her Cabinet began to wilt under 
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popular pressure to accept a Labour amendment which would add a non-discrimination clause to 
the legislation. After voicing her displeasure, she grudgingly accepted. “Once we put in an 
unnecessary new clause,” she told the home secretary, “we throw doubt on all the other 
principles of the bill.”66 Instead of being seen to accept Labour’s amendment, she insisted that 
the government draft its own non-discrimination language.  
But despite this official commitment to non-discrimination within the text of the bill, 
Thatcher, Ridley, and other officials had conceded that race was at the heart of considerations 
over citizenship—whether Ridley’s comments about Hong Kong or Thatcher’s insistence that 
admitting more UK passport holders living in India would cause social unrest. Indeed, such 
comments harkened back to Thatcher’s notorious statement while in opposition that Britain was 
being “rather swamped by people with a different culture.”67 In this context, narrowing the rights 
of four hundred Falkland Islanders, however ethnically or culturally British, was a price worth 
paying.  
In October 1981, ministers resisted an amendment to the nationality bill in the House of 
Lords that would have granted all Falkland Islanders full British citizenship. The amendment 
failed on a tied vote. Against the expressed wishes of the government, a similar amendment for 
Gibraltar passed, but ministers later admitted that the Gibraltar exemption made sense, given the 
territory’s membership of the European Economic Community.68 A further amendment on behalf 
of the people of Hong Kong, who sought the use of the largely symbolic title “British National” 
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in their passports, failed. The government’s only concession was to reorder the wording of the 
new category of citizenship to “British Dependent Territories Citizen.” The word “British” was 
moved to the front. 
The British Nationality Act received Royal Assent on 30 October 1981.69 Much would 
change, however, before the act was slated to go into effect on 1 January 1983—not least 
Britain’s unexpected war with Argentina.  
 
“British Stock” 
On 31 March 1982, the British Cabinet received shocking intelligence. The Argentine 
fleet, including an aircraft carrier, was at sea and poised to invade and occupy the Falkland 
Islands. British officials had made no serious defensive preparations to meet the potential 
Argentine threat, even as the domestic political situation in Buenos Aires had become deeply 
unsettled. For eight years, the Argentine military junta had been embroiled in a systematic 
internal campaign against leftist dissidents, infamously known as the “Dirty War.” During these 
years, critics of the government were routinely imprisoned, tortured, and “disappeared.”70 But by 
1982, with the economy in freefall, General Leopoldo Galtieri, leader of the junta, ordered the 
invasion of the Falklands to divert attention from his internal troubles.71  
Just a month before, British and Argentine officials had concluded another round of 
apparently constructive talks in New York. But now, with no possible deterrent to the unfolding 
Argentine invasion, Thatcher ordered the governor of the Falkland Islands, Rex Hunt, to block 
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the airport’s runway and do whatever he could to repel the invaders. Hunkering down in 
Government House, Hunt drew upon the combined strength of sixty-nine Royal Marines, eleven 
Royal Navy sailors, and twenty-three members of the local Islander militia. By the next morning, 
Stanley’s defenders were quickly overwhelmed by over a thousand Argentine troops, attacking 
from the town’s landward and seaward sides. By lunchtime, Hunt was forced to surrender, and 
the new Argentine military governor duly notified him of his imminent deportation from the 
islands. Donning full ceremonial dress, including plumed hat and sabre, Hunt, his wife, and their 
son were driven to the airport in the governor’s private car—a black London taxi flying the 
Falklands flag. They were put on a direct flight to Montevideo.  
Argentine troops quickly rounded up the British soldiers, now prisoners of war. They 
were disarmed and made to lie face-down in the street of Stanley before they, too, were deported 
from the islands. Simon Winchester of the Sunday Times happened to be in Stanley, having 
traveled there to report on a relatively minor build-up of tensions between Britain and Argentina 
that preceded the invasion: a dispute over a scrap metal salvaging contract on the island of South 
Georgia. After the Argentine invasion, he snapped covert photos of a group of British Marines, 
hands in the air, being corralled by an Argentine officer. With the help of the governor’s teenage 
son, Tony, who smuggled Winchester’s film out of the islands in his shoe, these images of the 
British troops, coupled with shots of the blue and white Argentine flag flying over the islands, 
quickly splashed across British newspapers and television.72 Many MPs were seething, 
especially those Tories on the right of the party who had been angered by the government’s 
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abandonment of white Rhodesians three years earlier. They took their rage out on Lord 
Carrington. Unable to maintain his position, he was forced to resign.73   
The day after the invasion, Parliament met for its first Saturday sitting since the Suez 
crisis in 1956. In her prepared remarks, Margaret Thatcher decried the Argentine attack against a 
peaceful people, who were “British in stock and tradition”74 and a “fellow island race.”75 She 
announced that Cabinet had agreed to dispatch a naval Task Force to the Falklands to dislodge 
the occupiers and reassert British sovereignty over the islands. Any Falkland Islander who 
wished to enter Britain in the meantime was assured that they would face no visa or customs 
requirements.76 
In a series of parliamentary debates that followed over the next several weeks, MPs spoke 
of the Falkland Islanders as an integral part of a global community of Britishness. Sir Bernard 
Braine, for example, re-invoked the discourse of “kith and kin” that he had first called up in 
1968. “The very thought that our people, 1,800 people of British blood and bone, could be left in 
the hands of such criminals,” he declared, “[was] enough to make any normal Englishman's 
blood—and the blood of Scotsmen and Welshmen—boil, too.”77 Others spoke of a global British 
family, including the Scottish Tory Michael Ancram, who mused about the cultural linkages 
between Scottish and Falklands sheep farmers. The British government must do whatever 
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necessary to protect the Islanders, Ancram pledged, because “those people are our family.”78 
Another Tory, Philip Goodhart, was thinking in even bigger terms. The Falklands conflict 
presented an opportunity for Britain to re-forge dormant links with its former settler colonies. 
We “should think in terms of a joint force with our Australian and New Zealand friends,” 
Goodhart argued, adding that he “regret[ed] the way in which the ties between our own defense 
forces and those of Australia and New Zealand have tended to loosen. . .The time has come to 
reverse this regrettable trend,” he concluded.79 While ties had, indeed, loosened, citizens of the 
Dominions had always retained special grandfathered rights to enter the UK without a visa.80 
The press was just as committed to articulating this idea of global Britishness, with the 
Times declaring in a rousing editorial: “We are all Falklanders now.”81 The Telegraph columnist 
Peregrine Worsthorne described, in his view, the racial implications of the British defense of the 
islands. If the Falklanders “were British citizens with black or brown skins, spoke with strange 
accents or worshipped different gods,” the British would never have roused themselves to call up 
the fleet, he wrote. “Blood is thicker than water; even oceans of water.”82  
Along with their place in a wider British community, commentators quickly began to 
describe the islands as not just British—but the best of Britishness. The Times’s Michael 
Frenchman, an occasional visitor to the Falklands, waxed poetic about Stanley as the archetypal 
British village. “With its clapperboard and gaily painted corrugated roofed houses,” he noted, 
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“Stanley is rather like a waterside village in the West Country.” Frenchman added that, just like 
Cornwall, “the shops look as if out of the late 1920s; the Woodbine signs; the double flight of 
steps up to the West store; the old fire station in a dilapidated garage; the Edwardian pillar boxes 
and fire hydrants.”83 Frenchman’s nostalgic portrayal of Stanley as an idealized space invoked 
the same discursive tropes that the Falklands lobby had drawn upon after 1968—that the islands 
were Britain as it should have been, unsullied by postwar decline, poverty, crime, and racial 
diversity.84 Indeed, the Tory MP David Crouch even invoked a common refrain from 1968. The 
islands were “an ideal community,” he told the House of Commons, “where there is no 
unemployment, no poverty, and no crime.”85  
Policymakers were also quick to laud the character of the people themselves as 
exceptional. “The Falkland Islanders are strong, independent and interdependent,” proclaimed 
the Social Democratic Party MP Eric Ogden, and “have the best of British qualities and 
characteristics.” “They do not live in the past,” he concluded. “They are more aware of the world 
in which they live than are many people in Liverpool, Llandudno or many other places in 
Britain.”86 Far from inhabiting a cultural backwater on the edge of the world—or what Dr. 
Johnson had described in 1771 as a “bleak and gloomy solitude”—for Ogden, the Islanders were 
sophisticated and informed global citizens.87 They were also “passionate believers in 
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parliamentary democracy,” the Labour MP and former FCO minister Ted Rowlands told the 
Commons. “They listen to and watch everything that we say and do in the House.” He later 
warned his colleagues that “even the most obscure written parliamentary question is followed 
and debated in the Falkland Islands.”88 The Argentine occupation would be no impediment to 
these model democrats’ ability to exercise their rights and duties. “By one means or another, they 
will be listening to every word spoken in this debate,” the Conservative Michael Shersby added. 
“Whatever sanctions may have been imposed on them by the Argentine aggressors will not 
prevent their hearing these words from Britain.”89  
Even in the camp, Islanders were said to be specially attuned to the responsibilities of 
citizenship. Camp was a place of solitude and of direct democracy, Shersby argued, “where 
perhaps twenty-five people live together, farming their pastures and keeping their sheep.” He 
reported that on a past trip to the islands these interdependent people, living in close quarters, 
came together under one roof to express to the parliamentary delegation their desire “to continue 
their peaceful life as loyal subjects of the Crown.”90  
After the invasion, when a small minority of MPs suggested that the British government 
buy out the Islanders’ stakes in the Falklands, resettle them in Scotland or New Zealand, and 
surrender the territory to Argentina, members of the Falklands lobby could not contain their 
disbelief. “Disregarding everything else, even if the Falklanders were for sale, which they are 
not,” Eric Ogden began, “£30,000 in the Falkland Islands would buy 40,000 acres, 10,000 sheep 
and independence.” This was hardly the case in Britain, he noted. “What could one buy in 
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Salford, North London or Liverpool for that sum?”91 For Ogden, these locations offered no 
compensation for a life of rural bliss in the Falklands—a sentiment once expressed by the likes 
of Lord Baden-Powell, who wondered “why any Briton continue[d] to live in say, Wigan, when 
South Africa [was] open to him.”92   
 
“Your Britishness Will Enhance Ours” 
Just as Simon Winchester’s photographs had been important in setting a public narrative 
about Britain’s humiliation in the South Atlantic, other images found prime billing as 
representations of the islands and their people. After six weeks at sea—over half of that time 
spent perilously under enemy fire—on 21 May 1982, the Task Force arrived and over four 
thousand British marines and paratroopers disembarked to establish the main British beachhead 
at San Carolos Bay in the occupied Falkland Islands.  
Several journalists and photographers, embedded in various combat units, also came 
ashore and began interviewing the small population of Islanders in San Carlos, a humble sheep 
station some sixty miles west of Stanley. It was in this small village, as Argentine Pucaras and 
Mirages whizzed overhead, strafing the British naval escort with heavy fire, that Tom Smith—a 
Daily Express correspondent—snapped a series of photographs of the village’s residents.93 These 
images would gain great purchase in Britain in representing the Falkland Islanders as a 
domesticated, white settler population—one worth defending.94  
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In one scene, Sergeant Major Laurie Ashbridge talks over a slated white picket fence to 
five Islanders, a woman and (one presumes) her four children (see Figure 4.4). Fair-haired, 
pale-skinned, and ruddy-cheeked, the smiling children, all boys, surround their cheerful mother, 
who has dutifully served Ashbridge a cup of tea. One brief glimpse of Smith’s photograph 
helped to drive home the ethnic and cultural similarities between the Falkland Islanders and the 
mainland British. It could have been set anywhere in rural Britain. A handful of images, like this 
one, played a disproportionate role in representing the Islanders during the war because, from 
day one, government censors in Whitehall restricted the type of information that embedded 
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reporters could relay back home via heavily taxed Ministry of Defense satellites. This meant that 
British newspapers were unable to publish genuine photographs of the South Atlantic campaign 
until May 18, over six weeks after the initial Argentine invasion.95  
But descriptions of the Islanders and their idealized Britishness worked best in the press 
when contrasted to the actions of Argentine soldiers. After their landing at San Carlos, as British 
forces “yomped” and “tabbed” toward Stanley, press reports began to trumpet the harsh 
treatment some Islanders had experienced at the hands of their Argentine occupiers. In at least 
two villages, Argentine troops imprisoned the locals. The twenty-two residents of Douglas—
including five people over eighty years old and one infant—spent four days locked up in a 
schoolhouse. When the Argentine soldiers came for the elderly Elizabeth Morrison, they barged 
into her room as she lay half-dressed. “They tried to pull me out,” Morrison told Charles 
Laurence of the Telegraph after Douglas’s liberation, but “I would not leave until I was ready 
and refused to go.”96 As the Argentines withdrew from Douglas, they were said to have looted 
every home in the village. In one house, Laurence reported that they “left excrement over the 
floor, in the basins and in the bath.”97 This was in marked contrast to British troops at San 
Carlos, who when forced to requisition Islander buildings were reported to have been “careful to 
pack personal belongings and furniture in waterproof crates which [were] stored in sheltered 
positions.”98  
                                                        
95 Richard Harris, Gotcha: The Media, The Government and the Falklands Crisis (London: Faber and Faber, 1983), 
56. 
96 Laurence, “Islanders Held in School as Homes Were Looted,” Daily Telegraph, 1 June 1982, 5.  
97 Ibid. 
98 A.J. McIlroy, “Children Play as Jets Swoop in,” Daily Telegraph, 30 May 1982, 2.  
 221 
The larger settlement of Goose Green, however, fared even worse than Douglas, as all 
114 residents were locked in the community hall for over a month.99 Moreover, according to 
Richard Savill of the Press Association, British troops found thirty clearly marked Napalm tanks 
after liberating the village of Goose Green. “The tanks,” Savill reported, “were stacked in the 
centre of the village, only yards from where the civilians were held hostage in the community 
hall,” and right next to a stash of “crudely welded home-made bombs.” They were not 
sophisticated explosives, said one British officer. These bombs were no more than the work of a 
“village blacksmith’s—a child could have made them.”100  
But in addition to this narrative of Argentine soldiers as warmongering simpletons, the 
British press also cast them as hapless victims of the ruthless military dictatorship. There was 
some truth to this account, as most of Argentina’s invasion force was made up of conscripts 
scooped off the streets of Buenos Aires.101 In the midst of the occupation, before the arrival of 
British forces, some Islanders chose exile in Britain, and were swiftly deported from the 
Falklands by the Argentine government. These exiles brought fresh news of the islands, 
including accounts of an exposed occupation force struggling with the harsh climate. One 
reported that Argentine conscripts were “stealing cats and eating them, and they are picking up 
scraps from rubbish dumps.” He added that “they can’t be in any condition to fight.”102  
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These simplistic portrayals did much to occlude the complex demographic makeup of 
Argentina as having one of Latin America’s most “European” populations. Indeed, Argentina 
was home to a sizable community of over a hundred thousand people of British descent—the 
legacy of Britain’s nineteenth century informal empire in the Southern Cone of Latin America.103 
The majority of these “Anglos” supported Argentina’s claim to sovereignty during the Falklands 
conflict. Many Anglos even worked to convince the Islanders under occupation that they could 
thrive as part of a multicultural Argentina, while retaining their distinctly British culture.104  
The Anglo community’s support for Argentina grew even more fervent after one of the 
most dramatic episodes of the conflict. In early May, Thatcher ordered the British submarine 
HMS Conqueror to sink the Argentine battlecruiser ARA General Belgrano. Although it was 
sailing outside the British government’s self-declared two hundred mile Total Exclusion Zone 
around the islands, the Belgrano was viewed as a threat to the Task Force. The day after the 
frigid austral waters claimed 323 Argentine sailors, Rachel Apolinaire (nee Scoffield), a first 
generation Argentine of British descent and daughter of a decorated British war veteran, penned 
a fiery letter to Thatcher from her home in Rio Grande, Tierra del Fuego. Apolinaire argued that 
the preemptive strike against the Belgrano was a classic case of British double-dealing, forcing 
her to reconsider her connections to a nation that seemed increasingly to renege on its alleged 
moral principles. “Enclosed is my passport,” she wrote to Thatcher. “Stick it on the wall with the 
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rest of [the] British passports, war medals, and any other tokens returned to Gt. [Great] 
Britain.”105 
Despite the diverse make-up of the Argentine nation, including the many people of 
British descent, the racialized portrayals of Argentines in the British press as barbarians, 
simpletons, and hapless victims did a great deal to popularize the Falklands conflict. By 
mid-April, eight out of ten people polled by Gallup supported the government’s decision to 
dispatch the Task Force.106 As tensions escalated, sixty-five percent of respondents in a London 
Weekend Television poll said they would accept the wholesale sinking of the Argentine fleet to 
recover the Falklands.107 By late May, well after the sinking of the Belgrano, another poll 
published in the Guardian showed that, in the likely event that ongoing ceasefire negotiations 
broke down, only seven percent of respondents favored withdrawing the Task Force. Indeed, 
sixty-eight percent of those questioned supported some form of ground invasion.108 Perhaps most 
importantly, despite her prewar unpopularity, Thatcher received positive reviews; by war’s end, 
an astounding eighty-four percent of respondents approved of Thatcher’s handling of the 
crisis.109  
While also motivating a significant antiwar movement on the left, many people— 
previously unaware of the islands—supported the government’s Falklands policy and fully 
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bought into the discourses and representations of the territory as an ideal Britain.110 They reacted 
to the invasion in different ways. In the small hours of April 4, for example, a consultant 
architect and a junior barrister were arrested for throwing eggs at the Argentine embassy in 
Belgravia. As they were carted off to the local police station, they told the arresting office that 
they were “making a ‘protest’ on behalf of the man in the street.”111 Another two men, both 
drunk, were booked for throwing tins of corned beef at the embassy windows.  
Corned beef—one of the few commodities that British people readily associated with 
Argentina—became the target of boycotts, including one grassroots drive by a man in Carlisle. 
His campaign was touched off by Argentina’s response to the sinking of the Belgrano:  an 
Exocet-missile attack on HMS Sheffield that gutted the hull and killed twenty British sailors. The 
earnest boycotter in Carlisle wrote of his outrage that his local co-op had restocked its shelves of 
Fray Bentos corned beef on the very day that the Argentines had strafed the Sheffield.112 
Almost overnight, the same feelings that inspired people to hurl objects at the Argentine 
embassy also created a nationalist cottage industry—from kitschy bumper stickers to pocket 
maps to t-shirts boasting cartoonish penguins. In April, the Falkland Islands Office made a public 
call for donations, with staff placing advertisements in newspapers from Bournemouth to Belfast. 
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Representing a cross-section of society, from publicans and laborers to a university lecturer, 
concerned citizens sent in their money, but also appended special requests to their pledges.113 “I 
would be grateful if you would send me a price list of any T-shirts, stickers and badges 
displaying pro-Falklands slogans that you have available,” one donor, G.R. Moore, wrote, 
“especially the T-shirts with the slogan ‘The Falklands are British and Beautiful.’” These shirts 
were reminiscent of the one Sukey Cameron had worn to 10 Downing Street to deliver the 
Falkland Islanders’ petition against the British Nationality Act in 1981; representatives of the 
lobby had also appeared on news broadcasts after the invasion in similar attire.114 “I am a 
wholehearted supporter of the Islanders,” Moore added, “and would like to display my 
sympathy.”115 Falklands-stamped clothing also made its way abroad, including to the US, 
Canada, New Zealand, and even Peru.116  
Pubs and other small businesses wrote to the Falkland Islands Office, requesting 
hundreds of bumper stickers to sell in house, with the proceeds going directly to the Falklands 
appeal.117 This guerrilla marketing campaign seemed to pay off when the office began to receive 
requests directly from drivers. “I was pleased to see, somewhat fleetingly in the rear of a car at a 
traffic light, a car sticker bearing a Union Flag and a slogan ‘We support the Falkland Islands,’” 
wrote Ian Murdoch of Eltham in southeast London. He committed the office’s address to 
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memory and duly wrote to request his own. Within seven weeks, they had distributed over thirty 
thousand car stickers.118  
These donation letters give some indication of the public reception to the images of the 
islands popularized by politicians and the press. Many correspondents reacted passionately to the 
apparent links between the Falklands and Britain.119 Adrian Akehurst of Surrey, for instance, 
wrote that he “felt as if the Argentine invaders had moved into [his] own back garden.”120 For 
Ivy Kay of Argyll, the pictures on television convinced her that “your lovely islands. . .are just 
like our own Scottish Highlands.”121 Another writer advanced a political proposal to forever 
cement the links between the Falklands and Britain. “When this is all over, it is my opinion that 
the Falklands should be made a part of Britain,” she wrote—“in the same way as, say, the Isle of 
Wight.”122 
But some writers also meditated deeply on the question of Britishness. Miss P.A. Hough 
of Fleetwood in Lancashire wrote with apologies at being unable to contribute financially to the 
Islanders. She registered her interest in providing free lodging to any evacuated Falklands 
children. And she also wanted to make amends for being unaware of the plight of the Falkland 
Islanders until after the invasion. “After all you are people from my own country,” she added, 
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“and the British all over the world should stand united against military dictatorships.”123 
Elizabeth Stacey was even more introspective. “Britishness is also a state of mind,” she wrote. 
“Even over eight-thousand miles, your Britishness will enhance ours,” she added. “Your loss will 
diminish us.”124  
While the Falklands conflict inspired spontaneous acts and caused people to reflect on 
what it meant to be British, the issue aroused much uglier displays of nationalism. The day after 
the Argentine invasion, members of the far-right National Front gathered at Wilton Crescent, just 
a block from the Argentine embassy, for a foreboding candlelight vigil.125 Later in the week, 
these neo-fascists joined other fringe groups of the right to found the British National Party. Its 
first public call was for Thatcher’s “Cabinet traitors” to be hanged for betraying the Islanders. 
“Problems concerning the repatriation and resettlement of all coloured people in Britain were 
almost, but not quite, forgotten in a show of patriotic fervor,” the Guardian reported of the BNPs 
first meeting at a hotel near Victoria station.126  
In this range of public responses, the contention of the Falklands lobby since 1968, that 
the Islanders were inherently “more British” than people in the UK, caught traction—especially 
against the “othered” Argentine soldier. The conflict thus brought differing ideas of citizenship, 
identity, and belonging into competition. These themes would become no less contested in the 
aftermath of the war. 
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“Suitable Settler Material” 
 With their beachhead firmly established, British troops quickly outmatched the conscript 
army, and with the Argentine surrender at Stanley, the Falklands War came to a precipitous end 
on 15 June 1982. When the embedded journalist Max Hastings crossed the frontline and 
wandered into the battle-torn capital, he headed for the bar at the famous Upland Goose Hotel. 
“It was like liberating a pub in East Surrey or Kent,” he later reported.127  
After two and a half months of conflict, 904 people were dead. Thousands more suffered 
from grievous injuries, from amputations and severe burns to the latent wounds of 
Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD). Several British ships lay at the bottom of the Atlantic, 
including HMS Sheffield, HMS Coventry, and the Atlantic Conveyor. Despite these significant 
losses, in the haze of victory, Thatcher sought to maintain public support as the mission shifted 
squarely from a combat role to one of rehabilitation. In early June, Thatcher gave an interview to 
the Washington Post, in which she pledged to “rebuild and rehabilitate and develop” the 
Falkland Islands. In facilitating this goal, she announced that she sought to increase the 
population of the territory—and when asked where this new generation of settlers might come 
from, she bluntly replied that she was not “talking about Argentines.”128  
Thatcher had her finger on the pulse of the public’s interest in the Falklands. As one of 
the men tasked with recruiting skilled workers for rehabilitation and development work on the 
islands would later attest to Radio Scotland, “The Falklands appear to be one of those places 
which fire the imagination, and certainly the people who have been there have become very 
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attached to it.”129 By the following November, over two thousand people had written to the FCO 
to express an interest in immigrating to the territory—enough people to more than double the 
existing population.130 Officials in Britain and in the Falklands began to consider the 
implications of encouraging these people to move to the South Atlantic.  
The dwindling population of the islands had long been a significant quandary for 
administrators in Stanley who sought ways to spur economic growth. In late May 1982, well 
before the end of the war, but with military success in sight, Thatcher had asked Lord Shackleton 
to update his 1976 report on the economic prospects of the islands.131 Delivered that September, 
Shackleton’s conclusions highlighted the drain in population as the issue from which all other 
problems stemmed. “It is clear that development on any substantial scale will require 
immigration,” Shackleton wrote.132  
Governor Rex Hunt, now restored to his position in Stanley, shared Shackleton’s 
sentiment. At the start of his tenure in the islands in 1980, he was asked by Graham Bound of the 
Penguin News what he wanted his “lasting mark” on the islands to be. Hunt declared that he 
wanted to “arrest and, if possible, reverse the flow of people from the islands.”133 In August, just 
six weeks after the bullets had stopped flying, Hunt raised the issue of immigration with officials 
in London. “I believe we should start the immigration process immediately, before interest in the 
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Falklands wanes,” he told Foreign Secretary Francis Pym. “It is most important in terms of the 
Islanders’ morale that we are attracting new people with expertise to improve the quality of life 
here,” he wrote, adding that “we need new blood (particularly women).”134 A few months later, 
Hunt would add an additional trait to his characterization of the desirable immigrant: “We want 
people with enterprise,” he told Pym, people who could start a successful small business.135 
Lord Shackleton was equally enthusiastic but also more circumspect, arguing that the 
vetting of potential immigrants had to be managed carefully. He understood that the wartime 
image in Britain of the islands—of cheerful farmers and sweeping green landscapes—had built 
up an overly optimistic view of life in the territory. Immigrants often “cherish a romantic and 
unrealistic view,” he wrote in his updated report, “or seek escape from problems which in the 
event they bring with them.” Shackleton warned that “on collapse of the island idyll, they may 
become charges on the local social services,” adding that “the consequences of such failure 8,000 
miles from home would of course be acute.”136 While the UK government should encourage 
people to move to the Falklands, it must be sure that they were the right kind of immigrant. 
Thinking in similar terms, Hunt argued for the creation of a Falkland Islands Government Office 
(FIGO) in London, which could act in essence as a high commission. This organization would be 
an official counterweight to the lobby’s ad hoc Falkland Islands Office—brainchild of Bill 
Hunter Christie and the employer of the aforementioned Sukey Cameron. One of FIGO’s main 
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tasks would be to recruit would-be immigrants. It was eventually established in 1983, under the 
leadership of the former Falklands councilor, Adrian Monk.137 
At the same time, Roger Westbrook—head of the Falkland Islands Department at the 
FCO—drew up a list of qualifications for the ideal immigrant. The person would have “a desire 
to settle in the Islands on a long-term basis as opposed to a wish to secure a short-term 
appointment.” They would need key skills to fill specific gaps in the territory, while also having 
a reliable work history that could be properly vetted. They would be single women or married 
couples, aged 22 to 50. In the case of couples, wives would also have useful qualifications. And 
lastly, they would exhibit the promise of being able to settle in the “Falklands environment,” by 
which Westbrook meant that they would have past experience living in small and isolated 
communities.138 This description jived with a later FCO sketch of the ideal candidates for long-
term civil service postings in the Falklands. That person would be “something of a paragon,” the 
FCO acknowledged—“stable, self-sufficient, easy-going and a good mixer, good host and cook, 
a determined optimist not to be put off by wind, snow, sleet, rain or cold, with a do-it yourself 
disposition and an irrepressible sense of humor, fond of open spaces, nature and gardening, 
alcohol resistant and. . .fond of work.”139  
Such candidates would be difficult to find. But officials in London remained convinced 
that those people best suited to proper acculturation in the Falklands would come from the north 
of England or from Scotland. This stemmed from a somewhat misguided belief that the most 
successful Falkland Islanders were the descendants of Scottish settlers. As a result, FCO minister 
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Cranley Onslow instructed that official recruitment efforts for “suitable settler material” should 
focus on places like Glasgow. The Falkland Islands Recruitment Unit ultimately set up shop in 
East Kilbride, Scotland.140 In September 1982, Barry Cavanagh, director of the unit, told Radio 
Scotland that they were “inundated with applications from the start due to the media coverage.” 
He added that “everyone of course knows about the Falklands, and we’ve had general enquiries 
from all over Britain.” The office registered four hundred phone calls on one day alone.141 
By December, the FCO was distributing questionnaires to interested people to gauge their 
suitability for immigration. These official forms inquired about an applicant’s marital status and 
children. It asked whether “you (and your family) [could] adapt to life in a small community” 
and if “you like outdoor life.” When applicants were asked to list their hobbies, the form 
supplied a list of potential examples: “e.g. long distance & cross-country running, horse riding, 
orienteering, hiking, swimming, cycling, photography, sailing.”142 Some 280 questionnaires had 
been returned by Christmas 1982.143 Officials sorted the applicants into broad categories based 
on their stated occupations. The resulting list boasted plenty of people with expected skillsets—
farmers, mechanics, teachers, and pipe fitters—but also a few surprises, including a solicitor, a 
sociologist, and even a butler.144 
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The forms also posed questions which were meant to gauge the sincerity of an applicant, 
including whether they were willing to foot the bill for their own passage to the islands. Given 
the difficulties in transporting goods and people to the Falklands, which had to go by sea or be 
routed on a long air bridge via the US military base on Ascension Island, this was a significant 
cost. Along with the small housing stock in Stanley, the lack of assisted passages to the islands 
remained one of the key impediments to a fully formed immigration policy. Only fifteen percent 
of respondents affirmed their willingness to pay the bill, though one could surmise that they were 
hesitant to volunteer to pay a fee that they might reasonably expect the government to 
subsidize.145  
But because the British and Falkland governments remained unwilling to fund assisted 
passages, the FCO was left looking for alternative arrangements. For example, ministers and 
officials approached the non-profit Fairbridge Society for help funding an assisted passage 
scheme.146 In the years of high imperialism, Fairbridge had covered immigrants’ fares to various 
British colonies around the world. It had also facilitated the immigration of orphaned children 
from Britain to the empire.147 Even as late as 1980, local officials in the Falklands— Governor 
Hunt among them—had explored the potential for recruiting child immigrants to Stanley. Hunt 
was left lamenting the fact that “the larger orphanages like Dr. Barnado’s no longer run 
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emigration schemes for orphans.”148 But voices at the FCO were less aggrieved by the fact that 
orphaned children could not be airdropped into the islands. “The idea of encouraging orphans to 
go to the FI is Victorian, to put it mildly,” one official wrote, “and has little hope of getting 
anywhere.”149 In the end, the Fairbridge Society would be of no help in the postwar Falklands. 
Would-be immigrants would have to pay their own ways to the islands, though they might 
qualify for an interest-free loan from the Falkland Islands government. But despite this cost, 
significant numbers of people remained interested in moving there. 
 
“The Old British Spirit of Get-Up-and-Go” 
The state was not the only actor involved in encouraging immigration to the Falklands. 
Private stakeholders stood to benefit from the development of the islands and also sought to draw 
settlers to the territory. Under increasing pressure to break up his monopoly on land ownership in 
the islands, Ted Needham—chairman of the Falkland Islands Company—began subdividing 
company land on the road between Stanley and Darwin in the weeks after the war. Fifty acres 
went for £1,000, while a further £500 netted a hundred acres. These “smallholdings” were meant 
to encourage tradesmen and their families to immigrate to the islands. While the community 
would benefit from the newcomer’s much-needed skills, the immigrant could supplement their 
income from small-scale farming. The plots were also marketed as ideal for single women, or as 
the Guardian’s Martin Wainwright put it, “nubile market gardeners with an eye for a military 
man.”150  
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At the same time, Harry Camm—a businessman from Derbyshire—sought to attract 
settlers to the two hundred square miles of land he owned near Douglas. Camm had purchased 
the land during a stint as a consultant in the islands before the war. In a press release from his 
Falkland Islands Properties, Ltd., he described “evolv[ing] the nucleus of a scheme that could 
lead to the creation of a Douglas new town.” Camm’s New Town vision, much like the urban 
development project in the UK after 1945, encompassed homes, a school, shops, and even an 
industrial estate. “The idea hinges on whether enough people are prepared to participate,” 
Camm’s press release read. All he needed was a thousand people with “a bit of courage and the 
old British spirit of get-up-and-go” to purchase subdivided lots. His land was priced equal to 
Needham’s—a hundred acres for £1500. Camm promised unlimited opportunities to the 
ambitious settler willing to exploit farming, fishing, tourism, and the development of mineral 
resources in the islands. “Talks have already taken place with an international oil company 
interested in establishing the nature of mineral reserves below ground,” he declared. This was 
exactly the type of development supported by the Shackleton report, Camm claimed. “We have 
fought a war for the Falkland Islands,” he concluded. “Now we must help to develop and protect 
them.”151  
Despite his best efforts, Harry Camm’s Douglas New Town never developed into the 
utopia he imagined; nevertheless, immigration in the aftermath of the war did result in a steady 
influx of people, enough to outpace the longstanding decline in population. Three years after the 
war, the Observer’s Colin Smith was left touting a “minor baby boom” in the islands. He 
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claimed that this had nothing to do with the hundreds of British soldiers now permanently 
stationed at a new military base, RAF Mount Pleasant, just thirty-three miles southwest of 
Stanley. In the first quarter of 1983, Smith reported that the territory boasted ten births, which 
was two times as many from the same quarter in the four previous years. There were 1,910 total 
Falkland Islanders, including 53 immigrants since the war and 117 people working on 
contract.152 Every immigrant that Smith met “seemed to feel this tremendous sense of freedom, 
as well as the other satisfactions of pioneering.” He mused that the Falklands had become 
“Britain’s very own South Atlantic kibbutz.” As in Israel, Phantom jets were always passing 
overhead, and the settlers exhibited “the same readiness to contribute to [their] own defense.”153 
Among them were families that conformed closely to Roger Westbrook’s description of 
the ideal settler from November 1982. For example, David Hawksworth and his pregnant wife, 
Pauline, had purchased a fifty-acre lot from Ted Needham, sight unseen, after watching him 
make his pitch on national TV during the war. Within a few months, they had sold their Barnsely 
fish and chips shop and moved to the Falklands, where they set up a small café. Both had joined 
the Falkland Islands Defense Force. After discovering a roaring trade as local restauranteurs, by 
1985, the Hawksworths had bought two additional lots from the Falkland Islands Company, 
adding another hundred acres to their property. More significantly, they had purchased a local 
island that supported eight hundred sheep. “You can’t do that sort of thing in Barnsley,” Colin 
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Smith reported in the Observer.154 The Hawksworth were the type of immigrant success story 
that Lord Shackleton, Rex Hunt, and Margaret Thatcher were looking for.  
The same was true of Martin and Carol Cant, except that they had moved to Fox Bay East 
on the much more sparsely populated of the territory’s two main islands. Their first struggle was 
to overcome the steep cost of unassisted passage to Stanley, and then to the even more isolated 
Fox Bay. Securing work in a newly-established woolen mill, the couple spent their days 
producing fine yarn, as well as finished goods like scarves and sweaters. Martin, a carpenter, 
used his free time to renovate the new family home, the walls of which were lined with 
bookshelves featuring JRR Tolkien and Laurie Lee. To the journalist Smith, neither Martin nor 
Carol “appeared madly jingoistic.” Like most people in Britain, “they had watched the war on 
television,” and because both of them had been unemployed, they sat transfixed to nearly every 
news bulletin. They soon found themselves enamored of the scenery. “It reminds me of Bodmin 
Moor,” Martin told Colin Smith. “I know it’s 8,000 miles away, but it never feels that far.” For 
Carol, their two years in the Falklands had been a great success. “I feel I live the way you are 
supposed to live here,” she noted.155  
Immigration to the islands did not, however, come without local controversy. In January 
1984, Velma Malcolm—a Stanley businesswoman and director of the local branch of the 
Falklands lobby—wrote to Baroness Young, the new FCO minister responsible for the islands. 
Among a litany of complaints about the British administration of the territory, Malcolm put on 
record her belief that officials in Stanley should be the sole arbiters in deciding who came to the 
islands. “It is felt that immigrants to this Colony should be British,” Malcolm wrote, “and they 




should be carefully vetted.” She noted that there had recently been a case where an immigrant 
with a criminal record was admitted to the Falklands. “The ultimate decision [on] whether a 
person [will] be allowed into these Islands to settle should rest with the Islands Immigration 
Board,” she wrote.156 
After the experiences of the occupation and war, the Islanders were unwilling to consider 
any prospective immigrants from Argentina. Because of the highly raced discourses and 
representations of Argentines, outsiders with a “Hispanic physiognomy” or Spanish-sounding 
surnames were often shunned, as potential “Argie spies.”157 But many Falkland Islanders were 
leery of more than just Argentines. Indeed, discussions in the Falklands about race and belonging 
strongly mirrored those that had taken place in Britain surrounding the British Nationality Act in 
1981. While young white British couples like the Cants or the Hawksworths fit the local ideal of 
an immigrant family and were welcomed, many Islanders were much more concerned with the 
kind of people who, in their view, should be excluded from the territory.  
In April 1984, Mr. Dowling, a Falkland Islander, applied to bring his Vietnamese wife 
and son to the islands. He also registered his hope that in the future he could sponsor his wife’s 
family, so that they, too, might settle there. Government officials in Stanley reported to London 
that the prospective arrival of the Vietnamese Dowlings was “exercising people locally.”158 And 
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while the local Immigration Advisory Committee agreed to admit Mrs. Dowling and her son, her 
relations would have to go through a thorough vetting by FIGO in London, primarily “to check 
that they had the skills that Mr. Dowling alleged that they had.” Only then would they be 
allowed to immigrate, and only when “adequate accommodation was available.”159 Mr. Dowling 
felt that his relatives were being discriminated against. On Apri1 13, the FCO received word that 
he had decided to leave the islands permanently, “claiming racial prejudice against his 
family.”160 
The case was reminiscent of an earlier controversy. At a public meeting in 1979, a 
Falklands councilor proposed that the community accept four or five Vietnamese refugee 
families of the so-called “Boat People.” “We have something to offer them, and we need 
people,” the councilor told those assembled. But in response, a “large proportion of speakers” 
had lambasted the suggestion. According to Graham Bound, editor of the Penguin News, the 
general sentiment expressed was that “one only had to look at Britain to see what Asian people 
have done there by refusing to integrate into society.”161 Bound was so incensed by the reaction 
that he devoted his next editorial to the subject of racial prejudice in the Falklands. He alleged 
that the Falklands government first considered the color of a person’s skin before issuing work 
permits in the islands. “We can now expect to be mentioned in the same breath as Southern 
Africa,” he wrote. “We have nothing to lose from admitting settlers of any race,” he added. “We 
desperately need people.”162 
                                                        
159 TNA: FCO 7/5902, “Minutes of the Meeting of the Executive Council No 3/84,”10 April 1984. 
160 TNA: FCO 7/5981, handwritten note dated 13 April 1984, on “Falklands Round-Up No 26,” 12 April 1984 
161 Graham Bound, “Councilor Wallace Holds A Public Meeting,” Penguin News, no. 1, 3 October 1979. 
162 Bound, “Editorial,” Penguin News, no. 3, 24 December 1979. For Vietnamese refugees in Britain, see Bailkin, 
Unsettled, 20-21. 
 240 
The Dowling case showed that the war and subsequent settlement drive had reignited 
discussions about race and belonging in the Falklands. The following August, the Falkland 
Islands Company decided to bring in ten shepherds from New Zealand to augment their work 
force. “The fact that these prospective immigrants are New Zealanders should save the day,” the 
first secretary in the Falklands government, Michael Smith, told the FCO. In other words, no one 
would complain about a group of white newcomers. In the same report, Smith also noted that a 
Ministry of Defense official had approached him “rather nervously” about establishing a laundry 
service run by Chinese workers in Stanley. There was no legal problem, Smith told the man from 
the MOD. “But I can see something of this sort become a problem at some stage in the future,” 
he wrote, “It needs watching.”163  
The same was true of St. Helenians. While the Falkland Islands was always short of 
labor, St. Helena—a fellow British dependent territory in the mid-Atlantic Ocean—had a historic 
problem with unemployment. Officials had long toyed with the proposal of importing labor from 
St. Helena to help meet the local demands of the Falklands market. But in September 1985, Rex 
Hunt’s replacement, the incoming Governor Gordan Jewkes, told the Minister for Overseas 
Development that he was “not sanguine that the idea of recruiting St. Helenians would work.” 
The local people of St. Helena were largely of mixed race, and Jewkes “felt that it might create 
problems of a different order.”164  
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In the aftermath of war, as the rehabilitation program and security situation reordered 
Falklands society, immigrants to the islands who conformed to the exalted ideal—young, white, 
resourceful, outdoorsy, and entrepreneurial—found quick acceptance and new lives in the 
islands. But the specter of immigration also raised objections among some Islanders. The 
territory needed new people to thrive. But was it worth it if immigration threatened the 
Falklands’ imagined status as a “better Britain”?  
  
“Loyal British Subjects” 
 The Falklands War, laden with the images of heroic British soldiers storming beaches in 
defense of quintessentially British people and places, brought the controversies of the British 
Nationality Act back into focus. The Act was set to come into force on 1 January 1983, but it 
now seemed especially farcical that the Thatcher government would dispatch Britain’s largest 
ever naval Task Force and sacrifice the lives of over 250 servicemen for a people that it would 
then relegate to a separate tier of citizenship. The government defended its position by noting 
that “the matter [was] somewhat academic given the undertaking to admit the Falkland Islanders 
to the United Kingdom, whether they have the right of abode or not.”165 But this was hardly 
convincing logic in light of the symbolic importance ascribed to the Islanders in the wartime 
construction of a British national identity. Their legal status thus became highly symbolic. 
 It was of little surprise to officials in Whitehall, then, when Lord Bruce of Donnington, a 
peer in the House of Lords, signaled his intention in the immediate aftermath of the war to 
introduce legislation to amend the British Nationality Act, incorporating the Falkland Islanders 
into full British citizenship. Lord Bruce’s amendment in Lords was identical to a bill introduced 
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in the Commons by the Labour MP Robert Kilroy-Silk, but ministers had successfully parried 
that effort by refusing to allot it time for debate. The government had no such ability in the 
Lords. As one official outlined, Lord Bruce likely sought “to use a Second Reading debate in 
October to embarrass the Government” by forcing a vote that he would likely win.166  
Thatcher and her ministers faced a rerun of the quandary they had confronted the 
previous year. To oppose the bill would be futile, but to treat the Falklands as an exception to the 
terms of the British Nationality Act would lead to calls of discrimination from the other 
dependent territories. As one official at the Home Office reminded his colleagues in August, “I 
need hardly draw attention to the row we will have with Hong Kong if Parliament is obliged to 
give special treatment to the Falkland Islanders.”167 In light of the war, Home Secretary Willie 
Whitelaw suggested that ministers should lay out the detailed reservations the government had to 
the bill, and then, if Lord Bruce forced a vote, to abstain. Even if the bill passed, ministers could 
still be seen as having been fair to the dependent territories. As one Home Office official put it, 
ministers needed to demonstrate “that they [were] bowing to the will of Parliament and not 
themselves favoring Lord Bruce’s bill.”168 On July 26, Thatcher assented to this course of 
action.169 
 But as the issue developed over the fall of 1982, the strategies of the FCO and the Home 
Office began to diverge. By early September, Foreign Secretary Francis Pym had decided that 
the Government should accept Lord Bruce’s bill and bring all Islanders into full British 
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citizenship.170 The attending minister in the Lords should give a speech in the tone of “qualified 
enthusiasm,” stating the case against the bill, outlining the differences between the Falklands and 
Hong Kong, and pledging that Lord Bruce’s amendment to the British Nationality Act would not 
establish a precedent. “This is an occasion where consistency must take second place,” one FCO 
contact wrote.171 The Home Office rejected Pym’s approach, arguing that the issue went much 
deeper than Hong Kong. “If British Dependent Territories’ citizenship is not good enough for the 
Falkland Islanders,” an official wrote, “it could well be argued that British Overseas citizenship 
is not good enough for, among others, East African Asians.”172 The government had to hold firm 
to its manifesto commitment to reform citizenship or face the possibility of having to admit an 
unknown number of people in a future emergency—viewed as a real threat in the Cold War 
context.  
 But slowly, the Home Office’s resolve began to crumble, even as the government of 
Hong Kong seemed to confirm its fears by restating its earlier case for adding the words “British 
National” to the territory’s passports after 1983.173 As the Falklands exemption got closer to an 
affirmative vote, officials began to recognize that Hong Kong’s demand “was becoming 
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increasingly hard to resist.”174 Indeed, the Falklands War had had its own related effects in Hong 
Kong, especially with the looming expiration of Britain’s lease over the New Territories in 1997. 
Many in Hong Kong worried that an assertive China could lead to a standoff similar to the 
Falklands. Would Britain come to their aid, just as it had done in the South Atlantic?  
Most people doubted the prospect, but they had more immediate concerns. Some four 
hundred sailors from the territory, fifty of them laundrymen, were serving on British ships in the 
Falklands Task Force or on contract in the Royal Fleet Auxiliary (RFA). While UK sailors of the 
RFA were allowed to terminate their contracts when the war broke out in the South Atlantic, 
Hong Kong sailors were not afforded that privilege.175 Initially, they were paid much less than 
UK-born sailors. They were also given a false assurance—that “they would not be used as close 
to [the] front line as in the event proved operationally necessary.”176 Some protested these 
inequities, threatening industrial action unless they were equally paid or repatriated. Still, many 
served stoically, including two individuals who were awarded the British Empire Medal for their 
service.177 By the June 15 ceasefire, six Hong Kong sailors had died aboard British ships—twice 
the number of Falklanders who lost their lives on the islands. Another eleven were seriously 
injured.178 
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Owing to these deaths, British officials in Hong Kong reported a “greatly heightened 
interest here at all levels.”179 Before the fighting ended, the government of Hong Kong pledged 
£20 million for the rehabilitation of the Falklands. But despite this generosity, some UK officials 
were hesitant to accept the money, expressing “considerable reservations about getting beholden 
to the Hong Kong Government” at a time when the British Nationality Act was still be 
legislated.180 While the idealized wartime discourses of the Falkland Islanders symbolized one 
representation of Britishness, as a diplomat later explained, “Hong Kong see themselves as loyal 
British subjects”—subjects who had sacrificed just as much as the Falkland Islanders. “Any 
grant of UK citizenship to Falkland Islanders,” he added, “would be seen as racially 
discriminatory.”181 Ultimately, the Hong Kong case demonstrated how tiered citizenship in the 
British Nationality Act was contested through appeals to a different vision of Britishness—one 
that celebrated the territory’s contributions to the Falklands War. 
In November, after Lord Bruce had been convinced to delay his bill until the start of a 
new parliamentary session, Baroness Vickers took up the final charge, introducing the 
amendment which would finally exempt the Falkland Islanders from the requirements of the 
British Nationality Act. Cabinet agreed not to oppose bill, and indeed, ministers freed up 
parliamentary counsel to provide drafting assistance to Vickers.182 Francis Pym subsequently 
telexed British officials in the dependent territories, with an eye especially toward Hong Kong, 
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the South Atlantic Fund. TNA: FCO 40/1423, Pym to Hong Kong station, Telno. 520, 7 July 1982. 
181 TNA: HO 213/2608, R.D. Clift to C.J. Howells, “British Citizenship for All Falkland Islanders?” 26 July 1982. 
182 TNA: HO 213/2565, M.J. Addison, Brief on L982095: Baroness Vickers’ British Nationality (Falkland Islands) 
Amendment Bill [H.L.], 19 November 1982.  
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“not [to] initiate discussion” about the Falklands amendment. “In response to inquiries,” he 
wrote, “it should be stressed that it is only a bill and there is no certainty as to the form in which 
it will reach the statute book.”183 The Falklands exemption was a matter of context; there would 
be no precedent. One voice at the FCO went even further: “We must avoid anything suggesting 
that the Islands are being incorporated into the United Kingdom,” he wrote, “even if only for the 
purposes of the Act.”184 Vickers’s bill was officially passed by Parliament in March 1983, and 
under the British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Act, 1983, the Islanders gained the right to live, 
work, and vote in Britain.185  
But the story was not over for Hong Kong, either. In 1990, in the wake of the Tiananmen 
Square massacre, and just seven years away from the colony’s imminent transfer of sovereignty 
to the People’s Republic of China, elite residents of the territory began to emigrate en masse, 
securing visas in Canada, Australia, and the United States. The effect of this brain drain 
threatened to be perilous for the Hong Kong economy. In order to stabilize the situation, the 
Thatcher government granted fifty thousand Hong Kong families (the heads of which were 
highly skilled professionals) the right to settle in the UK.186 The government’s goal in creating 
this “Selection Scheme” was not to motivate fifty thousand families to suddenly move to Britain, 
but to give them the peace of mind to stay.187 The remaining British subjects in Hong Kong, as 
                                                        
183 TNA: HO 213/2565, Pym to Certain Missions and Dependent Territories, Telno. 231, 9 December 1982.  
184 TNA: HO 213/2565, C.J. Howells to J.K. Moore, 16 December 1982.  
185 British Nationality (Falkland Islands) Act, 1983, c. 6. See also, Paul, Whitewashing Britain, 185. 
186 Ibid, 186. Fifty-thousand families amounted to an estimated 225,000 people. Ming K. Chan, “Democracy 
Derailed: Realpolitik in the Making of the Hong Kong Basic Law, 1985-90,” in The Hong Kong Basic Law: 
Blueprint for “Stability and Prosperity” under Chinese Sovereignty?, eds. Ming K. Chan and David J. Clark (Hong 
Kong: Hong Kong UP, 1991), 29. 
187 British Nationality (Hong Kong) Act, 1990, c. 34.  
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well as all other Dependent Territory Citizens, were also given the status of “British National 
(Overseas)” in their passports.188  On 1 July 1997, Britain passed Hong Kong back to China. Five 
years later, the Blair government made a further reform to British nationality law, restoring full 
UK citizenship to the now substantially smaller population of the remaining colonies, now 
renamed “British Overseas Territories.”189 
 
Conclusion 
 The Falklands War fired ordinary British people’s interest in the islands and their 
residents. Many became enamored of the plucky community as a South Atlantic utopia. This 
discourse had first found purchase in the late 1960s political environment that had engendered 
Enoch Powell’s “Rivers of Blood” speech. In 1982, the Falklands again became the well-spring 
of “true” Britishness. In the wake of Thatcher’s comments about Britain being “swamped” with 
immigrants, the lobby successfully brought this discourse into mainstream politics—helping to 
win support for the war and encouraging dozens of settlers to relocate to the territory after 1983. 
The Thatcher government’s continued efforts to relegate Falkland Islanders to a second tier of 
British citizenship thus sat in awkward contrast to this rhetoric. And the Islanders’ late 
reincorporation into British citizenship only raised further questions for the residents of other 
British Dependent Territories, for Overseas British Citizens, and for sizable British communities 
in the informal empire, like the Anglo-Argentines. As Denzel Washington’s 1988 portrayal of 
Reuben James shows, the Falklands War engaged key questions of citizenship, race, and 
belonging that would shape the political terrain of Thatcher’s Britain.   
                                                        
188 Paul, Whitewashing Britain, 186. 
189 British Overseas Territories Act, 2002, c. 8, s. 3. 
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CONCLUSION 
 On April 18, 1982, the Sunday Telegraph led with a story about the deepening crisis in 
the South Atlantic. This was not surprising. The frontpages of every edition of the paper since 
the Argentine invasion of April 2 had carried details of the ensuing standoff in all of its 
complexity. The April 18 story, “Gallup: Massive Support for Attack,” confirmed widespread 
public approval for the government’s decision to dispatch the Task Force to the Falklands and to 
apply sanctions against Argentine interests in the UK. The article also reported that a hefty 
majority of Labour Party members—some 62 percent—supported the government’s course of 
action.1 
 Readers may have been somewhat more surprised by the small photo directly adjacent to 
the Falklands lead (see Figure 5.1). It showed Queen Elizabeth II and Pierre Trudeau at a signing 
ceremony on Ottawa’s Parliament Hill to formalize the patriation of Canada’s constitution.2 The 
effect was slightly marred by the torrential downpour and gusty winds that moved rapidly 
through the Canadian capital during the proceedings, drenching the 50,000 spectators that turned 
up to witness history in the making.3 But the dramatic weather made for a lively and memorable 
ceremony. “Mr. Trudeau holds his hair,” the photo’s caption announced, “while two officials
                                                        
1 “Gallup: Massive Support for Attack,” Sunday Telegraph, 18 April 1982. 
2 Untitled photo of Queen Elizabeth and Pierre Trudeau, frontpage, Sunday Telegraph, 18 April 1982. 
3 James Youngblood Henderson, First Nations Jurisprudence, 1. 
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behind the Queen lean over her to hold down the document.”1 Once affixed to the Canada Act, 
1982, the Queen’s signature “[brought] a still divided Canada to full nationhood 115 years after 
the original Act of Confederation,” Ian Ball wrote in the accompanying article.2 Ball’s reference 
to Canada’s continuing divisions was a nod to simultaneous demonstrations by Québécois 
separatists in Montreal and Indigenous peoples in Edmonton.3  
 When readers flipped the page of the Sunday Telegraph, they were treated to descriptions 
of another independence day celebration—this one taking place in southern Africa. That same 
weekend marked two years since the independence of Zimbabwe, and in recognition of the 
milestone, Robert Mugabe had staged a military parade in Rufaro Stadium. Front and center was 
                                                        
1 Caption to untitled photo of Queen Elizabeth and Pierre Trudeau, frontpage, Sunday Telegraph, 18 April 1982. 
2 Ian Ball, “Rain Mars Canada Royal Ceremony,” Sunday Telegraph, 18 April 1982. 
3 Ian Ball, “Queen Ends Canada’s Last Colonial Link,” Daily Telegraph, 19 April  
Figure 5.1 The Sunday Telegraph frontpage from 18 April 1982, showing side-by-side reporting on the Falklands War and 
patriation in Canada.  
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the prime minister’s crack unit of North Korean-trained soldiers—the Fifth Brigade. Its prime 
position in the ceremony was a clear warning to Mugabe’s domestic opponents.4 To cap off the 
weekend’s celebrations, he declared the official rechristening of Zimbabwe’s capital, Salisbury. 
Henceforth, the city would be called Harare. The change was one of seven hundred designed to 
displace reminders of Zimbabwe’s colonial past.5  
 A month later, Thatcher welcomed Mugabe to 10 Downing Street. In her remarks at 
lunch, she noted that his “visit in present circumstances [was] not without a certain irony.” In his 
last visit to London, Mugabe and his fellow Zimbabwean political leaders were working away in 
Lancaster House to bring the war to an end through a negotiated settlement. Calm deliberations 
had prevailed, Thatcher declared. But now Britain was facing another crisis—this time in the 
Falkland Islands. Having greenlighted the landings of British troops at San Carlos Bay that very 
morning, Thatcher knew that there would be no such negotiated settlement in the South 
Atlantic—only war. In closing her speech, she congratulated Mugabe on changing the name of 
Zimbabwe’s capital. Harare “translates as ‘the one who never sleeps,’” Thatcher told the 
delegation. It was an apt description, she added, for the hometown of “a Prime Minister who has 
worked tirelessly to consolidate the independence of his country and improve the quality of life 
of his people.”6 
 This collection of Sunday Telegraph articles, published on the same day and within a 
page of each other, underlines the late imperial conjuncture of the early Thatcher years—both as 
                                                        
4 Christabel King, “Mugabe Pledges Socialism as Korean-Trained Troops Parade,” Sunday Telegraph, 18 April 
1982. 
5 “Change of Name for Salisbury,” Daily Telegraph, 19 April 1982. 
6 Margaret Thatcher, “Speech at lunch for Zimbabwean Prime Minister (Robert Mugabe),” MTF, 19 May 1982, 
http://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104940. 
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a political reality and in how these issues were presented to the public. The three crises played a 
significant role in shaping the political culture of Britain in the early 1980s, a time when nascent 
“Thatcherism” was just beginning to take root. The late imperial threads connecting them were 
self-evident.  
The 1980s were not disconnected from the earlier period of British decolonization, but 
part of longer story. For decades, our understanding of the so-called “end of empire” has been 
shaped by a narrative constructed by the state on the basis of a manipulated archive. In the 
machinations of Operation Legacy, British officials concertedly crafted a new historical reality—
one that ignored the undeniable fact that decolonization was a contested process. Instead, they 
staked Britain’s reputation as an apparently benevolent imperial power on the growth of the 
nation-state, and furtively swept the remaining colonies and the host of related late imperial 
complications under the rug. This pronounced bifurcation between the empire and post-empire 
ultimately entered the historiography and stayed there. Many historians were all too willing to 
buy into this narrative.  
By contrast, this study has argued that historians must carefully reconsider their basic 
analytical frameworks and the way they tell stories about continuity and change. They must 
resist their deeply held inclination for imposing neat periodization on messy historical realities. 
Decolonization was contested and contextual, unfolding according to different trajectories. After 
1968, it was not only located “in the mind,” as the legal, political, and constitutional 
ramifications of the late empire were still being legislated. When did the British Empire end? 
Historians would be wise to embrace the uncertainties and speculation that this question raises, 




Epilogue 1: Zimbabwe 
 When news broke that the top brass of the Zimbabwean armed forces had confined 
Robert Mugabe to house arrest in November 2017, hundreds of exiles converged on Zimbabwe 
House, the nation’s high commission in London, just off the Strand. The gathering soon evolved 
into an impromptu street party. Draped in Zimbabwean flags, the revelers heralded the imminent 
removal of the 93-year-old president by dancing and singing in the street. “We are here to see a 
new Zimbabwe, the rebirth of Zimbabwe,” one of the celebrants, Jackie Luvv, declared. “We are 
calling it our Independence Day.”7 
In his thirty-seven years in power, Mugabe had seen off repeated challenges. From the 
moment he took office, his most credible adversary was his former partner in the struggle against 
Ian Smith—Joshua Nkomo. After April 1980, ZAPU and ZANU militias almost immediately 
engaged in violent campaigns, notably in Nkomo’s hometown of Bulawayo. By 1983, Nkomo 
was forced to flee to neighboring Botswana after being accused of fomenting a coup. Mugabe 
then ordered the Fifth Brigade into Matabeleland, where soldiers committed a string of 
massacres against civilians known collectively as Gukurahundi.8 This fresh quasi-war only came 
to an end in 1987 when ZAPU merged with ZANU. Zimbabwe became a one-party state with a 
constitutionally reformed executive system under the heel of now President Mugabe and his 
ZANU-PF. When Joshua Nkomo agreed to serve as one of Mugabe’s two vice-presidents, the 
remaining threat from ZAPU loyalists was immediately co-opted.9 
                                                        
7 Jackie Luvv, quoted in Ben Weich, “Zimbabwe Coup Latest: Celebrations on the Streets of London over 
‘Independence Day,’” Daily Express, 18 November 2017.  
8 Mlambo, A History of Zimbabwe, 197; See also, James Muzondidya, “From Buoyancy to Crisis, 1980-1987,” in 
Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the Precolonial Period to 2008, ed. Brian Raftopoulous and Alois Mlambo 
(Harare: Weaver Press, 2009), 185; Eliakim M. Sibanda, The Zimbabwe African People’s Union, 1961-87, ch. 7. 
9 Terence M. Mashingaidze, “The 1987 Zimbabwe National Unity Accord and its Aftermath: A Case of Peace 
without Reconciliation?” in From National Liberation to Democratic Renaissance in Southern Africa, eds. Cheryl 
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Bishop Muzorewa fared no better. By 1984, though still serving as an MP in the House of 
Assembly, the Bishop sat in a Harare prison cell. The government charged him with conspiring 
to overthrow Mugabe with the help of a consortium of white Zimbabweans, white South 
Africans, and Israelis.10 After ten months in jail, Muzorewa was released into exile. Some years 
later, he returned to Harare after pledging to stay out of politics—a promise he did not keep. 
Launching a campaign for the presidency in 1996, Muzorewa eventually pulled out of the contest 
after his efforts to have the election delayed were turned down by the Supreme Court. Robert 
Mugabe won over ninety percent of the vote.11  
In the late-1990s, the regime embarked on a campaign of political reform, culminating in 
a referendum on a new constitution, which was ultimately rejected by voters. This process 
spurred the establishment of the multiracial Movement for Democratic Change (MDC), led by 
Morgan Tsvangirai. The referendum campaign, which renewed the government’s long heralded 
promise to provide land for veterans of the Second Chimurenga, emboldened many former 
fighters. By 2000, facing serious economic hardships, these men undertook a violent string of 
land occupations on white farms. With the consent of the Mugabe regime, they attacked white 
                                                        
Hendricks and Lwazi Lushaba (Dakar: Council for the Development of Social Science Research in Africa, 2005), 
88. The constitution was amended in 1987 to give Zimbabwe a presidential system. Mugabe thus served first from 
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History of Zimbabwe, 1890-2000, 350-352. 
10 “Obituary: Bishop Abel Muzorewa,” The Scotsman, 9 April 2010, 
https://www.scotsman.com/news/obituaries/obituary-bishop-abel-muzorewa-1-799030. 
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Thatcher. “Bishop Abel Muzorewa,” Daily Telegraph, 9 April 2010, 
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time, he allegedly accepted the state’s grant of a large farm near his hometown, Mutare, formerly owned by a white 
man named Lodewyk van Rensburg. See, “Obituary: Bishop Abel Muzorewa,” The Scotsman, 9 April 2010. 
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farmers and, within a few years, all but a few hundred families had fled the country.12 In pinning 
the blame for Zimbabwe’s escalating economic crisis on white landowners, Mugabe had finally 
turned his back on the uneasy symbiotic relationship forged with the white community after 
1980.13 Mugabe continued to deflect opposition challenges. After the contested 2008 presidential 
elections, he was forced to accept a power sharing arrangement with the MDC. He would remain 
president, while Tsvangirai took the revived position of prime minister, serving until 2013.14  
For Thatcher, it was not long before the memories of her associations with Robert 
Mugabe became politically awkward. In her memoirs, The Downing Street Years, published in 
1993, Thatcher included a group photo of Commonwealth leaders at a Special Commonwealth 
Conference in London in 1986. Mugabe was conspicuously cropped—half in frame, half beyond 
it (see Figure 5.2). In Thatcher’s estimation, it was an appropriate position for the Zimbabwean 
leader. Zimbabwe was suspended from the Commonwealth in 2002, and Mugabe fully withdrew 
the state from the organization the following year. 
 Thatcher and Mugabe, however, shared one thing in common. Both leaders were ousted 
by their own parties—Thatcher by Tory MPs in November 1990 and Mugabe by one of his two 
vice-presidents in November 2017. Mugabe’s final undoing was his attempts to anoint his second 
wife as his successor. Forty years his junior, Grace Mugabe had slowly amassed power in 
ZANU-PF, becoming leader of the women’s wing in 2014 and later a member of the party’s 
Politburo. Her extravagant lifestyle courted scandal in other ways. In August 2017, for example, 
                                                        
12 See Brian Raftopoulous, “The Crisis in Zimbabwe, 1998-2008,” in Becoming Zimbabwe: A History from the 
Precolonial Period to 2008, eds. Brian Raftopoulous and Alois Mlambo (Harare: Weaver Press, 2009), 211-219.  
13 See Cooper, Africa Since 1940, 138. 
14 Zvobgo, A History of Zimbabwe, 350-352. 
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she fled South Africa after allegedly assaulting model Gabriella Engels with an electric extension 
cord in a Johannesburg hotel room. South African prosecutors later issued a warrant for her 
arrest.15 
All of this contributed to Robert Mugabe’s loss of legitimacy. Once he was ousted from 
power by the military, Vice-President Emmerson Mnangagwa took control. Meanwhile, the 
opposition MDC had languished after Morgan Tsvangirai was diagnosed with colon cancer in 
                                                        
15 “Grace Mugabe faces South Africa arrest warrant,” BBC News, 19 December 2018. 
Figure 5.2 Margaret Thatcher with seven prominent Commonwealth leaders at the Special Commonwealth Conference in 
London in August 1986—a photo featured in her autobiography, The Downing Street Years. Robert Mugabe (top row, far right) 
was very nearly cropped out. Margaret Thatcher, The Downing Street Years (New York: Harper Collins, 1993), third photo 
insert, unnumbered page 6. 
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2013. He died in February 2018.16 In the wake of the nearly four decades of violence and 
economic deprivation under Mugabe, one wonders whether we have witnessed the “rebirth of 
Zimbabwe” under Mnangagwa (as Jackie Luvv declared happily outside Zimbabwe House in 
London) or whether the struggle against state oppression will continue under different terms. 
 
Epilogue 2: Indigenous Canada 
At the downtown Vancouver headquarters of the Union of British Columbia Indian 
Chiefs in September 2016, Grand Chief Stewart Phillip faced a bank of news cameras. He had 
called a press conference to discuss the ongoing visit to British Columbia by Prince William and 
Kate, the Duke and Duchess of Cambridge. The provincial tour had been conducted to huge 
fanfare. The winsome couple and their two photogenic children had flown into Vancouver on a 
float plane that landed on the scenic harbor, and their ensuing program was highly 
choreographed.  
Many of their activities involved Indigenous peoples—interactions that, for the Royals, 
involved taking in some hard truths. On a visit to unceded Haida and Tlingit land on Haida 
Gwaii (formerly the Queen Charlotte Islands), the Royal couple came face-to-face with what one 
journalist described as “the ugly legacy of British colonialism”—poverty, environmental 
destruction, and a legion of missing and murdered Indigenous women.17 At the same time, they 
also saw Indigenous nations in action, working for social, economic, and environmental justice. 
                                                        
16 Stephan Chan, “Morgan Tsvangirai Obituary,” Guardian, 14 February 2018, 
https://www.theguardian.com/world/2018/feb/14/morgan-tsvangirai-obituary.  
17 Nancy Macdonald, “Royal visit 2016: Will and Kate on the grittiest tour ever,” Maclean’s, 29 September 2016, 
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While in 1982, the Constitution Express had gone to London to see the Queen, in 2016, William 
and Kate traveled to unceded land to meet Indigenous peoples on their terms (see Figure 5.3.) 
Grand Chief Phillip’s press conference centered upon one of the final engagements in 
Prince William’s diary. In a deeply symbolic display at Government House in Victoria, he and 
William were to take part in a ceremony of reconciliation. Phillip was to pass a silver ring 
representing Indigenous peoples to the prince, who would then place it on the Black Rod—a staff 
symbolizing the crown’s sovereign authority in the provincial legislature. The Black Rod was 
already affixed with three silver rings to represent the crown, the federal government, and the 
province; the addition of the fourth ring was meant to right a symbolic wrong. But on the day of 
the ceremony, Phillip backed out, citing a vote taken by UBCIC chiefs against his participation. 
In his announcement, he noted a string of broken federal and provincial promises, from failed 
efforts to tackle poverty and child welfare issues to Trudeau the Younger’s firm support for the 
construction of the Kinder Morgan pipeline.18  
After patriation, Section 35 of the Constitution Act had recognized “existing” aboriginal 
and treaty rights. It had formally defined aboriginal peoples as Indians, Inuit, and Métis. But 
because Section 35’s language was vague, merely recognizing and not defining aboriginal rights, 
legal minds debated the extent to which it constituted an “empty box” or a “box of treasures.” 
Federal lawyers subscribed to the “empty box” theory, arguing that the government was 
responsible for imparting legal meaning upon Section 35. In contrast, Indigenous peoples argued 
that the section had delivered them a full box of rights as “existing” in the Royal Proclamation, 
                                                        
18 Mike Laanela, “B.C.'s Grand Chief Stewart Phillip Won't Attend Royal Ceremony with Prince William,” CBC, 26 
September 2016, https://www.cbc.ca/news/canada/british-columbia/royal-visit-black-rod-stewart-phillip-1.3778997. 
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the Treaty of Niagara, and subsequent bilateral treaties.19 Ensuing constitutional reform 
proposals, including the failed Meech Lake and Charlottetown Accords, were unable to pass a 
clarified definition of aboriginal rights into law.  
Over the next twenty years, this burden fell to the courts, which increasingly supported 
Indigenous conceptions of Section 35. In its most important legal decision, the Supreme Court of 
Canada decided in Delgamuukw v British Columbia (1997) that aboriginal title on unceded land 
was one of the existing rights codified by Section 35.20 But victories in the courtroom did not 
offer a panacea for the remaining political, economic, and social inequalities of the settler 
colonial state.  
                                                        
19 Walkem and Bruce, eds., Box of Treasures or Empty Box? 
20 Russell, Canada’s Odyssey, 435. 
Figure 5.3 William and Kate on Haida Gwaii, September 2016. “Canoeing, Fishing Planned As Royal Tour Heads To Coastal 
Islands Of Haida Gwaii,” Darpan Magazine, 30 September 2016. 
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As William and Kate toured the province, the Indigenous struggle against colonialism 
remained active and robust, especially in the contexts of political representation, land rights, 
wealth distribution, and gender equality.21 While the provincial government quickly mobilized 
other, more agreeable Indigenous representatives to act as stand-ins at the reconciliation 
ceremony, Grand Chief Phillip apologized for causing any inconvenience to the prince. The 
Royal couple had merely found themselves caught between Victoria, Ottawa, and the UBCIC, 
representing over half of British Columbia’s Indigenous nations. “We mean no disrespect,” 
Phillip wrote in an official statement.22 But in a further interview, he added that “our people on 
the ground. . .in the midst of dealing with these tragedies on a daily basis will appreciate us 
standing up. . .and not blindly participating in yet another grandiose pomp and ceremony that 
would create the illusion that things in our communities are progressing forward.”23 In this 
context, such a pro forma reconciliation ceremony would be inappropriate, he added.  
 
Epilogue 3: The Falkland Islands 
In June 2007, exactly twenty-five years after the Argentine surrender at Port Stanley, 
Queen Elizabeth, Prime Minister Tony Blair, and a host of dignitaries joined a visibly frail 
Margaret Thatcher at the Falkland Islands Memorial Chapel. The chapel sits on the campus of 
Pangbourne College, a boarding school with a former naval affiliation in the village of 
                                                        
21 See Manuel and Derrickson, Unsettling Canada; Coulthard, Red Skin, White Masks; Simpson, Mohawk 
Interruptus.  
22 Grand Chief Stewart Phillip, quoted in Union of BC Indian Chiefs press release, “Reconciliation Must Be More 
than Symbolic: Grand Chief Stewart Phillip Declines Invitation to Participate in Ceremony with Duke and Duchess 
of Cambridge,” 26 September 2016, https://www.ubcic.bc.ca/royalreconciliation. 
23 Phillip, quoted in “Royal Visit 2016: BC Indian Chiefs Snub Black Rod Reconciliation Event,” Global News, 26 
September 2016, https://globalnews.ca/news/2964357/royal-visit-2016-bc-indian-chiefs-snub-reconciliation-event/. 
 260 
Pangbourne—just west of Reading. At the time, it was the nation’s only significant monument 
commemorating the Falklands War.24  
In the intervening years, British governments of all parties had staunchly defended 
“Fortress Falklands,” refusing to discuss sovereignty with Argentina. In response, the territory 
had flourished. In 1986, after years of lobbying by local officials, the Thatcher government had 
declared an Exclusive Fishing Zone (EFZ) for two hundred nautical miles around the islands, 
allowing Stanley to collect licensing fees from trawlers fishing in its territorial waters. By 1988, 
the commercial fishing industry had created an economic boom in the territory, replacing sheep 
as the mainstay. The Falklands’ gross national product for 1987 stood at £9.89 million; just one 
year later, on the back of commercial fishing alone, it jumped to £30.7 million. This staggering 
increase of revenue occasioned a fifty percent tax cut for all residents.25 With the substantial 
budgetary surplus, the local government earmarked funds for investments in housing, 
infrastructure, and public amenities, including an indoor pool in Stanley.26 Such was the success 
story of the islands that, according to the Times, Falklanders took to predicting who would be the 
territory’s first millionaire.27  
Though too ill to speak publicly by 2007, Thatcher was likely pleased with the chapel in 
Pangbourne. As a space, it sought to underline the affinities between Britain and the Falkland 
Islands—from its boat-like exterior, meant to evoke the sea, to its stain-glass windows of 
Falklands scenery. But the chapel’s carefully maintained grounds made the most explicit attempt 
                                                        
24 Mark Tran, “Queen Attends Service to Mark Falklands Anniversary,” Guardian, 14 June 2007, 
http://www.theguardian.com/uk/2007/jun/14/falklands.world. 
25 Michael Evans, “A Dream Takes Shape as the Falklands Get Rich,” Times (UK), 25 May 1988. 
26 “Budget Summary,” Penguin News, no. 112, 8 July 1988. 
27 Evans, “A dream takes shape as the Falklands get rich.”  
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to link Britain and the islands. In a commemorative garden, designed as a place for reflection, 
landscape designers planted a series of peat mounds, reminiscent of the boggy terrain of the 
South Atlantic (see Figure 5.4). They sank a circular recessed seating area into the center of these 
mounds. At the head of the space, a waterfall flows over a black granite map of the Falklands 
and into a pool. Grasses, similar to the native flora of the islands, loom overhead. Boulders rim 
the edges of the mounds. Though not from the islands themselves, the designers painstakingly 
sourced their geomorphology, finding similar stones in a particularly remote area of the Scottish 
Highlands (see Figure 5.5).28  
                                                        
28 Anthony Hudson, Just to See His Name (Reading: Falkland Islands Memorial Chapel Trust, 2002), 67. My thanks 
to Mr. Robin Brodhurst, head of History at Pangbourne College, for giving me a tour of the chapel and grounds in 
May 2012.  
Figure 5.4 The Falklands Islands Memorial Chapel at Pangbourne College, with the memorial garden in the 
foreground. http://www.falklands-chapel.org.uk/.  
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In the haze of victory, Thatcher had famously declared to a Conservative Party rally at the 
Cheltenham Racecourse that Britain had “found a newfound confidence—born in the economic 
battles at home and tested and found true 8,000 miles away.” Britain “had found herself in the 
South Atlantic.”29 Now the South Atlantic found itself on a boarding school campus in the leafy 
Berkshire countryside—where rolling green hills merged into freshly clipped tennis lawns. 
Architecture and landscape design collapsed the Atlantic gap, superimposing Britain and the 
islands. Commemorating their fallen comrades, Falklands veterans were said to have invoked the 
war poet Rupert Brooke. The graves of soldiers in the Falklands, they declared, would always be 
                                                        
29 Thatcher, “Speech to Conservative Rally at Cheltenham,” 3 July 1982, MTF, 
https://www.margaretthatcher.org/document/104989. 
Figure 5.5 Peat mounds with plants indigenous to the Falklands and specially-sourced boulders surround a recessed seating area. 
Howard M.R. Williams, “Commemorating the Falkland Islands – Commemorating the Falklands Conflict,” Archaeodeath blog, 
https://howardwilliamsblog.wordpress.com/. 
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“a corner that is forever England.”30 Similar sentiments guided the construction of the chapel in 
Pangbourne—in effect, to unite metropole and periphery together in one space; to create a small 
corner of the Falklands (as imagined) in Britain.  
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